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‘Sometimes, it’s not enough 
just to change laws. You’ve 
got to change hearts.’ 
And sports has a way, 
sometimes, of changing 
hearts in a way that politics 
or business doesn’t.’
Barack OBAMA
(44th President of the United States) 
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Foreword
Professor Margareta Baddeley recently 
retired from her full-time professorship 
at Geneva University School of Law and 
ceased teaching within the frame of 
AISTS programmes. She was part of the 
pioneering team who had the challenging 
idea of bringing to life and developing 
from scratch an international Master of 
Advanced Studies in the field of Sport 
Administration under the aegis of AISTS 
back in 20031. The multidisciplinary 
programme grew up quickly in size and 
quality and is nowadays classified the 
best masters in the world in its field2. 
Margareta ensured, through both her 
teaching and numerous publications, the 
steady growth of the programme’s fame 
in relation to legal concepts taught to a 
public comprising mostly non-lawyers. 
1 Among the initial team were also Jean-Loup 
Chappelet, Gérald Gremion,Daniel Oyon, Francis-
Luc Perret, Laurent Rivier and Claude Stricker
2 EdUniversal Best Masters Ranking Sport 
Management 2015 - 2016
This book contains articles written by 
both members of the AISTS Scientific 
Committee as well as former participants 
of the AISTS Master in Advanced Studies 
of Sport Administration. It serves the 
purpose of warmly thanking Margareta 
for her countless investment in the 
long term and as a humble gesture of 
gratitude. 
The topic that naturally came as “fil 
rouge” among the following articles is 
governance. Governance in sport is 
defined as “The framework and culture 
within which a sports body sets policy, 
delivers its strategic objectives, engages 
with stakeholders, monitors performance, 
evaluates and manages risk and reports 
to its constituents on its activities and 
progress including the delivery of 
effective, sustainable and proportionate 
sports policy and regulation.”3 
The current governance challenges in 
sport cannot be resolved in isolation 
and the need for good governance 
in sport is more urgent than ever as 
information floods and public scrutiny 
of organisations’ behaviour continue 
to intensify. Governance is therefore a 
multidisciplinary topic that, when taught 
to the (future leaders of) the sports 
industry, should be viewed from different 
angles. Better governance in sport goes 
beyond regulations, guidelines and laws. 
It requires a change in the ethics and 
attitude of all actors involved, or as former 
US President Obama said during his last 
event at the White House: 
“Sometimes, it’s not enough to change 
laws. You’ve got the change the hearts”.
3 EU’s Expert Group on Good Governance, 
Principles of Good Governance, 2013
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Responsibility in the 
Regulation of International 
Sport
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Switzerland’s Responsibility in the Regulation of International Sport
‘Good governance never 
depends upon laws, but 
upon the personal qualities 
of those who govern’
Frank HERBERT
(American author)
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Sport in Switzerland 
Competitive sport, professional sport, 
elite sport, grassroots sport, leisure sport, 
physical activity and physical education 
all grew massively during the 20th 
Century. In Switzerland, for example, 74% 
of the population now claim to do some 
form of sport or physical activity (Sport 
2014 survey). Consequently, sport is 
now a major socio-cultural phenomenon 
in most of the world’s countries and 
has taken on great economic and 
political importance. It can even impact 
international relations, as was shown by 
the ping-pong diplomacy of the 1970s, 
the boycott of the Moscow Olympics 
in 1980, the emergence of the BRIC 
countries in the international system, 
and the effect of the 2015 FIFA scandal 
on Switzerland’s reputation. Many 
stakeholders have contributed to the rise 
in sport’s popularity, including nation-
states, intergovernmental organisations, 
NGOs, the media, sponsors, private 
organisations such as fitness centres and 
sports goods manufacturers, and, very 
importantly, sports federations and clubs.
Around 60 international and European 
sports federations are based in 
Switzerland, having followed in the 
footsteps of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), which moved its 
headquarters to Lausanne in 1915. In 
fact, the IOC is both the custodian of the 
Olympic Games, which, despite recent 
criticisms, remains a unique symbol of 
peaceful international cooperation and 
coexistence, and the de-facto head of 
a system for overseeing world sport 
that dates back to the Belle-Époque. 
The numerous organisations within this 
system that are based in Switzerland are 
subject to Swiss law, in particular articles 
60 and subsequent articles of the Swiss 
Civil Code (governing associations). 
Over the last two decades, however, a 
seemingly endless succession of crises 
has rocked this system to its core. These 
crises, many of which were triggered 
by scandals relating to the choice 
of hosts for major events controlled 
by international sport organisations, 
especially world championships and the 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games, 
are frequently attributed to failures of 
governance.
Regulating Sport in 
Switzerland
As a 2012 report to the Federal Council 
pointed out, whatever the facts of 
the matter, cases of corruption and 
abuses of human rights associated 
with international sport organisations 
and events reflect extremely badly on 
Switzerland. What is Switzerland doing 
to avoid this criticism and damage to its 
reputation? What more could it do? And, 
most importantly, how can the country 
help resolve these problems and improve 
the regulation of international sport? 
Until now, international sport has been 
self-regulating and has fiercely defended 
the principle of “sport autonomy”. Today, 
the limitations of this sport autonomy are 
increasingly apparent with respect to a 
wide range of issues that are damaging 
the integrity of sport, including: doping, 
match-fixing and hooliganism, as well as 
corruption by sport’s administrators.
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Since 1970, when an article referring 
directly to sport was added to 
Switzerland’s constitution, the Federal 
Council has taken numerous actions 
to address issues arising in the world 
of sport. The most significant of these 
actions are listed below (in chronological 
order):
• 1981: approval of a federal order 
recognising the IOC’s “specific 
character as an international 
institution”. In 2000, this federal order 
was turned into an agreement between 
the Swiss federal government and the 
IOC, confirming the IOC’s exemption 
from income tax and its right to recruit 
an unlimited number of foreign staff 
with no restrictions on their nationality.
• 1989: ratification of the European 
Convention on Violence and 
Misbehaviour by Spectators at Sports 
Events (Council of Europe).
• 2000: addition of a new article (article 
11) to the 1972 federal law on sport, 
making trafficking doping products (but 
not their use) a penal offence (under 
the jurisdiction of the cantons).
• 2005: amendment to the Civil Code 
(article 69b) making it mandatory 
for associations of a certain size 
to have their accounts audited by 
external auditors. The law applies to 
associations that meet at least two 
of the following criteria: total assets 
of at least CHF10 million, turnover of 
at least CHF20 million, and average 
annual staffing level of more than 50 
employees.
• 2005: ratification of the UNESCO 
International Convention against 
Doping in Sport. This convention 
superseded a similar convention drawn 
up by the Council of Europe, which 
Switzerland had ratified in 1989. It led 
to the creation in 2008 of Antidoping 
Suisse, the Swiss national anti-doping 
organisation.
• 2011: introduction of a new federal 
law (which came into effect in 2012) to 
encourage sport and physical activity. 
Chapter 5 of the law is entitled “Ethics 
and Safety”.
• 2014: revision to the law on money 
laundering (article 2c) in order to add 
international sport’s most senior 
executives to the list of “politically 
exposed persons” (PPE). As a result, 
banks now have to monitor these 
executives’ bank accounts.
• 2015: revision of the Criminal Code 
(articles 322.8 and 322.9 CP) to allow 
cases of serious private corruption to 
be prosecuted without charges being 
brought by one of the parties. This is 
in addition to existing articles covering: 
fraud (article 138 CP), criminal 
mismanagement (article 158 CP), 
and money laundering (article 305bis 
CP) that have already been used to 
bring cases against sport executives. 
Moreover, article 102.2 CP allows 
criminal proceedings to be brought 
against organisations that do not take 
all necessary measures to combat 
private corruption. Switzerland has also 
ratified the UN’s, OECD’s and Council 
of Europe’s conventions on active and 
passive corruption.
• 2014: signature of (and intention 
to ratify) the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Manipulation of 
Sports Competitions in Maggligen/
Macolin.
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• 2016-17: revision of the law on 
gambling (as proposed by the Federal 
Council in 2015) in order to make 
match-fixing a criminal offence and to 
compel sports organisations to pass 
on to the authorities any information 
they may have concerning the 
manipulation of competitions in their 
sport (articles 63.2 and 63.3).
• 2016: parliamentary discussion 
of MP Cédric Wermuth’s request 
that the Federal Council prepare 
a parliamentary report on the 
consequences “of modifying the 
legal form of major international sport 
federations or of creating a specific 
status for them” (following the 2015 
FIFA scandal).
• A law to protect whistleblowers is due 
to be presented to parliament in 2017.
• Following the acceptance of a popular 
initiative in April 2016, a referendum on 
Swiss multinational companies’ duty 
of care with respect to human rights, 
inspired by United Nations guidelines, 
will take place in 2018 or 2019.
Future Considerations
As host to numerous international 
sports organisations, Switzerland could 
take several further measures, either 
by modifying national laws or through 
intergovernmental conventions. Such 
measures could include:
Audit Mechanism
Setting up a voluntary, independent audit 
mechanism that international sports 
organisations could use to audit their 
activities, especially their finances and the 
redistribution of funds to their members. 
This mechanism could be based on:
1) National public auditors, such as 
the Swiss Federal Audit Office, 
which already audits international 
organisations such as the WIPO and 
WHO, or 
2) An independent internal body, such 
as the World Bank Inspection Panel 
(WBIP), which audits some World 
Bank projects, or 
3) A specific body, such as the World 
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
or the ZEWO Foundation, which 
monitors and certifies charities.
International Convention
Drafting and tabling an international 
convention to prevent misconduct and 
promote “Sustainable, Addiction-free, 
Fair and Ethical (SAFE)” sport. In a similar 
way that the Geneva Conventions gave 
birth to international humanitarian law, 
this convention (which could be entitled 
the “Lausanne Convention”) could bring 
together existing conventions covering 
sport, in order to create an international 
law for sport. It could also award the 
IOC a similar status to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (a non-profit 
association under Swiss law), thereby 
giving it a legal mandate to regulate 
international sport and ensure that sports 
events respect human rights and the 
environment.
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‘Corporate governance is 
about intellectual honesty 
and not just sticking to rules 
and regulations.’
Mervyn KING 
(British Economist)
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Abstract 
The IOC and FIFA have grown 
considerably over the past 30 years 
and have reached a global dimension. 
These organisations, legally formed as 
associations, have not always evolved 
their organisational structures and 
governance systems accordingly. For a 
long time, the IOC and FIFA have applied 
a basic sports rule: never change a 
winning team. The financial scandals, 
however, have reminded us of the realities 
of organisational development, requiring 
the establishment of organisational 
structures adapted to address the new 
demands of sports. This article attempts 
to highlight some of the characteristics of 
these large, not-for-profit organisations 
that are still neglected by governance 
research.
Introduction
In an increasingly competitive 
environment, corporate governance 
has become a fundamental topic. 
Strategic and operational errors, such 
as the Volkswagen fraud, the Fukushima 
accident or the manipulation of financial 
statements by Lehmann Brothers, can 
cause considerable economic, social 
and environmental damage. They can 
also enable executives, customers, 
competitors, suppliers and other partners 
to exploit the situation to their advantage 
and gain an undue access to a source 
of value on an occasional or permanent 
basis. Organisations must put in place 
governance mechanisms enabling 
them both to discover and exploit the 
opportunities that arise and to manage 
the major risks.
Over the last 30 years, corporate 
governance has thus become a 
dominant field of research explored by 
many academic disciplines. To date, the 
main emphasis has been on for-profit 
organisations and, more particularly, 
on those listed on the stock exchange, 
partly because of the stakes involved 
but also because of the separation 
between ownership and control. When 
owners and managers are different 
people agency costs arise due to the 
potential misalignment of interests 
between shareholders (principals) and 
officers (agents). To date, results from 
research have developed the state of 
knowledge and contributed to improve 
the governance of organisations, as well 
as managerial practices.
For various reasons, the governance 
of other forms of organisations such 
as family businesses, non-profit 
organisations, governmental and 
non-governmental entities, has not yet 
attracted the attention they deserve. 
Recent scandals involving the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) and the International Association 
of Athletics Federation (IAAF) have, 
however, aroused interest in this type 
of organisation and demonstrate the 
importance of governance to the survival 
and prosperity of the organisation. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine 
the specific governance context of 
international sports federations.
Corporate Governance
Larcker and Tayan (2015: 7) defines 
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corporate governance as “the 
collection of control mechanisms that 
an organisation adopts in order to 
prevent or dissuade potentially self-
interested managers from engaging in 
activities detrimental to the welfare of 
shareholders and stakeholders”. This 
set of mechanisms forms the system of 
governance represented in Appendix 
I. In its most basic form, corporate 
governance relies primarily on the actions 
of a board of directors in charge of 
supervising executives and on auditors 
who must attest to the reliability of the 
financial statements. In a more elaborated 
version, shareholders, creditors, unions, 
customers, analysts, the media, and 
regulators can play a very important role 
in the governance of organisations.
From an economic point of view, 
the key idea behind the choice of 
governance mechanisms is that the 
costs of implementing these mechanisms 
will be offset by lower agency costs, 
in other words, better alignment of 
the behaviour of managers with the 
interests of shareholders. Empirical 
research in publicly listed firms has 
shown a strong relationship between 
the quality of governance and economic 
returns. The governance structure for 
non-profit organisations has received 
less attention and the optimum is so 
far based on extrapolating research in 
for-profit organisations. The choice of 
governance mechanisms thus requires 
a good managerial appreciation in order 
to put in place the appropriate corporate 
governance system.
According to Larcker and Tayan (2015), 
the structure of the governance system 
also depends on the orientation of the 
organisation and its role in society. In a 
market economy based on the allocation 
of capital to the most profitable sources 
of value, the governance system of a for-
profit organisation is to align the interests 
of the managers with the interests of 
the shareholders and maximize their 
wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a 
result, a non-profit organisation will have 
a governance system that is structured 
differently. It follows that a single, generic 
system cannot satisfy all types of 
organisation: ‘one size does not fit all’.
As can be seen in Exhibit 1, external 
factors related to the environment 
of organisations also influence the 
architecture and effectiveness of the 
governance system. The efficiency of 
capital markets, the legal tradition, the 
regulatory enforcement that enhances 
the application of law, the reliability of 
accounting standards, and the societal 
and cultural values play a fundamental 
role on influencing the behaviour of 
managers. These factors function as 
external governance mechanisms and 
complement the mechanisms that 
companies must or can implement.
Putting in place the right combination 
of internal governance mechanisms 
that complement those of the corporate 
environment is not the only challenge that 
organisations face. Good governance 
also requires respect for basic operating 
conditions such as the independence of 
key governance actors such as: auditors, 
analysts, rating agencies, regulators, legal 
bodies, and governments. Independence 
is often the cornerstone of any system of 
governance.
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International sports federations such as 
the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), the Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) and the 
Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA) are special organisations in many 
respects, making their governance 
difficult. They are characterised, in 
particular, by a lack of owners, a broad 
mission with hard-to-measure objectives, 
a legal status that might not be optimal 
anymore given their increasing economic 
and social importance, a composition 
of their governance bodies that need to 
be responsive to the new demands, a 
dominant position in their field, and an 
extreme internationalisation of their field 
of activity and structures. (Van Puyvelde 
et al., 2012).
The Absence of 
Owners
The IOC and FIFA are characterised by 
the fact that these institutions do not 
belong to anyone: they are not-for-profit 
associations of individuals and entities 
created to promote one or more sport 
disciplines through the organisation of 
international competitions. For the IOC 
and FIFA, the flagship competitions are, 
respectively, the Olympic Games and the 
World Cup of Football, which take place 
every four years.
The members of these associations do 
not hold ownership rights but, instead, 
social rights allowing them to influence 
the strategy and the organisational 
structure of these associations. From the 
governance perspective, the absence 
of owners is not without effect and 
complicates the situation. One of the 
consequences of this is that it does 
not have a supreme body composed 
of representatives concerned with 
maintaining the financial value of 
the organisation. Property generally 
produces favourable effects on the 
management of tangible or intangible 
assets. Men and women pay special 
attention to what they have; they 
usually make good use of the goods 
they own or want to positively develop 
the organisation in which they have 
ownership rights. The fact that the IOC, 
FIFA or UEFA do not have owners does 
not create the same pressure from 
the supreme body (principal) over the 
executives (agent).
The supreme body of the IOC is the 
Session of the members. Consisting 
of 115 people, it brings together 45 
representatives of active athletes, 
international federations and national 
Olympic committees and 70 co-opted 
personalities. Due to the importance 
of the IOC in the world, becoming a 
member of the IOC is a highly sought-
after function. The members are all aware 
of their privileges and this accentuates 
the sense of responsibility. Being among 
the very narrow circle of the IOC’s 115 
members is a unique honour, forcing 
every member to be deeply concerned 
about the future of such an institution. No 
IOC member, however, holds a share of 
the IOC, as it actually does not belong to 
anybody.
FIFA is in a similar situation. The 
Congress is the supreme body of the 
association and brings together the 
209 delegates of the national football 
24
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federations recognised by FIFA. 
Undoubtedly, the delegates feel very 
honoured with such a function and the 
future of FIFA certainly is close to their 
hearts, especially those from small 
national federations heavily dependent 
on the revenues distributed by FIFA. No 
delegate, however, has this ownership 
relationship conferred by possession. As 
a result, both the IOC and FIFA cannot 
rely on a governance structure arising 
from ownership of the principal (owners) 
to ensure that the agent (officers) takes 
great care of the institution he has charge 
of.
A Broad Mission with 
Hard to Measure 
Objectives
For international sports federations legally 
formed as not-for-profit associations, 
good governance is not about 
maximising a measurable objective 
such as financial results, but of fulfilling 
a broad mission while respecting certain 
constraints and diverse expectations 
from its members.
According to the August 2, 2016 version 
of the Olympic Charter (IOC, 2015), 
the mission of the IOC is to promote 
Olympism throughout the world and to 
lead the Olympic movement. The Charter 
also specifies in the form of 16 points 
the role of the IOC (Appendix II). Like the 
IOC, the objectives of FIFA (FIFA, 2016) 
are also multiple and cover a wide range 
of activities aimed at the development 
and promotion of football worldwide 
(Appendix III).
A mission that is hard to translate into 
specific and measurable objectives 
makes the delegation of the mission by 
the principal (members) to the agent 
(executives) extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. This is particularly the case 
when the elements of the mission leave 
a large margin of interpretation and may 
appear to be contradictory. The lack of 
precision and ambiguities of the mission 
sometimes lead to a reversal of control 
where the agent (executives) takes 
power over the principal (members). In 
the case of FIFA, it is undeniable that 
President Sepp Blatter had succeeded 
over time in gaining control over a large 
part of the delegates of small national 
football federations by granting them 
significant, and continually increasing, 
financial contributions. In such a situation, 
some members of Congress lost their 
independence vis-à-vis President Blatter 
and were no longer able to exercise 
their oversight role. In addition, the 
extraordinary development of revenues 
from the sale of television rights for the 
Football World Cup and sponsorship, 
allowed President Blatter to propose 
generous redistributions to national 
federations and broad support for many 
development programmes. Under his 
presidency, between 1998 and 2015, 
FIFA’s revenues increased from CHF 
332 million for the 1995-1998 period to 
CHF 5’718 million for 2011 to 2014. FIFA’s 
equity increased also from CHF 94 million 
in 2003 to over CHF 1’340 million in 2015 
(FIFA, 2013;2015). With such financial 
results, no one could say that FIFA was 
not fulfilling its mission and President 
Blatter easily secured his re-election 
despite the potential existence of many 
governance problems.
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The Legal Form of 
International Sports 
Federations
The legal form of international sport 
federations organised as an association 
under Swiss law also leaves a great deal 
of freedom in terms of governance. The 
general assembly of the members is the 
main supervisory body of executives. 
Except for the keeping of financial 
accounts and their auditing, Articles 
60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code do 
not impose any specific governance 
mechanism to associations and let them 
define their organisational arrangements 
in their statutes and internal operating 
directives.
Basically, an association is not subject 
to either the Swiss Code of Best 
Practice of Corporate Governance 
issued by EconomieSuisse in 2002 (see 
EconomieSuisse, 2016) or to the 21 
ZEWO norms applicable to non-profit 
organisations (see Zewo, 2016). It may 
voluntarily adopt such a framework. 
On the basis of the articles of the 
Swiss Civil Code, an association is 
not subject to very demanding rules 
concerning: disclosure of financial and 
governance information to members 
and other stakeholders, the composition 
of governing bodies, relations between 
legislative and executive bodies, 
independence of members, rules 
governing the functioning of the 
various bodies, conflicts of interest, 
risk management and internal control 
systems, setting up committees with 
specific tasks (e.g. audit, recruitment and 
remuneration), auditing and adoption of 
an accounting framework.
In such a liberal context, associations 
tend to adopt minimum rules of 
governance giving maximum freedom to 
the governing bodies, often encouraging 
the reversal of control between the 
principal and the agent. Both the IOC and 
FIFA have not been zealous in this regard 
and have long been limited to a system 
of elementary governance which does 
not facilitate the exercise of high-level 
oversight by the members of the Session 
and the Congress.
To date, neither the IOC nor FIFA 
have officially recognised the Swiss 
governance frameworks (Swiss Code of 
Best Practice of Corporate Governance, 
the SWX Directive on Information 
Relating to Corporate Governance or 
the 21 ZEWO norms) or International 
frameworks such as those established 
by the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2006)
or the OECD (2015). For a long time, 
the sport and financial success of the 
Olympic Games and of the Football 
World Cup spoke favourably of their 
leaders. It was only after crises that the 
IOC and FIFA changed their governance 
systems and put in place more advanced 
organisational arrangements. In 2008, 
however, the IOC introduced universal 
principles of good governance that it 
strives to implement and constantly 
evolve. While at FIFA, it is only since 
2011 that the annual report mentions 
governance issues, which are gradually 
leading to organisational reforms.
In terms of financial accounting and 
disclosure of financial information, the 
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situation can be considered satisfactory. 
Since 2000, the IOC has prepared 
its financial statements based on 
International Accounting Standards 
(IAS / IFRS). FIFA has done the same 
since 2003. The financial statements 
of the IOC and FIFA thus offer a true 
and fair view of the economic situation 
of both associations. At FIFA, however, 
financial allocations to associations 
and confederations via the Financial 
Assistance Programme and the Goal 
programme are not detailed in the 
annual report, although FIFA requires the 
audited accounts of associations and 
confederations. It is, therefore, difficult to 
ensure that the allocated funds are used 
correctly. More transparency would also 
help to avoid the pitfalls of the past.
The Composition 
of the Members of 
the Supreme Body - 
Session and Congress
The composition of the supreme bodies 
of the IOC and FIFA, respectively, the 
Session and the Congress, does not 
facilitate good governance because 
of the heterogeneous interests of the 
members. These members are not united 
behind a common objective, as they 
are generally in a for-profit enterprise 
where the vast majority of shareholders 
are interested in getting a good financial 
return on their investment.
At FIFA, the football association of each 
country recognised by the continental 
federations is represented in the 
Congress, has a seat and appoints its 
delegate. Obviously, the 209 members 
of the Congress, bringing together 
delegates from major football countries 
such as England, Germany, Spain, Italy 
and France, and delegates from tiny 
nations such as the islands of Cook or 
Vanuatu, do not have the same interests. 
The great nations are campaigning for 
the organisation of the World Cup and 
for a high redistribution of money to the 
nations participating in the final phase 
of the competition, while small countries 
are seeking maximum subsidies to 
finance their association and develop 
their basic sport infrastructure. The 
allocation of one seat per nation to the 
Congress and consequently of one vote 
divides the power of the Congress for the 
benefit of the Presidency. Moreover, the 
redistribution of funds further strengthens 
the power of the Presidency, creating 
a strong financial dependency of small 
associations on FIFA. For small countries, 
the base amount of CHF 250,000 
distributed annually by FIFA to each 
association via its financial assistance 
programme, represents a substantial 
amount and makes them fully vested 
in the cause of the FIFA presidency in 
charge of generating revenue for FIFA.
At the IOC, the situation is not exactly 
the same because a part of the Session 
(70 out of 115 members) is formed by 
co-opting members to represent the 
IOC. The criteria of recruitment are 
not explicit and there are among its 
members both representatives of the 
nobility like S.A.S Princess Nora of 
Liechtenstein, or former athletes like 
Guy Drut. Obviously, the members of 
these supreme bodies do not have the 
same interests and do not have the 
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same degree of independence towards 
the IOC Presidency. Indeed, some IOC 
members represent only themselves and 
their actions are oriented towards the 
maintenance of their personal benefits. 
Others have broader interests such as 
the spread of a sport practice on the 
planet or in their respective countries, 
the organisation of large-scale sport 
events, or even beyond sports issues 
like the rapprochement of nations and 
people. In this context, the IOC and 
FIFA leaders face a very heterogeneous 
and divided assembly of members with 
little ability to impose a very precise 
strategy. This leads to many non-explicit 
objectives that make governance difficult. 
Is it necessary to maximise the financial 
result to finance sport development? Is 
it necessary to maximise the economic 
or societal impact of competitions, the 
spread of sport practices on a global 
scale, the resolution of conflicts via sport, 
the entertainment of spectators, and the 
economic and social development of 
organising sites? The composition of the 
supreme bodies does not facilitate the 
formulation of a single supreme objective 
that can be reduced into clearly defined 
and sequenced secondary objectives. 
Without a clear objective, the strategic 
and organisational choices are extremely 
difficult and create the conditions for 
substantial problems of governance.
The Dominant Position 
of the IOC and FIFA
The Olympic Games and the Football 
World Cup are global competitions 
attracting an audience of more than 3 
billion viewers (FIFA, 2015; IOC, 2015). 
By holding the rights to these events, the 
IOC and FIFA enjoy a dominant position 
in the market for major international 
sports competitions. These unique 
competitions allow the IOC and FIFA 
to generate extraordinary revenues 
and profits. Apart from the two major 
sport events organised by UEFA (the 
Champions League and the European 
Championship of Nations), no other 
temporary event generates such high 
revenues and has such a media impact. 
As a result, the presidents of the IOC 
and FIFA are treated on an equal footing 
with the heads of state of big countries 
or the heads of major international 
institutions. Everyone remembers the 
image of Angela Merkel jumping happily 
as a child next to President Sepp Blatter 
following Germany’s victorious goal 
against Argentina in the 2014 World Cup 
final. The Chinese President, Hu Jintao’s, 
glowing face at the opening ceremony 
of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, 
hailing athletes and receiving more than 
80 heads of state, also symbolised 
the political, economic, and social 
importance of Olympic events.
Exercising high supervision over leaders 
in charge of such a function is, therefore, 
extremely challenging. Once at the top of 
such prestigious institutions, the leaders 
do not easily accept any form of control 
and generally consider that they are not 
accountable. In addition, implementing 
a governance system is difficult because 
nobody has, de facto, the legitimacy to 
do so. Without owners, the IOC and FIFA 
have no real supervisory authority. It is 
true that the Session and the Congress 
are the two supreme bodies of the IOC 
and FIFA, to which presidents and top 
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officials must report but these bodies are 
often at the foot of presidents because 
of their financial dependency. The same 
is generally true of the various specific 
committees which, apart from the ethics 
and audit committees, remain heavily 
dependent on the Presidents.
Moreover, the supra-national character 
of the IOC and FIFA tends to ‘protect’ 
them from the usual political and judicial 
authorities. Of course, these institutions 
are subject to the laws and rules of 
Switzerland, where they have their 
headquarters. The importance of these 
institutions in the Swiss landscape, 
however, makes them almost ‘too big-to-
fail’ and gives them special treatment, if 
only because many countries around the 
world would welcome the headquarters 
of these institutions and would be willing 
to grant them special arrangements.
As a result of the recent FIFA scandals, 
however, we have observed that the 
FIFA Ethics Committee and the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport based in Lausanne 
have exercised their oversight duties and 
have been able to enforce their decisions 
and sanctions. The legal procedures 
launched by the Swiss and American 
judicial authorities have had some effect 
and should serve to remind the leaders of 
the major international sports federations, 
for a few years, that they are not above 
the law.
The International 
Dimension of IOC and 
FIFA Organisational 
Bodies and Activities
Few non-governmental organisations 
are associated with as many countries, 
cultures, languages as the IOC and FIFA. 
In Switzerland, Nestlé and the Red Cross 
(ICRC) are two organisations recognised 
for their high degree of internationalisation 
and cultural diversity. Yet, both Nestlé 
and the ICRC have supreme bodies that 
are fairly homogeneous because of their 
institutional history, their raison d’être 
or their respective objectives. Nestlé 
is frequently cited as an example of a 
multinational company that has adapted 
its product offering to specific tastes, 
while the ICRC is facing an extreme 
diversity of situations in its activities. 
These two organisations, however, have 
deep European and Swiss roots which 
facilitate governance.
The same goes for the IOC and FIFA, 
which also have an important European 
anchoring. The development of these 
two institutions over the past three 
decades, however, has led to a major 
internationalisation of the Session and 
the Congress. At FIFA, the Congress 
brings together all countries on the 
planet with one delegate per country 
with identical social rights irrespective 
of the size of the country. Worldwide, 
FIFA is the only institution that gives so 
much power to microscopic countries. 
Even the United Nations do not bring 
together so many member states and 
give so much power to small nations. At 
the IOC, the composition of the Session 
is not as international as it is at FIFA, as 
the members do not represent states. 
Yet, the IOC wants the Olympic Games 
to be open to every country on the planet 
regardless of their political regime, size or 
development stage. In order to maintain 
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this global reach, FIFA and the IOC strive 
to treat minorities with great care. This 
has implications for governance systems 
that cannot then, only take into account 
the contingencies of the western world.
Conclusions
Due to the particular context of the IOC 
and FIFA, it is not possible to simply 
adopt the governance systems put in 
place in large international companies. 
A specific approach must be followed, 
taking into account the strategy and the 
respective contingencies.
The reforms adopted in the spring of 
2016 by FIFA and proposed by the 
working group led by Mr François 
Carrard, however, go in the right direction 
because they limit, in a structural way, the 
possible influence of the president and 
senior leaders on the organisation. With 
a term of up to 12 years, it seems difficult 
for the new president Gianni Infantino to 
build a potentate similar to that developed 
by Sepp Blatter. Greater separation of 
control and execution functions will also 
create the necessary counter-powers for 
good governance, stating that there is 
‘no good power without counter-power’. 
Similar measures were adopted by the 
IOC in the 2000s following the Salt Lake 
City scandal and appear to have borne 
fruit. Although the IOC is not immune to 
governance problems, it now appears to 
be much less exposed. The future will tell 
if the same applies to FIFA.
At this stage, the recent financial 
scandals of FIFA have at least had the 
merit of having caused major structural 
changes and created an important 
disciplinary shock to FIFA and the 
associated federations, for at least the 
next two decades. It will be necessary, 
however, to adapt the governance 
systems to the constantly evolving 
context to prevent new scandals that 
that could next time be fatal to these 
organisations. In this regard, the 
independence of the internal and external 
supervisory bodies, the implementation 
of checks and balances and a greater 
transparency over the allocation and use 
of funds seem to be the key elements of 
good governance on which the IOC and 
FIFA must continue to work.
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Appendix I
Selected determinants and participants in corporate governance 
systems
Source: Larcker and Tayan (2015).
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Appendix II
Mission and role of IOC from 
the Olympic Charter
(in force as from 2 August 2015)
The mission of the IOC is to promote 
Olympism throughout the world and to 
lead the 
Olympic Movement. The IOC’s role is:
• to encourage and support the 
promotion of ethics and good 
governance in sport as well as 
education of youth through sport and 
to dedicate its efforts to ensuring that, 
in sport, the spirit of fair play prevails 
and violence is banned;
• to encourage and support the 
organisation, development and 
coordination of sport and sports 
competitions;
• to ensure the regular celebration of the 
Olympic Games;
• to cooperate with the competent public 
or private organisations and authorities 
in the endeavour to place sport at the 
service of humanity and thereby to 
promote peace;
• to take action to strengthen the unity 
of the Olympic Movement, to protect 
its independence and to preserve the 
autonomy of sport;
• to act against any form of 
discrimination affecting the Olympic 
Movement;
• to encourage and support the 
promotion of women in sport at all 
levels and in all structures with a 
view to implementing the principle of 
equality of men and women;
• to protect clean athletes and the 
integrity of sport, by leading the fight 
against doping, and by taking action 
against all forms of manipulation of 
competitions and related corruption;
• to encourage and support measures 
relating to the medical care and health 
of athletes;
• to oppose any political or commercial 
abuse of sport and athletes;
• to encourage and support the efforts 
of sports organisations and public 
authorities to provide for the social and 
professional future of athletes;
• to encourage and support the 
development of sport for all;
• to encourage and support a 
responsible concern for environmental 
issues, to promote sustainable 
development in sport and to require 
that the Olympic Games are held 
accordingly;
• to promote a positive legacy from the 
Olympic Games to the host cities and 
host countries;
• to encourage and support initiatives 
blending sport with culture and 
education;
• to encourage and support the activities 
of the International Olympic Academy 
(“IOA”) and other institutions which 
dedicate themselves to Olympic 
education.
Source: IOC (2015). Olympic Charter
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Appendix III
The objectives of FIFA as of 
statutes dated of April 2016
The objectives of FIFA are: 
• to improve the game of football 
constantly and promote it globally in 
the light of its unifying, educational, 
cultural and humanitarian values, 
particularly through youth and 
development programmes; 
• to organise its own international 
competitions;
• to draw up regulations and provisions 
governing the game of football and 
related matters and to ensure their 
enforcement;
• to control every type of association 
football by taking appropriate steps to 
prevent infringements of the Statutes, 
regulations or decisions of FIFA or of 
the Laws of the Game;
• to use its efforts to ensure that 
the game of football is available to 
and resourced for all who wish to 
participate, regardless of gender or 
age;
• to promote the development of 
women’s football and the full 
participation of women at all levels of 
football governance; and
• to promote integrity, ethics and fair play 
with a view to preventing all methods or 
practices, such as corruption, doping 
or match manipulation, which might 
jeopardise the integrity of matches, 
competitions, players, officials and 
member associations or give rise to 
abuse of association football
Source: FIFA Statutes (2016)
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‘If people are good 
only because they fear 
punishment, and hope for 
reward, then we are a sorry 
lot indeed.’
Albert EINSTEIN 
(German Physicist and Nobel prize winner)
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Abstract
Bad governance in sport and all the 
political involvement poisoning it have 
recently led to numerous negative 
headlines in the press.
Not a week goes by without hearing 
about: doping, corruption, violence, 
competition-rigging, or player trafficking, 
and that is only the tip of the iceberg. 
This is damaging to sport ethics 
indivisible from good sports governance. 
Without any doubt, these ethical issues 
will be at the centre of the concerns and 
challenges to come from the International 
Olympic Committee and all the other 
national sports federations.
Doping: an Account 
of the Most Publicised 
Scandals
In relation to doping problems in 
particular, cycling was, rightly or 
wrongly, the first to attract a great deal 
of attention. It began in 1998 with the 
Festina scandal during the Tour de 
France. Three days before the start of 
the tour in Dublin, Willy Voet, the Festina 
soigneur, was stopped in his car by 
French customs. The customs officers 
found an unbelievable haul of doping 
agents, indicating that doping was being 
used by the leading team of the time. The 
shock wave was immense. The Festina 
team was expelled from the competition. 
Under the pressure of questioning, some 
riders admitted their guilt and were 
suspended. Willy Voet received a fine 
and a ten-month suspended sentence, 
as did the Festina Sports Director, Bruno 
Roussel. In the wake of the scandal, the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was 
established in November 1999, followed 
by the biological passport and the Anti-
Doping Administration and Management 
System, an online management tool that 
aids anti-doping activities.
After surviving testicular cancer, Lance 
Armstrong returned to the sport in 
1999 and it was hoped that cycling 
could start afresh. Unfortunately, he, in 
turn, was suspected of doping when 
he tested positive to corticosteroids on 
July 4 after the first stage. A doctor from 
the UCI, the world governing body of 
cycling, covered for the American using 
a medical certificate created after the 
fact. From 1999 onwards, Armstrong 
enjoyed unrivalled domination of the 
Tour de France, a reign that ended in 
January 2013 with his admission about 
doping practices in American teams (US 
Postal and Discovery Channel) during an 
interview with Oprah Winfrey. The Texan 
was stripped of the seven titles he had 
won on the Tour de France.
During the 2006 Tour de France, cycling 
was again in the spotlight. To begin 
with, seven riders were expelled from 
the competition on the day before the 
Tour’s official start from Strasbourg, 
including, notably, Jan Ullrich, because 
of his involvement along with other 
riders in Operation Puerto. During the 
same tour, Alexandre Vinokourov was 
thrown out along with his team, the 
highly controversial Astana, which was 
taking part in its first Tour de France. 
The same thing happened to the Cofidis 
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team, whose Italian rider, Cristian Moreni, 
tested positive for testosterone. Finally, 
there was the disqualification of Floyd 
Landis, holder of the yellow jersey when 
he arrived at the Champs-Élysées. After 
14 months of legal proceedings, Landis 
was stripped of his title and suspended 
two years after he had tested positive for 
testosterone. In 2007, the former yellow 
jersey, Rasmussen, was disqualified three 
days before the Tour’s arrival in Paris 
for failing to appear for a surprise anti-
doping test. 
Yet even though cycling has attracted 
much attention, it is, of course, not the 
only sport implicated. Operation Puerto 
is certainly one of the scandals that 
best illustrates the weaknesses of sport 
bodies in fighting doping. Operation 
Puerto was an investigation by Spanish 
police that resulted in the discovery of 
a vast network of blood doping. Some 
cyclists were implicated at the time 
but so were footballers from the most 
prestigious teams in Spain. The names 
of some male tennis players were also 
mentioned. Yet, ten years after the 
scandal came to light, few and light have 
been the penalties handed down to the 
protagonists. Governed by a multitude 
of supervisory powers and rules, the 
sports bodies’ complicated organisation 
has made it more difficult to punish 
transgressors. Rule breakers are not 
criminals, so the courts have no interest 
in them. Hence the regulatory system has 
faced difficulties in defining the actions 
that it is supposed to punish. A few 
convictions were obtained in Operation 
Puerto but only following complicated, 
cumbersome procedures by using 
the same ploys that the transgressors 
themselves had been using up till then. 
In the US, the BALCO scandal hit 
American sport in the spring of 2003. The 
scandal started with a then anonymous 
telephone call from an athletics trainer 
called Trevor Graham, during which the 
American accused athletes of using 
an undetectable substance called 
THG (tetrahydrogestrinone). He named 
the director of the BALCO laboratory, 
Victor Conte, as the man organising its 
distribution. A police search carried out at 
the head office of the laboratory led to the 
discovery of an entire arsenal of doping 
agents, as well as a list of clients that 
included the names of baseball players, 
athletes (Dwain Anthony Chambers, 
Marion Jones, and Tim Montgomery), 
boxers, and American football players.
The owners of the laboratory avoided 
trial by reaching a financial settlement. 
Nevertheless, the sprinter Marion Jones 
was given a 6-month jail sentence in 
2007 for perjury, as was the cyclist 
Tammy Thomas.
The International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) then became mired 
in scandal. A programme on German 
television station ARD and an article in 
the British newspaper the Sunday Times 
appeared three weeks before the Beijing 
world championships in August 2015, 
revealing information that had been kept 
secret by the IAAF itself. The information 
pertained to a list of 12,000 blood tests 
conducted on 5,000 athletes between 
2001 and 2012. This investigation by 
journalists reported that more than 
800 test results were abnormal, clearly 
suggesting doping similar to that which 
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marred cycling in the 80s and 90s. 
Among the countries implicated were 
Russia and Kenya.
Lastly, institutionalised doping in Russia 
has shaken world sport in recent 
times. The scandal was revealed 
at the beginning of this year by the 
whistleblower Yulia Stepanova and by 
the admissions of Grigory Rodchenkov, 
the director of the Moscow anti-doping 
centre who has now taken refuge in 
the US. The sport world learned with 
stupefaction that athletes competing 
in the Olympic Games and different 
world championships were involved in 
organised doping in which the Russian 
sport bodies and Russian secret services 
had also taken part. Those in charge 
of the Russian anti-doping agency 
were forced to resign. Curiously, two of 
those who resigned died within seven 
days of each other, officially of heart 
attacks. These revelations led to the 
establishment of the McLaren report, 
which confirmed that the Russian state 
organised, at the highest level, and with 
the aid of its secret police, repeated 
manipulation of urine test results.
Tongues have started wagging about 
doping and the former Soviet Union 
states. The New York Times has cited 
documents implicating the Russian 
doctor Sergei Portugalov. Since 1983, 
any Soviet athlete likely to win a medal 
has benefited from his reprehensible 
services with the stated aim, according 
to the documents brought to light by the 
newspaper, of achieving victory whatever 
the cost. 
With this Russian doping scandal, the 
International Olympic Committee has 
once again shown its weaknesses and 
failings in governing sport. Instead of 
banning the Russian Federation from 
the Rio Olympics as requested by 
WADA, it dodged the issue and did not 
assume its responsibilities, appealing to 
the international federations to decide 
themselves whether Russian athletes 
should or should not be disqualified from 
all Olympic competitions.
This lack of governance embittered 
the spirit of the Rio Olympics, not in 
terms of doping but on a political and 
human level. The athletes accused each 
other whenever they lost or whenever 
a competitor won a medal that was, in 
their mind, undeserved. This happened 
to Yulia Efimova, cleared by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport three days before the 
opening of the games. She was booed 
by American spectators and was in tears 
on the podium alongside two American 
swimmers (who said they were clean, so 
of course they must have been). There 
was also the French swimmer Camille 
Lacourt, who, having lost and being 
frustrated, accused the bronze medalist, 
a Chinese swimmer, of doping. Are the 
Chinese doped? Are the Russians? 
Perhaps, but not a word is said about the 
Americans, who are all clean – American 
puritanism needs it to be so!
The Ploy of 
Therapeutic Use 
Exemptions
A group of hackers known as the “Fancy 
Bears” gained access to confidential 
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data, namely the therapeutic use 
exemptions (TUEs), used by some 
sportspeople during significant sports 
competitions. The data was published 
in several waves. More than 100 
sportspeople who participated in the 
recent Olympic Games used these 
products as doping agents with the 
indulgence of WADA. They will not be 
penalised for doping since everything 
was done above board. In 2015, WADA 
issued 1330 TUEs, 48% more than in 
2014. Anyone would think that sport 
leads to illness, whereas, in fact, it plays 
a protective role in preventing chronic, 
non-transmissible diseases.
Of these TUEs, it ought to be recognised 
that some of these medical prescriptions 
have been dubious. Serena Williams, for 
example, was authorised to treat a cold 
with a five-day course of 40mg of oral 
prednisone – a large dose of cortisone – 
on the eve of the final at Roland Garros, 
which she won against Lucie Safarova. 
She had received a similar authorisation 
for the tournaments of Miami and Rome 
that she won in 2014. Her sister Venus 
also benefited from the indulgence of 
WADA doctors, using prednisone in 2012 
for her victory in the London Olympics 
doubles competition and for Wimbledon.
Another American star with a troubling 
TUE was Simone Biles, the three-time 
winning gymnast at the Rio Olympics. 
In her case, it was an amphetamine 
treatment to take care of a hyperactivity 
disorder, a very common diagnosis in 
the US, even though insufficient physical 
activity has generated an obesity 
epidemic. Travis Tygart, head of the US 
Anti-Doping Agency, indicated that the 
sportswoman had acted correctly and 
in accordance with the rules when she 
obtained authorisation to take these 
drugs.
The most unsettling case revealed by the 
Fancy Bears involves Bradley Wiggins, 
another controversial Tour de France 
winner, like many of his predecessors. 
The 36-year-old cyclist, who has won five 
Olympic gold medals, obtained six TUEs 
during his career. Three were requested 
while he was riding for the Garmin team 
enabling him to use inhalants to treat his 
asthma. The other three were obtained 
while he was riding in Sky’s colours. 
These involved intramuscular injections of 
long-acting depot corticosteroid solutions 
on the eve of the Tour de France in 2011 
and 2012, as well as on the day before 
the Giro d’Italia in 2013. The Sky team 
has always vaunted its transparency 
about doping. With the Wiggins case, we 
find ourselves in an extremely borderline 
area that has cast doubt on the methods 
used by Sky to improve its riders’ 
performance levels. Strangely, since 
Wiggins’ switch back to track cycling, he 
has not requested any other TUE. It is 
as if all the allergies behind his requests 
had magically disappeared. An identical 
TUE was granted to Christopher Froome 
in 2014.
TUEs are systematically exploited by 
some athletes and even form an integral 
part of a doping programme. The 
examples mentioned in this chapter are, 
without doubt, confirmed doping cases 
approved by often Anglo-American 
specialists and made legal by the 
granting of TUEs. 
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In the cyclist’s case, members of the 
Mouvement Pour un Cyclisme Credible 
(MPCC) would not have accepted that 
any of their racers receiving such a 
treatment take part in a competition. The 
Sky team, like the Russian teams, have 
not signed the MPCC Charter. 
The TUEs granted to the Williams sisters, 
to Higgins, to Froome, and to Simone 
Biles were done so, in my opinion, 
abusively.
Discussion
Governance, particularly in the area 
of sport, may be defined as the 
establishment of national sport agencies 
and non-governmental organisations 
that work together and independently on 
the basis of specific internal legislation, 
policies, and rules to promote sport 
activities in a democratic, ethical, 
effective, and transparent fashion 
(Chaker, 2004). This definition of 
governance is specific to sports and 
differs from governmental entities, which 
can, however, create laws in this area. 
This is particularly true for doping. The 
circulation of products within state-
funded organisations that are illegal 
and potentially harmful for the athletes’ 
health puts into question the possible 
relationship between sportspeople and 
established rules and standards. This 
sport standard is often undermined by 
another factor, the “realities of business,” 
and business has its own dictates (Soulé 
& Lestrelin, 2012)).
Moreover, most countries, particularly in 
Europe, possess a general law on sports, 
and some have even included sports 
in their constitution. We have also seen 
internal regulation with the establishment 
of WADA and its world anti-doping code, 
which are instances of a self-regulation 
initiated by the international sports 
movement itself (Kernbeck, 2016).
These factors play a role in the fight 
against doping, which aims to resolve 
doping problems and better counter this 
phenomenon. Depending on whether 
we define sportspeople as citizens or 
competitors, they may be bound by the 
applicable laws of their country or by the 
sports regulations of their federation. 
This may give rise to varying, or even 
contradictory, rights and responsibilities. 
Alejandro Valverde during Operation 
Puerto is a case in point: He could not 
be brought to court in Spain given that 
there were no anti-doping laws in Spain 
when the scandal came to light, whereas 
he was punishable by the UCI (Soulé 
& Lestrelin, 2012, Kornbeck (2016a), 
Freeburn 2013).
To continue to promote ethical and 
transparent sport activities, sports 
governance must, in the area of doping, 
pursue the development of self-regulation 
mechanisms and increase cooperation 
with stakeholders, particularly national 
governments (Soulé & Lestrelin, 2012). 
Government regulation alone cannot 
accomplish as much in determining 
sportspeople’s ethical behaviour. The 
sport world must establish rules of good 
conduct and instil a culture of fair-play. 
This will naturally lead to promoting 
the development of good governance. 
These conditions must be met so that 
investment may be made in the future of 
sport in general.
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National governments have a major part 
to play in spurring on sports federations 
to achieve good governance. They are 
their main source of funding. They shape 
the sport world.
The federations must, in return, work 
closely with governments. Instead of 
striving for victory at all costs, so as to 
promote a political system, they must 
ensure good governance in terms 
of ethics and probity (Camporesi & 
mcNamee, 2014). The best governance in 
sports in general, and in the fight against 
doping in particular, is achieved by 
working together with reliable partners.
Conclusion
Sports’ viability is at stake. The latest 
Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro dealt 
a disastrous blow to the reputation 
of sport, since it demonstrated how 
politics had won out over sport and 
ethical considerations. The revelations 
about state-organised doping in the 
ex-Soviet Union from the 1980’s to the 
present day have fatally damaged the 
credibility of sports performances during 
those competitions. TUEs granted in 
an overly indulgent manner with the 
approval of sports medicine bodies have 
damaged the world anti-doping code by 
highlighting its failings. Both grassroots-
level and elite sports depend entirely 
on the trust of the fans who watch and 
admire the athletes’ exploits live or on 
television. These fans will not put up with 
a worsening of sport governance in the 
future. Doping has no future, neither in 
sport nor with the public. The media will 
make the cheats see this sooner or later 
by deserting the stadiums or turning off 
the television screens.
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‘The measure of intelligence 
is the ability to change’
Albert EINSTEIN 
(German Physicist and Nobel prize winner)
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Abstract
Starting with a short description of the 
regulatory mechanisms of the doping 
detection system in sport that are in the 
World Anti-doping Agency Code, the 
major cheating at the 2014 Winter Games 
in Sochi has highlighted the existence of 
some loopholes in this tightly controlled 
system of regulated science. The 
governance of the accredited anti-doping 
laboratories is actually stretched between 
incompatible forces that make an ideal, 
robust, fully objective, independent and 
neutral status impossible to reach in 
practice. The clean athlete, the essential 
stakeholder in the whole sport business, 
has to be reassured with the rapid and 
efficient measures that the concerned 
regulatory authorities have to implement 
on without delay. To regain credibility and 
trust, it is explored how to prevent these 
unethical behaviours at the laboratory’s 
governance level. To better control these 
failures, major changes in the direction 
of the accredited laboratories by WADA 
are sought necessary. It is proposed 
to impose the application of modern 
principles of corporate governance and 
to add a board of several competent 
directors with scientific, economic and 
forensic competences at the top of 
each of these entities, whether they are 
publicly or privately owned.
WADA: Unique 
International Entity
It is largely recognised that modern sport 
is a complex human activity where many 
actors are concerned in its regulation. 
Since the beginning of this Century, 
the relative influence of its respective 
stakeholders has changed. Recently, 
Chappelet (2016) described it as moving 
over the years from an idealistic Total 
Olympic System to one of multiple 
responsibilities shared between a three-
party governance system: 
• Olympic and Sports system for sports 
governance 
• The business world for organisational 
governance
• The public sector for democratic 
governance 
Ideally, there should be a regime where 
these three parties are integrated into a 
sport’s sustainable governance system, 
which is in sync with the fundamental 
guarantees of Human’s rights (Korchia 
and Pettiti, 2000). This is also applicable, 
in principle, for anti-doping activities, 
where there is a set of specific rules 
created for the World Anti-Doping 
Agency (WADA; https://www.wada-ama.
org/en/who-we-are) whose mission is to 
lead a collaborative worldwide movement 
for doping-free sport. 
WADA is an international agency 
composed and funded equally by 
the sports movements and world 
governments. Its key activities 
include: scientific research, education, 
development of anti-doping capacities, 
and monitoring of the World Anti-Doping 
Code (WADC or Code: WADA, 2015) – 
the document harmonising anti-doping 
policies in all sports and all countries. 
WADA is the authority who sets the rules 
and regulations for a comprehensive 
approach to the fight against doping 
in sport. It ensures a harmonised 
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approach to anti-doping in all sports 
and in all countries and monitors the 
implementation of and the compliance 
with the Code. Being centralised under 
a single umbrella entity, the fight against 
doping headed by WADA has gained 
considerable efficacy and has built a high 
level of credibility, although criticisms 
have always targeted one or another part 
of the system (for a short survey, see 
Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
World_Anti-Doping_Agency).
A Code Written to be 
Revised
The latest 2015 revision of the Code is 
robust but needs constant adaptation 
in accordance with the decisions and 
new interpretations made by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (Rigozzi et al., 
2014, see also the Code’s commentary: 
http://wadc-commentary.com). This 
should happen particularly when totally 
unexpected events are revealed, such as 
when the principle of Best Anti-Doping 
Practice, promoted heavily within the 
Code, can be questioned. 
Since the recent discovery of Russia’s 
organised sports doping, one can 
seriously question the robustness of 
the WADA system. These revelations 
have shaken the foundations of this 
system. Several voices have already 
called for a fundamental requalification 
of the responsibilities in anti-doping 
that are shared between the historical 
stakeholders (Duval, 2016a). 
The dramatic shortcomings of WADA 
with regard to the compliance of the 
signatories with the Code has pointed 
out the urgent need for an institutional 
overhaul with several concrete reforms 
proposed. According to Duval (2016b) 
and several sports governing entities, 
WADA could be made more robust by:
• Improving its capacity to conduct and 
follow up on investigations 
• Implementing a more rigorous 
monitoring process for accredited 
laboratories and stronger requirements 
for them to operate autonomously
• Improving security systems to protect 
information 
• Providing policy support to encourage, 
protect, and engage whistleblowers
• Strengthening the agency’s 
governance
• Increasing the agency’s power and 
funding
One latest IOC initiative (IOC, 2015) 
would result in making the anti-doping 
system more independent from sports 
organisations. This could possibly be 
achieved by creating:
• A totally independent testing and 
results management entity possibly 
to be set up under the leadership of 
WADA: 
• Sports organisations should transfer 
their doping control operations to 
this new organisation and make the 
funding available initially at the level 
of the present investment in the fight 
against doping 
• This organisation should also co-
ordinate the work of the national 
anti-doping agencies to ensure a 
streamlined, efficient and worldwide-
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harmonised anti-doping system 
• A professional intelligence-gathering 
unit to be established also within this 
organisation. This would allow WADA 
to be proactive: 
• The unit should address issues that 
may affect the compliance of anti-
doping organisations and anti-doping 
laboratories accredited by WADA, at 
the earliest possible stage 
• This would help to make all such 
institutions compliant at all times and 
in such a way as to protect the clean 
athletes worldwide to the same level 
Governments, the Olympic and 
Paralympic movements, International 
Sports Federations, coaches and 
athletes should work together to reaffirm 
the uncompromising principles of clean 
sport. It is important to recognise that 
WADA is a unique partnership and 
should be supported, as the central 
agent in dealing with the complex doping 
issues in the dynamic and challenging 
environment we all live in.
The next sections briefly describe how all 
this happened, what was fundamentally 
wrong and why there is a need for 
improvement. The scope and the 
discussion will focus at the level of the 
anti-doping laboratory’s governance.
WADA Independent 
Investigations
Since the initial documentary of journalist 
H. Seppelt, ARD Germany, broadcasted 
on December 3, 2014, WADA has 
ordered two investigations, which have 
recently thoroughly documented the 
extent and nature of Russia’s doping 
system. The specific problems with 
good anti-doping governance were 
described in the two complementary 
WADA Independent Commission (IC) and 
Independent Person (IP) investigation 
reports: 
The first IC investigation report (WADA, 
2014b) was published in July 2014. 
Richard W. Pound, the first President 
of WADA in 1999, was the head of 
the IC with Richard H. McLaren and 
Günter Younger as members. The IC 
investigation, proper, was conducted 
under the leadership of Jack Robertson. 
He was WADA’s chief investigator 
from September 2011 until leaving the 
agency in January 2016. Previously he 
had worked for the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA). He helped 
to bring down US professional cyclist 
Lance Armstrong and ran dangerous 
investigations into Mexican drug cartels in 
his previous job as an agent for the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the 
United States.
Since the disclosure of the first IC 
investigation report, additional inquiries 
were necessary in order to exemplify 
many terms. WADA sought to further 
investigate the allegations of Russian 
state manipulation of the doping control 
process, which were made by Grigory 
Rodchenkov (GR), the former director 
of the WADA-accredited laboratory in 
Moscow. CBS 60 Minutes and The 
New York Times had first released his 
allegations publicly on 8 and 12 May 
2016. WADA again asked Prof. Richard 
McLaren, the Canadian law professor 
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and practicing lawyer and former 
member of the IC, to conduct the task 
within a very short of time (56 days), as a 
so-called Independent Person (IP). 
The first IP report (WADA, 2016a) was 
presented on July 18, 2016 and was 
based both on the testimony of the 
former director but also on those of 
other, unnamed, individuals – possibly 
belonging to the laboratory – who 
were also questioned. The IP report 
summarised: “The State implemented 
a simple failsafe strategy. If all the 
operational precautions to promote and 
permit doping by Russian athletes proved 
to have been ineffective for whatever 
reason, the laboratory provided a failsafe 
mechanism. The State had the ability 
to transform a positive analytical result 
into a negative one by ordering that 
the analytical process of the Moscow 
Laboratory be altered. The Ministry of 
Sport, the Russian Anti-Doping Agency 
(RUSADA) and the Russian Federal 
Security Service (the “FSB”) were all 
involved in this operation.”
Prof. McLaren completed his inquiry with 
a second IP report (WADA, 2016b) that 
was released on December 9, 2016. 
It provided further evidence that over 
1,000 athletes in 30 sports benefitted 
from a state-sanctioned doping 
programme operating in Russia from 
2011 until 2015. This 144-page report 
is also accompanied by a collection 
of evidence of “non-confidential” 
information, containing 1,166 documents 
including photos, forensic reports, testing 
analyses, schedules, emails, and working 
documents (WADA, 2016c).
The Intelligence 
Findings
So far, one of the most concerning 
findings of the IC and IP reports, is the 
corruption at the heart of Russia’s anti-
doping authorities. It involved several 
Russian officials within the Ministry of 
Sport and its infrastructure, as well as 
the RUSADA, the Moscow’s laboratory 
and the FSB. Yet, it is impossible to know 
just how deep and how far back this 
conspiracy went.
The criticisms levelled against RUSADA 
are numerous, including allegations 
that doping control officers “routinely 
accept bribes from athletes” and “provide 
advance notice of out-of-competition 
tests”. Taking into account such 
damaging criticisms, the IC stated that 
it has “major concerns” about RUSADA 
functioning as an impartial institution.
There are also startling findings related 
to the WADA-accredited laboratory in 
Moscow, with director GR admitting to 
destroying 1,417 doping control samples 
despite receiving written notification from 
WADA Medical Director Olivier Rabin 
to preserve them prior to his visit in 
2014. The report concludes that there is 
“strong corroborating evidence that the 
Moscow laboratory has been involved in 
a widespread cover-up of positive doping 
tests”.
Although only one laboratory in Russia 
is accredited by WADA, the reports 
also found that a second shadow 
laboratory existed with identical testing 
facilities. This so-called “Laboratory of 
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the Moscow Committee of Sport for 
Identification for Prohibited Substances 
in Athlete Samples” was controlled by 
the city of Moscow government. The IC 
report admitted that its “precise use was 
unknown”.
The report said, however, there was 
enough evidence to conclude that this 
mysterious laboratory was “assisting in 
the cover-up of positive doping results”.
The most important findings of the IP 
reports have now established that:
• Over 1,000 Russian athletes benefitted 
from the concealment of positive 
doping tests. There were 600 (84%) 
summer athletes and 95 (16%) winter 
athletes
• 695 Russian athletes 
and 19 foreign athletes 
were identified as part 
of the manipulation 
to conceal potentially 
positive doping control 
tests 
• The ’systematic and 
centralised’ cover 
up and manipulation 
of the doping control process 
existed from 2011 until 2015, and 
was ‘refined’ over the course of the 
London 2012 Olympics, the 2013 
Moscow International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF) World 
Championships and the Sochi 2014 
Winter Olympics 
• The sample swapping technique used 
at Sochi became a ‘regular monthly 
practice’ of the Moscow Laboratory in 
dealing with elite summer and winter 
athletes in 2014-2015
In summary, Prof. McLaren expressed 
his general understanding that the 
mechanics of the manipulation and cover 
up of doping control processes evolved 
over these five years, as the World Anti-
Figure 1: The official Bereg-kit glass bottle used for collecting doping 
samples. The spring was the critical piece manipulated in order to be 
able to re-open the bottle once the cap was screwed (adapted from 
wpaquatics.org.com)
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Doping Agency (WADA) updated and 
changed the regulatory landscape.¡
Cleaning Dirty Samples 
by Swapping Urines
According to the allegations made by 
GR about details of the cheating system, 
preparations for Sochi began as early as 
the fall of 2013. It was around that time 
that a man began showing up at the 
laboratory in Moscow, inquiring about the 
security bottles (Figure 1) used for storing 
the urine samples tested for banned 
substances. The man took a particular 
interest in the toothed metal rings that 
lock the bottles when the cap is twisted 
to the locked position. He collected 
hundreds of them. GR came to believe he 
was working for the FSB.
GR received the list of named athletes on 
the doping programme on Jan. 21 2014, 
two weeks before the Winter Games 
and shortly after he arrived in Sochi to 
begin work at the Olympic laboratory. 
This list was to be used as reference 
during competition and to outline the 
competition schedule for each athlete. 
Figure 2: A schematic drawing of the two rooms where the swapping of doping samples apparently 
took place during the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games - with a small picture of the mouse’s hole allowing the 
passage of the urine samples (adapted from www.motherjones.com/files/blog_russia)
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Figure 3: Diagram explaining the probable process of the doping cheating disclosed in the two McLaren 
reports (adapted from BBC internet)
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If any of them won a medal, their urine 
samples had to be substituted with a 
clean one! 
During the Games, a sport’s official 
each night sent GR a new list of athletes 
whose samples needed to be swapped. 
To allow the Russian officials to identify 
which urine sample were theirs’, athletes 
also sent photos of their doping control 
forms to transmit the unique numbers 
printed on them that corresponded to 
those marked on the sample A and B 
vials.
Upon receiving a signal, usually after 
midnight, GR and co-workers went 
to Room 124. The room was officially 
a storage space outside the strictly 
controlled area of the anti-doping 
laboratory’s space (Figure 2). He and his 
team had converted it previously into a 
laboratory. Room 124 was situated wall 
to wall next to Room 125, the official 
sample collection room of the anti-doping 
laboratory. With the list of targeted 
numbers in hand, a colleague in Room 
125 passed the bottles through a hole 
in the wall near the floor. The opening, 
made before the opening of the Winter 
Games, was covered with white plastic 
caps and kept hidden on the collection 
room side by a small cabinet during the 
day.
In Room 124, GR received the securely 
sealed bottles through the hole and 
handed them to a man who would take 
them to an adjacent building. Within a 
short time, the bottles were returned 
to the room with the caps loose and 
unbroken. The team emptied and dried 
the bottles with filter paper and filled 
them with clean urine collected from the 
athlete. These old urine samples were 
collected from each of the athlete months 
prior to the Olympics, before they started 
doping. They were delivered in soda 
bottles, baby formula bottles, and other 
miscellaneous containers. 
The cheating system was so refined 
that a laboratory technician would also 
add a few drops of a NaCl (table salt) 
solution or pure water to balance out 
any inconsistencies in the specifications 
(pH and specific density) of the A and B 
samples that were recorded during their 
collection. The colour of the urines was 
adjusted with dry soluble cafe powder 
whenever necessary. As these three 
parameters were first measured during 
the collection of the urine and written on 
the official doping control forms, they 
would completely match those later 
recorded at the anti-doping laboratory 
and the swapping of the urine would 
remain undetected (Figure 3).
The Science Behind 
the Cheating
Dr. Rodchenkov said it was up to him 
to ensure that Russian athletes won 
the most medals, preferably gold ones. 
Reflecting on his career, he said in the 
first IP report that he was open about 
his role in Russia’s doping programme: 
he considered it simply as a condition 
of his employment. To receive funding 
and support for his lab, he had to follow 
the Kremlin’s instructions. By his own 
admission, GR, who received a PhD. in 
analytical chemistry, used his expertise 
to help athletes who used banned 
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substances to go undetected.
He had been director at the Russia’s anti-
doping laboratory in Moscow since 2005, 
and was considered one of the world’s 
experts in performance-enhancing drugs 
in sport since before 2000. He was a 
guest at the annual anti-doping symposia 
organised by WADA or NADOs and 
attended highly confidential meetings 
of the exclusive members of the World 
Association of Anti-Doping Scientists 
(WAADS, http://www.waads.org). 
After Sochi, President Vladimir V. 
Putin awarded the prestigious Order 
of Friendship to GR. At the end of 
2015, however, GR had a dramatic 
change in fortune when WADA’s IC 
report identified him as instrumental 
in covering up positive drug tests and 
destroying hundreds of urine samples. 
Russian officials forced him to resign. In 
addition, two former RUSADA officials 
died unexpectedly in February 2016, 
within weeks of each other. Fearing for 
his safety, he moved in March 2016 to 
Los Angeles. Later in 2016, Putin call 
Rodchenkov a “man with a scandalous 
reputation”.
To date, it has not been disclosed 
exactly how Russian officials could have 
executed such a complex operation. The 
second, more detailed report from Prof. 
McLaren has offered better clues. Most 
of the information that has been collected 
so far focused on Russia and suggested 
a deep-rooted culture of cheating with 
apparent state complicity. This remains 
to be confirmed by more investigations 
and testimonies but this scandal might 
result in larger scale issues. Indeed, the 
planned additional inquiries headed by 
WADA might include different sports in 
other geographic areas at various levels 
of their respective national anti-doping 
systems. The number and importance 
of these future investigations will depend 
on the financial resources that WADA will 
agree to dedicate to these investigations.
One can question how such unethical 
behaviour could remain undetected for 
such a long time. Quite a few members 
of the Moscow laboratory should have 
been implicated at least as early as 2011. 
If a robust quality insurance programme 
was applied strictly during the Winter 
Games, one could have uncovered 
spurious changes made, for example, 
in the chain of custody, pointing out the 
inconsistencies between the samples’ 
results produced automatically from the 
analytical instruments and those results 
introduced manually into the database of 
WADA. This Athlete Data Administration 
Managing System (ADAMS) (https://
www.wada-ama.org/en/adams) could 
have been examined more closely and 
compared with the entries made by the 
Moscow laboratory (if access to this 
data is permitted); any sign of undue 
manipulation in data transcription would 
appear. 
Daytime security was particularly tight 
in the Sochi laboratory. There were 
numerous surveillance cameras and 
anyone wishing to enter the laboratory 
required security clearance. It was 
later at night when the urine samples 
were swapped in Room 124. Several 
laboratory staff members were most 
certainly involved. How could they not 
have been suspect, when so many 
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foreign specialists were present for 
collaboration? The testing laboratory for 
the Sochi Games had a staff of nearly 
100 people, including employees of the 
laboratory in Moscow, as well as a dozen 
international anti-doping experts, flown 
in from cities like Beijing, China; Doha, 
Qatar; and Lausanne, Switzerland. Each 
had their unique identification initials and 
signature, so it is still possible to know 
exactly who was doing what during those 
critical days.
The WADA independent observers who 
watched over the laboratory at random 
times during the day and night (WADA 
2014a) observed that there were indeed 
a number of different entities operating 
within the Sochi laboratory. They 
revealed in their report, the presence of a 
representative of the Ministry of Sport of 
the Russian Federation who was not part 
of the Laboratory Games staff or the IOC 
Medical Commission and whose role was 
unclear to them. 
Initial Russian 
Response
Confronted about these embarrassing 
revelations, the Russian Sports Minister 
claimed that the first McLaren report, 
which provided the basis for the banning 
of Russian athletes from the 2016 
Summer Olympics and Paralympics in 
Rio, Brazil, would not stand up to legal 
criticism. According to him, this IP report 
lacks the basic due process required in 
any legal system.
First, any dispute resolution proceeding 
requires neutrality. Indeed, WADA 
selected Richard McLaren, as an 
“Independent Person” to write this report. 
Prof. McLaren, however, “was previously 
a member of WADA’s three-person 
Independent Commission … which 
exposed widespread doping in Russian 
Athletics.” It is, therefore, not surprising 
that Prof. McLaren ended up agreeing 
with his previous findings. In order to 
insure fairness and credibility, the IP, 
in the opinion of some commentators, 
should have been someone who was 
previously not associated with this issue.
A second way to insure fairness and 
credibility is to require that the accused 
have the right to confront the witnesses 
against them. In the IP reports, evidence 
is cited from witnesses who are not 
even identified. It is obviously difficult for 
Russia to defend itself against unnamed 
accusers.
The second IP report does not give 
many names of other people involved at 
the laboratory level nor does it indicate 
precisely the identity of athletes who 
had benefited from the swapping 
procedure. Further, it doesn’t contain 
any evidence that members of the 
Russian Olympic Committee were 
involved in this conspiracy. In the near 
term, CAS is expecting many requests 
from IFs in relation to these cases. 
When this happens, more solid defence 
arguments will be revealed and a better 
understanding of the mechanisms in 
place at each level of responsibility will 
become more evident.
Credibility of the 
Testimonies
57AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
Professor McLaren finds the main 
accuser of Russia to be credible. 
According to some journalists, however, 
GR is an informant who might have an 
agenda other than the truth. The only 
way that those another agenda can be 
revealed is through cross-examination – 
an essential component of due process 
in Courts – but no one has yet the 
opportunity to cross-examine him.
More importantly, some of the key 
manipulations were demonstrated by 
forensic examinations in the second IP 
report as follows:
• Samples given by two female 
ice-hockey players were found to 
contain male DNA, indicating sample 
swapping. One sample did show two 
different DNA profiles
• Cleaned B samples were altered 
so that the specific gravity matched 
that declared on the Doping Control 
Forms (DCFs) of the dirty B samples 
by diluting with water, adding salt, 
sediment or Nescafé granules, 
leading to non-physiologically viable 
concentrations of salt 
• Microscopic examination of the lids 
indicated that sample bottles were not 
tamper proof. The lids of the Berlinger 
BEREG-KIT urine sample bottles could 
be removed by inserting thin flexible 
strips of metal or plastic between the 
cap and the glass bottle, by lifting 
the metal ring and by turning the lid 
anti-clockwise. Indeed, marks of 
strips due to such opening tools were 
documented on many caps
All these points are considered as fully 
objective, un-disputed and non-refutable 
proof of manipulation of the samples.
Finally, it doesn’t matter so much who 
did it, nor the protection of the clean 
athlete demanding corrective measures 
to stop such cheating forever (Figure 4). 
In balance stands the credibility of the 
whole anti-doping system. Due to the 
many incidents occurring during these 
five years, it is imperative to impose 
robust corrective measure(s).
What Shall Be Done 
at the Laboratory 
Level?
Reinforce Trust in All the 
Accredited Laboratories
As the mechanism of cheating appears 
to be vast and – in a way - so easy to 
perform, the relationship between all 
the accredited laboratories and WADA 
is now open to many uncertainties! 
With the discovery that International 
Federations (IFs), National Anti-Doping 
Agencies (NADOs), and States’ 
governments are interfering directly with 
the results produced by some accredited 
laboratories, the current system is open 
to major conflicts of interest (WADA, 
2013). Thus, credibility in anti-doping 
governance has now reached an all-time 
low. It is time for those who rule anti-
doping in sports to put it back on track 
by creating more independent structures 
to ensure transparency, democracy, 
and accountability. To contribute to the 
restoration of the WADA system, the 
accredited laboratories must revise their 
position within the system. 
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In practice, WADA defines and imposes 
the rules of good governance on the 
accredited laboratories and gives them 
the permission to work. In addition to the 
Code, a complex set of obligations called 
International Standards for Laboratories 
(ISL, WADA 2016d) is applicable. 
Consequently, WADA has been, until 
now, reasonably confident of the scientific 
robustness of the tests used. Meaning 
that if the tests are properly administered 
and the samples are properly analysed 
by the accredited laboratory following 
ISL, one can have confidence in the 
reliability of the results and the science 
below them, notwithstanding occasional 
Figure 4: Russian drug doping just the tip of the iceberg in world sport drawn by Dom Nelson (adapted 
from cartoonmovement.com) 
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complaints about accuracy.
Today, however, WADA does not have 
confidence that all the accredited 
laboratories are equally able to meet 
the performance criteria required by 
the ISL. It seems increasingly clear that 
not all accredited laboratories have the 
necessary equipment and skill sets to 
derive the full benefit of the science 
available to them (WADA, 2013). At the 
end of 2016, six out of the 34 accredited 
laboratories were suspended for a variety 
of reasons. Thus, WADA-accredited 
laboratories, owing to weaknesses in 
following strict quality management 
procedures and protocols, do not always 
deliver the expected level of testing. 
In reality, they are moving in a very 
complex and specialised field of scientific 
expertise that is evolving rapidly.
Assure Complete Reliability in 
the Detection Procedures
New analytical techniques are introduced 
annually following the evolution of the 
use of doping and to take advantage 
of the newly developed detection tools. 
This has resulted in new detection 
approaches not being fully covered 
by the older analytical approaches. A 
detailed demonstration on the difficulties 
involved in reconciling new specialised 
analytical methods with the traditional 
structure of the ISL was recently covered 
(see Giraud et al, 2014). 
As an example, the old and unique 
position based on the evidence of the 
presence or not of a forbidden substance 
in urine is not tenable anymore to qualify 
all doping offences in respect to the 
2015 Code. The introduction of new 
analytical approaches like the Athlete 
Biological Passport or the detection of 
Growth Hormone Abuse has modified 
the basis of the classical administration 
of the proof. Statistical evaluations are 
new decisive elements in these mixed 
scientific and legal processes. Now 
more than ever, all stakeholders in anti-
doping are encouraged to develop the 
«translation» skills needed for lawyers 
and scientists to develop a common 
language. In short, this “new” science of 
anti-doping and the law in sports have to 
collaborate together (Viret, 2014).
In relation to these newest technological 
developments, the 2015 edition of 
the Code appears to be insufficiently 
precise about several general principles 
concerning the operation’s levels 
between all stakeholders. It was pointed 
out in detail (Viret, 2015) how these 
shifts in doping detection strategies may 
modify evidentiary assumptions implicit 
to the Code regime. This thesis has 
discussed the position of the accredited 
laboratories and WADA officials in various 
places (Viret, 2015; e.g., pp 220-224, and 
229-233) as well as with respect to CAS 
expertise (pp 607-609, and 644-645).
Since 2000, WADA has set up a closed 
system deliberately to avoid anti-doping 
analytics being challenged. At the 
same time, there is an unwillingness to 
share too much laboratory analytical 
information, as they don’t want 
those who are cheating to know how 
sophisticated they have become in 
their detection methods. Anti-doping 
science is under the control of a very 
small group of specialists (for example: 
WAADS is composed of approximately 
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50 individuals). These scientists think 
that they are creating good science 
because their results are often published 
in peer-reviewed international journals. 
Unfortunately, this quality control 
before publication is not a fool proof 
guarantee of valid results (Smith, 2006)! 
Additionally, there is a limited number 
of other, independent, scientists 
involved in this narrow research topic. 
Independent oversight is critical for 
ensuring full objectivity and quality in 
this economic-scientific business area, 
as it is in any other credible industry. It 
is highly desirable that researchers stay 
open to criticism when it is meant to be 
constructive.
Reinforce the Indispensable 
Trust upon the Laboratory’s 
Directors
According to WADC, the ISL sets out 
the procedures a laboratory must follow 
when handling and analysing athletes’ 
samples to ensure test results are valid 
and reliable. It also specifies the minimum 
standard of harmonisation and criteria 
that must be fulfilled by anti-doping 
laboratories to achieve and maintain 
WADA accreditation, which a laboratory 
must have in order to test doping control 
samples. The vast majority of the ISL 
articles are targeting technical points 
and just a few concern the personnel. 
Even less cover the qualifications of the 
responsible people heading the anti-
doping laboratories.
The accreditation process is a lengthy 
one. Once accreditation has been 
obtained, steps must be taken to 
maintain it. The procedure for each 
of these steps is set out in the ISL. 
During the accreditation process, 
an independent certifying body is 
requested to visit the laboratory and 
produce a report of conformity with 
the ISL and assure that all standard 
operating processes are following GLP 
requirements. In fact, more requirements 
exist for the certifying team than for the 
direction of the examined laboratory: 
• The certification body should not be 
owned, operated, or controlled by a 
sport entity
• Members of the certification body 
should not have any ownership 
or financial interest in any sport 
organisation
• Should not accept anything of value 
from anyone in connection with the 
establishment being audited other 
than the programme/audit fee. The 
term “anything of value” includes, 
but is not limited to, gifts, gratuities, 
reimbursement of expenses, 
entertainment, loans, or any other form 
of compensation in cash or in kind
• The certification body should maintain 
records pertaining to the financial 
interests of the personnel involved in 
the certification programme
• Fees charged or accepted should 
not be contingent or based upon the 
report made by the certification body 
or any personnel involved in the audit 
process
• The certification body and its auditors 
should be free from any other conflicts 
of interest that threaten impartiality
These are nowadays considered as 
standard requirements for independence, 
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objectivity and transparency. Why are 
they not formally included yet into the 
accredited laboratory’s governance? 
Governance Structure 
of the Anti-Doping 
Laboratory
Anti-doping laboratories, public or 
private, are financed in various ways: 
they might be funded by the state, by an 
association, or they might have their own 
revenues. Income is, most of the time, 
a mix of those three sources. Thus, the 
scope of their activities, the equipment 
and the human resources made available 
to them by their respective owners vary 
considerably. This particular situation was 
exploited by WADA who imposed very 
little margin of manoeuvre on them. As 
explained by Viret (2015, pp 684-685) the 
laboratories are completely caught in the 
middle of irreconcilable obligations, a few 
of them are described below.
The ISL make clear in Article 4.1.8 that 
the laboratory shall be established and 
remain operationally independent from 
ADOs to ensure full confidence in its 
competence, impartiality, judgment or 
operational integrity. This operational 
integrity implies that the laboratory shall 
have a separate budget permitting the 
laboratory to manage its own affairs 
without hindrance or interference.
When looking at the actual governing 
structure of the 34 key partners of the 
WADA accredited laboratory’s network 
(https://www.wada-ama.org/en/what-
we-do/science-medical/laboratories/
accredited-laboratories), major 
differences can be seen, as they are:
• laboratories belonging to universities
• laboratories belonging to national 
sports organisations
• laboratories belonging to private 
companies
Complex Financial 
Implications of the 
Anti-Doping Business
Clearly, these structural schemes do 
not provide sufficient guarantees for 
the independence of all anti-doping 
laboratories. Most of the time, if an 
important part of their income is granted 
directly by the organisation they belong 
to, a large part of their revenues are 
originating from their clients (for example: 
local, national and/or international anti-
doping agencies). They can also get paid 
directly by WADA, sports federations, 
and the IOC for conducting special 
investigations and research projects. 
As a consequence, these service 
contracts may have unpleasant 
obligations and biased content. For 
example, IFs can impose on their own 
rules and negotiate for best prices for 
adapted or reduced analytical menus. 
As the 2015 WADC requires laboratories 
to publish their analysing capabilities, 
methods and prices on ADAMS, ADOs 
like to compare several laboratories’ 
offers before making their choice. As a 
result, a real competition has built up 
over the years between some accredited 
laboratories. In fact, the number of 
samples collected every year is limited 
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and places a very restricted business 
framework for anti-doping analyses. 
Consequently, it is difficult for the 
laboratories that are often under strong 
financial pressures to grow, to develop 
new analytical approaches, and to find 
the additional resources to renew the 
sophisticated and costly instrumentations 
that they are required to have. In the end, 
the heads of the accredited laboratories 
are exposed to multiple contradictory 
influences and much too dependent 
on the goodwill of their owners for their 
survival. 
If not financially independent, how can 
they be independent in regards to other 
aspects? First, whilst WADA-accredited 
laboratories have supposedly to be 
independently funded, without such 
accreditation, laboratories could not have 
anti-doping testing authorities as clients. 
Then, the laboratories’ indirect financial 
dependency on the WADA accreditation 
could build a financial predisposition and 
a duty of loyalty towards the organisation. 
In order to overcome this uncomfortable 
situation, it was proposed to drastically 
reduce the number of accredited 
laboratories: just a few important 
institutions could be accredited on the 
five continents and make them directly 
dependent of the authority of WADA. 
Whatever the issue, it is, more than ever, 
critical that stricter principles of ethics 
must be imposed on all anti-doping 
laboratories.
Compliance with the 
Code of Ethics
One can find mandatory sections of 
the professional ethics’ principles in the 
Code of Ethics (Annex B of the ISL). In 
practice, every year, the laboratory shall 
communicate the Code of Ethics to all 
employees and ensure the understanding 
of and commitment to the different 
aspects of it, signed by the director. 
How credible can such a document be? 
In practice, as shown recently by the 
Moscow laboratory’s cheating episode, it 
is clearly not a fool proof guarantee! 
In order to verify these specific points, 
as well as all the other technical issues, 
the ISL make provision for inspections 
and visits of the laboratory at any time. 
In exceptional situations, these can be 
unannounced. The relevant (most of 
the time, national) accreditation body is 
responsible for the inspector’s visits. This 
inspector will send a report to WADA.
Other documents must be provided to 
WADA upon request to ensure conformity 
with the rules established under the 
Code, as part of the maintenance of 
WADA accreditation. This includes all 
contracts with Code-signatory clients 
or testing authorities. Commercial or 
financial data, however, are generally not 
communicated in detail because that 
information is considered commercial 
or proprietary and is treated in a fully 
confidential manner.
Necessary 
Transparency
As pointed about by Duval (2016a), 
“Sports governance in general is plagued 
with a regrettable transparency and 
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accountability deficit and WADA is not 
immune to it.” 
In order to remedy this actual 
unsatisfactory situation, Duval (2016b) 
would recommend “WADA to: 
• Publish all individual compliance 
reports/audits on a yearly basis 
• Publish all anti-doping decisions at 
national and international level in a 
publicly available repository 
• Commit to systematically publishing 
scientific reports even when they are 
not amenable to WADA
• Ensure that noncompliance decisions 
are taken by a fully independent body
• Ensure a greater voting power inside its 
executive bodies for the main affected 
party: the athletes.” 
All these critical points can be applied 
to the accredited laboratories. 
Fundamentally, it is in the direct interest 
of the clean athlete to know, in detail, 
the whole range of activities in each 
accredited laboratory to be assured 
that they are fully in compliance with the 
Code.
Independent 
Laboratory’s Service 
without External 
Influences
Unfortunately, any opening to the scrutiny 
of the clean athlete or the public in 
general does not appeal to WADA (Viret, 
2015, pp 582-591). The anti-doping 
system is generally afraid that outside 
experts might understand too well the 
limitation of the tests in place and that 
these weaknesses would become 
opportunistic loopholes allowing the 
other party to argue publicly against 
detection protocols. Holistically, it would 
make the system weaker. For examples, 
in Courts, scientists are often prevented 
from providing evidence if they want to 
challenge the findings because they, the 
external experts, haven’t access to the 
same level of knowledge and experience 
and so are less credible. WADA 
considers, at most of the disciplinary 
panels, that the accredited laboratories 
are essentially infallible: they fit into the 
very small group of scientists who are 
absolute experts into this area. Their 
values have been always outstandingly 
good and beyond question (see Viret, 
2015, pp 640-644). 
Anti-doping science is, however, not 
written in stone. Analytical protocols 
and detecting approaches are evolving 
rapidly. What is considered to be correct 
today might very well be inadequate 
in a few years from now. Perhaps it is 
because the WADA experts wrote the 
technical documents for testing, they 
did not imagine any unethical or non-
scientific behaviour from the heads of the 
accredited laboratories.
Certainly, it is stated in the Code 
that the laboratory should have no 
privileged relationship with any political, 
administrative or economic organisation 
or movement. The laboratory does not 
conduct any surveillance, control or 
inspection tasks. Its role is limited in 
principal to that of a consultant or expert. 
If the laboratory is fully committed to 
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respecting all the procedures and rules of 
quality control and professional ethics, it 
will guarantee complete impartiality and 
independence from its clients. While this 
is fine in theory, in practice, however, a 
conflict of interest exists because WADA 
is expected to serve as a neutral arbiter 
of science and as a prosecution witness 
at the same time – both roles that are not 
particularly compatible.
In most practical situations, the 
laboratory expert’s opinion will be 
influenced by his strong dependence 
on the WADA accreditation system. 
The observed aggressive behaviour of 
WADA toward scientists raising questions 
around WADA’s practices in front of 
CAS, for example, call for investigation 
of the ability of WADA to implement a 
robust and fair scientific approach to 
anti-doping. In reality, if an accredited 
laboratory staff’s neutral opinion is 
not in line with WADA’s position, the 
scientist would most likely decline to 
testify, even as a neutral expert, for fear 
of questioning the integrity of the official 
anti-doping programme. From the athlete 
view’s point, there exists an inherent 
disadvantage in mounting any scientific 
defence against anti-doping charges (St 
Cyr Clarke, 2016).
Introducing Corporate 
Governance 
to Accredited 
Laboratories
Corporate governance broadly refers 
to the mechanisms, processes and 
relationhips by which corporations 
are controlled and directed (https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_
governance). Governance is about how 
companies are directed and controlled. 
Good governance is an essential 
ingredient in corporate success and 
sustainable growth. Such an approach 
could be easily applied to the anti-doping 
laboratories whatever the system under 
which they are governed. 
Small or large, the anti-doping 
laboratories are much too involved in 
the world of business, its power and 
economic tensions to remain in a state 
of structural underdevelopment. The 
accredited laboratories are similar to 
contemporary industries concerned with 
conflicts of interests and credibility. The 
directors might become totally isolated 
from the clean athletes’ realities, the base 
for which they fundamentally work. At the 
same time, they have to be independent 
from any anti-doping organisation and, of 
course, from WADA; these unique entities 
that allow them to work and survive.
Ways to prevent these contradictions 
include the processes by which 
the laboratories are structured and 
organised, their accountability and how 
these are made transparent to the whole 
range of stakeholders, including the 
clean athletes, in the fight again doping 
in sport.
Principles of Corporate 
Governance
Contemporary discussions on corporate 
governance tend to refer to several 
general principles. They can be applied 
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to the anti-doping laboratories provided 
WADA agree to adapt their requirements 
to them:
• Rights and equitable treatment of all 
stakeholders: 
 – Laboratories should respect the 
rights of stakeholders and help them 
to exercise those rights 
 – They can help by openly and 
effectively communicating 
information and by encouraging 
stakeholders to participate in their 
scientific meetings
• Role and responsibilities of the 
directors: 
 – The directors need sufficient 
relevant skills and understanding to 
review and challenge management 
performance 
 – It also needs adequate size and 
appropriate levels of independence 
and commitment
• Integrity and ethical behaviour: 
 – Integrity should be a fundamental 
requirement in choosing corporate 
officers and directories’ members 
 – Organisations should develop a 
code of conduct for their directors 
and executives that promote ethical 
and responsible decisions’ making
• Disclosure and transparency: 
 – Laboratories should clarify and 
make publicly known, the roles 
and responsibilities of directors 
and management’s staff to provide 
stakeholders with a level of 
accountability 
 – They should also implement 
procedures to independently verify 
and safeguard the integrity of the 
company’s financial reporting 
 – Disclosure of material matters 
concerning the organisation should 
be timely and balanced to ensure 
that all stakeholders have access to 
clear, factual, information
Good Over Insufficient 
Governance
Many points listed above could be 
a good basis for achieving a good 
governance level in an anti-doping 
laboratory. This is essential because 
insufficient or bad governance had 
cast doubt on an laboratory’s reliability, 
integration and correct obligations to their 
stakeholders including the clean athlete 
and the public at large (Kromberck, 
2015). Ignorance, tolerance or support of 
illegal activities can create scandals like 
the ones touched on here.
As far as their corporate organisation 
is concerned, these units don’t have 
a formal board of Directors. If they 
have one executive director, most 
of the time, it is a scientific one. In 
spite of the complexity of the field, 
other professionals (administrative or 
economic) placed with an equal level of 
responsibility are rarely in place. Similarly, 
an individual with full proficiency in sports 
law is often lacking. In addition, someone 
with a strong forensic background, a 
person able to understand both science 
and law, could well complete this ideal 
directors team.
Apart from the IOC, the IFs and the 
NADO’s, very few bodies have shown 
interest in been involved in the evolution 
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of the rules around the fight of doping 
in sports. Athletes are shy in expressing 
their opinion and when they do, it is 
indirect and mostly through platforms set 
by their senior bodies like the Athletes’ 
commission at the IOC. There are, 
however, a few rare exceptions, the true 
independence of which is not always 
guaranteed.
For example, the Sport Integrity Global 
Alliance (SIGA, 2016; http://siga-sport.
com) claims to be the only organisation 
to bring together sport, governments, 
academia, international organisations, 
sponsors, business, rights holders, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
and professional services companies, 
from every region in the world, around 
a common cause of fostering greater 
integrity throughout sport.
This, as claimed “independent and 
neutral coalition of more than 70 
international multi-industry individual 
members, established in November 
2015”, announced on October 2016 
the release of a draft set of universal 
integrity standards for sport. It will cover 
good governance, financial integrity and 
sports betting integrity. This document 
is currently under consultation. Not 
surprisingly, they have excluded the 
doping problems from their scope, 
leaving to WADA the responsibility to 
tackle this problem. Consequently, and 
as confirmed by similar initiatives that 
have emerged recently, sports anti-
doping good governance is considered 
globally to be WADA business only.
If the credibility of WADA is still 
considered high, a new autonomous 
institution(s) could create revised 
guidelines and impose more efficient 
rules to anti-doping laboratories. 
firstly, WADA itself must become more 
independent from its historical partners, 
who share the responsibility of sports 
governance worldwide. Transparency 
and accountability are the most 
important keywords for being credible 
and successful.
Conclusion
The debate about a more independent 
WADA to deliver new clean sports 
principles are high on the political agenda 
and sport needs to lead that discussion. 
Sport has both the power and the 
financial capacity for it. Crucially, though, 
does it have the vision to find good and 
sustainable solutions and the will to avoid 
political imposition? This should be the 
way forward but for now, why not start to 
impose better governance rules where it 
is easy to do this? 
Most of the stakeholders in anti-doping 
are giving full autonomy to WADA to take 
care of a large revision of the system. 
They consider anti-doping being part of 
WADA and do not want to interfere in this 
territory. 
The first step would be to impose 
rigorous scrutiny and strict application 
of the rules and best practice. This 
means better controls and a stricter 
follow-up of each member of the anti-
doping chain. Anti-doping laboratories 
may still appear as black boxes where 
undue manipulation is always possible. 
This loophole in the doping detection 
chain cannot continue and should be 
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eliminated. Trust in individuals is not 
sufficient. By installing a board of several 
directors responsible for fully and publicly 
reporting all activities of each accredited 
laboratory may be the first move for 
transparency, leading to a greater trust 
by all stakeholders. One further step to 
reinforce the whole system, would be to 
place all anti-doping laboratories under 
the responsibility of WADA. The clean 
athlete, the principal stakeholder in the 
sports universe, will certainly benefit 
most from better governance leading to 
more dialogue, integrity and trust.
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‘A ‘no’ uttered from deepest 
conviction is better and 
greater than a ‘yes’ merely 
uttered to please, or what is 
worse, to avoid trouble’
Mahatma GANDHI 
(Leader of the Indian independence movement)
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Abstract
Return-to-Sport decisions after injury 
are complex and could be interpreted 
as an exercise in risk management. 
Clinicians face them on a daily basis and 
need to navigate the multi-stakeholder 
environment of competitive sports, 
where athletes and medical staff must 
collaborate with coaching staff, sports 
managers and agents, notwithstanding 
the media and financial stakeholders. 
Some key questions emerge from the 
recent literature and also from problematic 
situations discussed here. Measurable 
criteria of tissue healing need to be 
available and should be major goals of 
rehabilitation, but psychological factors are 
important as well. Next come contextual 
factors which vary depending on the type 
of sport, the timing of the season, the 
stage of the career and the future risk for 
the athlete. In order to make adequate 
Return-to-Sport decisions, a process 
must be followed, one which should 
integrate optimal planning, communication 
between stakeholders, appropriate levels 
of expertise and understanding by all 
parties and a thorough documentation 
that allows optimal transparency in the 
team-injured athlete dyad, and adequate 
integration of the coach/sport organization 
as well. Various models are presented, 
that come from clinical best practices, 
behavioural sciences and economics, as 
well as management and governance. The 
reunion of different skills and raising the 
level of education and health literacy of all 
stakeholders plays a key role in optimizing 
Return-to-Sport decisions and ultimately 
protecting the health of the athlete.
Introduction
“Hey Doc, when will I/he/she be able to 
play again”?
This is what a sports medicine physician 
will invariably hear within minutes after 
an athlete is hurt on the pitch. The first to 
ask is usually the coach, wanting to know 
whether the player can return immediately 
to the ongoing competition. At the 
same time, fans and spectators will ask 
themselves that same question, echoing 
the media broadcasters when the event 
is of that importance. If the player cannot 
return immediately, very soon the team or 
sports organization manager(s) will want to 
know, maybe the sponsors, and of course, 
the athlete him/herself. 
Clinicians in sports medicine face this 
very difficult question on a regular basis. 
What seems to be a fairly straightforward 
question, one that calls for a direct and 
precise answer, is actually one of the 
most complex and challenging task in 
the field of sports medicine. It is complex 
because it also asks about the values 
and priorities of sports. What is the goal 
of athletic endeavor? The answer may 
differ depending on the stakeholders. 
To a sports medicine physician, the goal 
should always remain the same: to develop 
the skills and competence of the athlete 
or human being so that he or she can 
perform in sports and in life to the best 
of their potential, whilst staying healthy. 
Healthy in the short term (protecting the 
athlete from injury) and healthy in the long 
term (protecting the athlete from negative 
consequences of any illness or injury 
for the future of his/her life). For a sport 
organization, the goal might differ a little, 
74
Reflections on Return-to-Sport Issues in Competitive Sports
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
as the short term performance goals 
might be at the forefront, without a full 
understanding of the health implications. 
In a world of elite sports that is ever 
developing, with constantly rising stakes, 
whether personal, financial or political, one 
thing remains absolutely clear: elite sports 
performance leads to health hazards and 
injuries will occur. No matter how much 
is invested in the medical care and the 
protection of the athletes, the simple fact 
is that athletes will go faster and higher 
to push beyond the limits of what was 
once deemed impossible. Recently a 
study looked at the various movements 
in the game of football and how it evolved 
in recent years, only to show that the 
speed and number of fast-paced actions 
increased dramatically, putting players 
under a higher load, one generally linked 
to the occurrence of injuries (Barnes et 
al.). For example, although the care of elite 
footballers has tremendously improved 
in the last decade with various types 
of preventative measures ranging from 
improved general fitness, strengthening 
of the most frequently injured muscles 
and applying modern recovery enhancing 
therapies, to optimized treatment and 
adequate staffing, we still seem to 
observe a similar if not rising rate of 
sports-specific injuries. In elite football, 
the rate of hamstring muscle injuries 
has steadily increased by 4% per year 
(Ekstrand, Walden and Hagglund). We 
know that one of the main risk factors 
for new injuries is the history of previous 
ones, and that injuries tend to recur 
sooner after returning to sports rather 
than later. It then becomes absolutely 
essential to manage the Return-to-Sport 
(RTS) processes optimally, keeping in 
mind that an injured or diminished athlete 
will not be able to successfully perform 
at the level required by all stakeholders. 
There is no performance without 
optimal health and this should put the 
athlete’s well-being as the top priority 
in elite sports. This short review will try 
to outline the multiple reasons for the 
complexity of RTS decisions, and then 
provide some guidance on how optimized 
processes should be thought about and 
implemented.
What does Complete 
Recovery Mean?
Successful RTS might mean different 
things to different people, and can be 
dependent on context and outcome. The 
athlete might want to return as early as 
possible to be seen on the field of play, 
the coach might define success viewing 
it through a performance lens (can the 
athlete bring a meaningful performance, 
whether individually or for a team), whilst 
the clinician will have a definition that 
integrates the avoidance of recurring 
injuries and preservation of the medium 
to long-term health of the athlete (Ardern, 
Glasgow, et al.).
Recovery criteria. In order for an 
athlete to come back to the playing field, 
some key parameters need to have 
been met. There are various elements 
to take into consideration: first, RTS 
must be understood as a sports-specific 
decision, since the demands of various 
sport activities will differ. Not only due 
to the type of sport, but also in light of 
the level at which the athlete wants to 
resume his/her participation. Second, the 
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injured body part must have recovered 
its full functional capacity. Table 1 
defines what this means for some of 
the most common injuries encountered 
in competitive sports. An important 
element is that functional capacity must 
be understood as not only satisfying 
anatomical restoration of tissues, but also 
recovery of neuromuscular abilities, as 
well as psychological readiness to face 
the challenges of full sports participation. 
The obvious factors are linked to the 
absence of movement limitation (e.g., 
knee range of motion after a surgical 
intervention, swelling of a joint or 
inflammation of the tissues), or significant 
muscular atrophy resulting from the body 
part being offloaded, immobilized or 
underused during the initial phases of the 
injury. 
Condition Range for 
time to RTP
Main criteria needed for full capacity Valid for all 
injuries
Concussion 7 to 15 
days
Absence of typical concussion 
symptoms upon exertion, 
appropriate balance and hand-eye 
coordination, full cognitive capacity 
(neurophysiological testing). Graded 
return-to-play protocol.
Psychological 
readiness, 
tissue healing, 
complete 
sports-
specific 
rehabilitative 
process
ACL injury 8 to 12 
months
Joint mobility and lack of swelling, lack 
of pain, adequate strength in lower 
limbs, optimal proprioception and joint 
position sense, symmetrical movement 
quality with side-cutting manoeuvers, 
adequate and symmetrical power 
generation ability (jumps, acceleration), 
confidence in ability to perform without 
apprehension.
Ankle sprain 
(grades II 
to III)
2 to 4 
months
Joint mobility and lack of swelling, 
restoration of joint stability (surgically 
or through rehabilitative process), lack 
of pain, adequate strength and power 
in leg and calf muscless, optimal 
proprioception and joint position 
sense, symmetrical movement quality.
Hamstring 
muscle tear
3 to 12 
weeks
Absence of pain upon stretching 
and forceful contraction, adequate 
strength and power, high-speed and 
load retraining, confidence in ability to 
perform without apprehension.
Table 1: Common sporting injuries and criteria for full functional capacity
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The less obvious factors relate to 
the functional capacity. In elite sport 
environments that benefit from a 
multidisciplinary sports medicine and 
sports science team, athletes will 
undergo various performance tests 
at regular intervals, and these can be 
used as benchmarks to attain when 
recovering from an injury. Unfortunately 
such baseline healthy tests are not 
always available and it doesn’t always 
suffice to compare the injured limb to the 
non-injured one, because we know that 
the injury will lead to a loss of function 
(strength, coordination, power) in the 
unaffected limb as well. On the other 
hand, even when good benchmark 
parameters are available, it appears 
that most football players returning to 
sport successfully still have muscular 
strength deficit that do not limit them 
in their performance capacity (Tol et 
al.). This reminds us of the complexity 
of performance capacity, and of its 
multifactorial nature. The body is indeed 
capable of compensating in different 
ways, especially in sports that allow for 
multiple ways of contributing to success. 
Naturally, a sprinter will require maximal 
force generating capacity, but an athlete 
in team sports might contribute through 
a range of actions requiring less absolute 
physical performance. We can recall 
an example from the 1970 basketball 
NBA Finals: New York Knicks center 
Willis Reed (who had been named Most 
Valuable Player of the regular season 
that year) suffered a hamstring muscle 
injury in game 5 (in the best of seven 
series) against the Los Angeles Lakers. 
He sat out game 6, which his team lost, 
and was uncertain for the decisive game 
7 on their home court. As he hobbled 
onto the court during warm-up, his 
teammates and the sold-out Madison 
Square Garden crowd knew they had 
a chance. He contributed as he could 
and his teammates did the rest to win 
the championship in what became a 
legendary moment in NBA basketball. 
Reed would later say: “I didn’t want to 
have to look at myself in the mirror 20 
years later and say I wished I had tried to 
play“. Obviously his thigh muscle had not 
fully recovered, but it is the unique ability 
of a leader on the field to empower and 
motivate his teammates to outperform 
the opponent. Had a medical doctor 
been asked about his ability to play, the 
answer would inevitably have been: “he is 
not fit to play”.
Contextual factors. As we saw in 
the example above, these factors 
will influence the decision-making 
process in RTS and they comprise the 
following: the type of injury/illness, the 
age or the career stage of the athlete, 
the importance of the upcoming 
competitions (e.g., Olympics, World 
Championships), and the social and 
financial stakes. All of these will modify 
the way risk is interpreted. Shrier has 
described a model of risk management 
for RTS under the acronym StARRT, for 
Strategic Assessment of Risk and Risk 
Tolerance in RTS (Shrier). The first two 
steps of the risk assessment comprise 
an evaluation of tissue health (medical 
factors, functional tests, medical imaging) 
and tissue stresses (to be applied to the 
recovering body part during the planned 
activity). The third step assesses risk 
tolerance, which includes the contextual 
factors (timing of the season, desire 
to compete, external pressure, etc.). 
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When risk assessment exceeds risk 
tolerance, the decision should be to not 
RTS. Contextual factors will always play 
a role in the decision-making process, 
but should be integrated with a clear 
understanding of the risks and must 
be made absolutely transparent to the 
athlete. In the next section, we look at 
some actual cases.
A few Examples of 
Problematic Situations
Concussion. Concussion in sports 
fuels a lot of discussions on injury 
management in elite sports. The main 
reasons being that concussions go 
frequently unnoticed and players 
continue playing, although they may 
be limited in their ability to perform and 
make optimal judgements on the field, 
and expose themselves to an elevated 
risk of a more severe, and potentially 
life-threatening injury. In the 2014 
Football World Cup, a few concussions 
sparked a heated debate (Gojanovic). 
In the final between Germany and 
Argentina, Christoph Kramer suffered a 
severe blow to the head with rotational 
force impacted to the brain early in the 
match. Although he seemed obviously 
dazed, he continued playing another 
15 minutes. He notoriously asked the 
referee shortly after the blow: “Is this 
the final, I need to know”? The referee 
later stated that he thought Kramer was 
joking. He eventually had to be pulled 
out in a state of confusion, and later said 
he could not remember anything from 
the time of the concussion to later in 
the locker room. Similarly, earlier in the 
competition, Uruguay’s Alvaro Pereira 
suffered a severe knee kick in the head 
that left him unconscious on the pitch. 
As he recovered and was taken to the 
sideline, his team doctor examined him 
and signaled for a necessary substitution 
in light of the obvious concussion. The 
player was agitated and refused the 
decision of the doctor, pushed him 
away and signified he wanted to resume 
playing, which he ultimately did. He 
apologized officially the next day for his 
gesture, acknowledging that he should 
have respected the decision of his 
medical staff. Having said that, he also 
concluded by saying that he must had 
done the right thing nonetheless, since 
he was able to help his team defeat 
England in that match. The problem is 
that not only have these players been 
exposed to a danger of more severe 
injury, but they have done so on the 
biggest world stage, for all (kids, parents, 
coaches, managers everywhere) to see 
that it was alright to leave them on the 
pitch. “If it is ok on that stage, it must be 
ok in my regional kids games, is it not?” 
These two example raise quite a few 
questions around the management 
of acute injuries. How can an optimal 
decision be made, one preserving 
the safety of the athlete and of the 
game, whilst avoiding any form of overt 
medicalization of bodily contacts which 
are inevitable in competitive sports. 
The stakes are sometimes high on 
the sporting level (major competition, 
media coverage, national pride, financial 
interests), and can be career-defining for 
an athlete. But they are also high on the 
health and safety level, whereby the risk 
taken by continuation of play after an 
injury puts the athlete at risk of a more 
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severe injury, one which can end a career 
or lead to permanent health damage 
(Quintana). 
Anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) 
injuries. The discussion is a bit different 
when we look at knee ligament injuries. 
Assuming a basketball player tears his 
ACL, we know that the likelihood that 
a non-operative treatment allows him 
to RTS at the highest level of play is 
extremely limited. Surgery will invariably 
require a type of ligament reconstruction 
that will never be the exact anatomical 
replication of the uninjured knee, neither 
structurally, nor biomechanically, and 
will be followed by a lengthy multistage 
rehabilitation. Once the athlete has 
successfully completed all steps as 
we currently define them (these will 
be refined and optimized in the future) 
and cleared to RTS, he now faces the 
following statistics: the risk of tearing 
the graft in the first year is at around 
5%. Assuming an athlete completes a 
fast rehabilitation and achieves some 
functional milestones quickly, he could 
possibly be cleared for RTS at 6 months. 
If that same athlete decides to wait 
another month before RTS, he will reduce 
his re-injury risk by 28%, and this is true 
for each additional month he trains and 
rehabs before RTS. We know that 1 
year after RTS at the highest level, about 
65% still compete at that level, and the 
number falls to 38% at 2 years post RTS 
(Ardern, Taylor, et al.). Yet the media keep 
telling us that a professional footballer 
or skier can RTS in 6 months after their 
injury. These messages are driven by a 
few exceptions and never mention the 
fact that they entail a much higher risk of 
re-injury. Lindsay Vonn injured her ACL 
in February 2014 towards the end of the 
season. She quickly underwent surgery 
and naturally started her rehabilitation 
as promptly and seriously as possible, 
in order to get back on skis as quickly 
as possible. And she did return to 
competition, only to re-injure her ACL in 
November 2014. We can look at this and 
simply say that these types of injuries are 
part of elite sports and that the athletes 
are familiar with them and take risks 
they can understand. This may be true 
in some cases for adult athletes, but 
the same cannot be said for younger 
developing athletes, who are sometimes 
pushed to take these risks despite 
not having a full understanding of the 
potential consequences.
Injuries on the pitch. In the closing 
minutes of the second match of the 
Premier League season on August 8th, 
2015, Chelsea player Eden Hazard 
was tripped and fell to the ground lying 
still. The referee signaled for the bench 
medical staff to come to the pitch, 
signal immediately followed by the 
physiotherapist and team doctor Eva 
Carneiro jumping off the bench onto the 
pitch. This all seems perfectly normal, 
as it is their role and duty to follow the 
referee’s call and to tend to an apparently 
injured player. Following their sprint 
on the pitch, Chelsea’s coach, José 
Mourinho, can be seen gesticulating 
and screaming at his medical staff, 
which he would then confirm at the 
press conference. He would call team 
doctor Carneiro “naïve and impulsive” 
and imply that she did not understand 
the game, and that it was obvious that 
Hazard was simply tired (he did not 
have any significant injuries indeed, yet 
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he was lying still, face down, for quite 
some time). She would be side-lined in 
the next games and eventually let go 
by the team despite a major uproar by 
the whole medical expert community. 
The lawsuit that followed was eventually 
settled by Mr. Mourinho’s lawyers for an 
undisclosed amount. This case calls for 
some very important questions as to who 
is making decisions regarding an athlete’s 
health conditions as an acute injury 
occurs. Various statements have been 
issued by medical and sport associations 
in the following weeks and months to 
remind of the chain of command in such 
cases: the medical staff is the only one 
able and competent to make such calls.
Who should Decide on 
RTS?
“If the guy wants to play, well… he 
plays” – Christian Constantin, Sion FC 
president.
The player will ultimately be the one who 
returns to play, and if he does not feel 
ready, he should not go. The athlete’s 
psychological readiness is an essential 
component in the RTS decision, although 
it has long been overlooked. But we 
Figure 1: RTS models
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know that the pressure he can be under, 
or the context at hand might push 
the decision. We recognize the need 
to have a multidisciplinary team with 
complementary skills to effectively guide 
the athlete towards recovery and help 
all stakeholders understand and decide 
adequately. 
Recently, a study asked the various 
professionals in Canadian sport about 
the most appropriate person to evaluate 
the possibility of RTS (Shrier, Safai and 
Charland). Sports medicine physicians, 
physiotherapists, athletic therapists, 
chiropractors, massage therapists, 
athletes, coaches and representatives 
from sport organizations were surveyed. 
The authors concluded from the surveys 
that all clinicians (doctors, physios 
and athletic trainers), except massage 
therapists, were considered best able 
to assess factors related to RTS. Each 
of these three clinician groups believed 
their own profession to be the most 
capable for this assessment, although 
there was some variation in the criteria 
they would utilize to make a decision. 
The authors call for more research 
on and implementation of shared 
decision-making practices in the sport 
injury context, as it appears that most 
stakeholders can add valuable elements 
to the process.
Theoretical models. In order to 
optimize the time of RTS, we need to 
ensure that the athlete undergoes an 
optimal and comprehensive rehabilitation 
process. This process needs to be 
supported by the current best practices 
and models and three need to be 
mentioned. 
1. The StARRT model defines a 
framework of 3 steps to lead to the 
assessment of RTS (Shrier): tissue health 
achieved, tissue stresses to be applied, 
risk tolerance modifiers as discussed 
above. 
2. The Biopsychosocial model, which 
takes us beyond the usual physical 
factors to integrate the myriad other 
factors influencing health outcomes 
(Wiese-Bjornstal). 
3. The optimal loading theory, which is 
the bedrock of training science, ensuring 
that a constant progression of tissue 
resistance without overload can be 
achieved by an adequate loading rate 
and frequency, without neglecting the 
need for recovery between training units 
or tissue stressors (Blanch and Gabbett).
When these principles can be applied, 
and when the roles of the various 
stakeholders have been defined, sport 
organisations have a setting for good 
decisions for every RTS situation (Figure 
1). This decision should be made within 
the shared decision-making model that 
represents current best clinical practice 
(Elwyn et al.).
Good Governance 
and Return-to-Sport
In a nutshell, the RTS process is one 
that requires multiples steps in a multi-
stakeholder environment. When the 
medical team can establish that the 
required physical criteria have been 
fulfilled, and then only, should RTS be 
considered. There may be some debate 
81AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
as to what the key criteria are, and this is 
where subjective and contextual factors 
will intervene (Dijkstra et al.). 
The rider and the elephant. The 
context of elite sports calls for emotions 
before rationality. Behavioural sciences 
teaches us about the complexity of 
decision-making, and the existing 
polarization between our emotional 
(System 1) and our rational (System 2) 
brain as described by Kahnemann in 
Thinking fast, thinking slow (Kahneman). 
Jonathan Haidt builds on these elements 
and introduces in the Happiness 
hypothesis the allegory of the rider and 
the elephant. Picture the rider sitting on 
top of the elephant. Who do you think 
decides where the elephant is going? The 
rider is our rational brain, full of logical 
thinking, scientific certainties (sometimes 
scientifically proven false by further 
research) and intellectual determination. 
The elephant is our visceral or emotional 
brain, it is impulsive, reacts before 
it thinks and moves according to its 
own rules. The rider tries to steer the 
emotional elephant (Haidt). When this is 
applied to decision-making in RTS, we 
can consider that the elephant is the 
compound powerhouse of coaches, 
management, public pressure, national 
pride, player motivation. The elephant 
decides that Lindsay Vonn competes 
earlier than what should be “reasonable”, 
or that Christoph Kramer stays on the 
pitch despite an obvious concussion. 
The elephant screams out loud that Dr 
Carneiro was impulsive to jump onto the 
pitch and jeopardized the team’s success 
by removing Eden Hazard from play for a 
few minutes at the end of a tied football 
game. The best way to achieve a positive 
outcome is through a combination of 
efforts, to direct the rider (the clinician), 
motivate the elephant, and shape the 
path that the pair must follow (Heath and 
Heath). 
Three Steps to Improve 
In order to shape the path, Heath 
recommends the following three steps. 
1. Adjustments in the environment
A potentially concussed player should 
be evaluated in a calm setting (hint: not 
in front of cameras on the pitch), where 
the medical expert can carry out a 
correct examination to reach a medical 
decision. The ground rules should also 
empower the clinician (the rider) to own 
his decision and have it respected by all 
other stakeholders, no matter the level of 
pressures exerted. Some changes have 
occurred in rugby, as they introduced 
the Pitch Side Concussion Assessment 
(PSCA) tool, which establishes some 
strict rules and protocol to follow in 
case of a suspected concussion. It also 
empowers the referee, the team doctor 
or the neutral game doctor to remove 
the player from play without possible 
contestation (Fuller, Kemp and Decq). 
In football, some changes have been 
implemented (FSEM), like the introduction 
of a neutral medical doctor, whilst others 
have been rejected. The most interesting 
one to be rejected was the proposal of 
an extra “concussion substitution”, which 
would put less pressure on a team to 
remove a concussed player. It remains 
a bit of a mystery as to why this is not 
implemented, but some cultural and 
conservative aspects in sports must not 
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be underestimated. 
2. Building habits for better 
decisions.
It is absolutely essential to develop 
good reflexes in the face of injuries, 
whether in the acute setting calling for 
an immediate decision, or in the case 
of an athlete having gone through a 
lengthy rehabilitation and who is eager 
to compete again. It is our opinion that 
education and proper information of all 
stakeholders can help develop better 
habits. It starts with the medical teams, 
which have to be regularly updated on 
the latest knowledge available. There 
is unfortunately a large variation in the 
level of knowledge amongst clinicians 
and this needs to be improved in the 
first place. Education opportunities exist, 
staff members should attend certification 
courses and sport organizations should 
only hire competent and certified medical 
staff. 
3. Rally the herd to harvest the 
power of peer-pressure. 
Successful programs or changes must 
be communicated and replicated. 
Research should serve that purpose, as 
ideally any study should provide some 
meaningful new information that can lead 
to implementation in a reasonable time-
frame. When positive experiences are 
replicated, they can become contagious, 
as the power of peer-pressure teaches us 
through many examples (Gojanovic).
Improving communication. It may be 
too simple to say that communication is 
the mainstay of any team environment, 
yet this seems oftentimes neglected 
in the sport setting. There are multiple 
components that can lead to effective 
communication between the various 
stakeholders of elite sports: it starts 
with people understanding the need to 
exchange information, which in turn has 
to be delivered in an understandable 
way (think of the appropriateness of 
medical jargon being transferred to 
a sports manager or the athlete him/
herself). The information also needs 
to be communicated in a timely and 
relevant fashion in order to be properly 
received and adequately interpreted. 
The communication tools must be 
agreed on, etc. We have experienced 
many an elite sports setting where 
most of these simple principles were 
not even considered. Now when we 
take the case of an athlete going 
through an ACL injury and needing 
an operation, there will be multiple 
opportunities for miscommunication and 
misunderstanding to happen, and it often 
happens.
RTS as a project to manage. We could 
consider that such an ACL injury is a 
project to manage. Project management 
is best understood by defining what 
a project is: a temporary endeavor to 
create a unique result, ensuring optimal 
outcomes and protecting the assets. 
Return-to-Sport may fit the bill, with steps 
geared towards helping athletes achieve 
their individual (unique) goals. In this case, 
RTS has a clearly identifiable beginning 
(injury) and progresses towards a unique 
result, returning to the highest level of 
competition. Each RTS project also 
defines the scope and resources, and is 
unique although the processes remain 
the same. Uniqueness comes from the 
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fact that each athletic injury or illness 
has its own anatomical and physiological 
characteristics, notwithstanding changing 
environments and stakeholders. The 
resources available for rehabilitation 
and the stakeholders need to be 
known. In our example (Figure2, a 
professional football athlete with ACL 
reconstruction), a physiotherapist and 
an athletic trainer might work together 
with a sports medicine doctor. A sports 
psychologist and a nutritionist might be 
consulted, and the coach, agent and 
team management (including media 
relations) are informed regularly. How, 
when and what is communicated is part 
of planning. The roles are clear and goals 
are set on a timeline. The progression 
is decided by incremental functional 
milestones reached, not by time. A 
system for communication is put in place 
and all staff are familiar with the process 
and the use of the tool. Figure 2 depicts 
how the central part (execution and 
monitoring) can be managed to facilitate 
informed shared decision-making and 
communication. Each member of the 
rehabilitation team has access to the 
RTS progression document and fills its 
part on a regular basis (weekly usually). 
This allows all team members to have 
an instant visual overview of the state 
of progression and this can be shared 
with the athlete as a basis for discussion 
and decisions. Such tools do naturally 
not preclude the team members from 
meeting, but it strengthens the common 
understanding of the path to follow, or we 
could say that it shapes the path towards 
Figure 2: RTS Framework
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the one goal, RTS (Gojanovic et al.).
Educating future leaders in sports. 
The AISTS (Académie Internationale 
des Sciences et Technologies du Sport, 
aists.org) hosts a masters in sports 
administration, in which future managers 
learn about sports medicine and the 
RTS process, helping to shape that path 
towards better governance in the RTS 
discussion and in the wider context of 
health-related issues in elite sports. It is 
only through the shared knowledge of 
the processes involved in sport injury 
rehabilitation and the consequences of 
injuries that uncomfortable situations 
and bad decisions can be minimized. 
We therefore encourage all stakeholders 
to develop their understanding of the 
health-related issues in sports, first in 
order to be a better leader and empower 
medical staff on their organizations, and 
second because any amount of improved 
health literacy can be beneficial to every 
individual.
Towards a new dimension for 
good governance in sport. With 
these reflections in mind, sport 
organizations can implement effective 
and respectful processes based on 
current best practice from medicine, 
behavioural sciences and psychology, 
and management (Gojanovic et al.). The 
principles of good governance in sports 
mostly apply to elements of transparency, 
integrity, controlling, representation 
and solidarity, as defined by Chappelet 
and Mrkonjic (Chappelet and Mrkonjic). 
There are no precise definitions of what 
good governance means in the athlete 
health domain, and perhaps this should 
be developed in the near future. The 
IOC medical code has worked towards 
an emphasis on athlete well-being and 
self-determination, being supported by 
its sport organization and medical staff 
(IOC). The following articles are of utmost 
relevance and should be kept in mind at 
all times (bold sections by the author of 
this review):
• Article 1.2.1: “Athletes must be 
informed, in a clear and appropriate 
way, regarding their health status and 
any specific diagnosis; preventive 
measures; proposed medical 
interventions, together with the risks 
and benefits of each intervention; 
alternatives to proposed interventions, 
including the consequences of 
non-treatment for their health 
and for their return to sports 
practice; the progress of treatment 
and rehabilitation measures and their 
ultimate prognosis”.
• Article 1.6.1: “The same ethical 
principles that apply to the 
practice of medicine apply within 
the practice of sports medicine. 
The principal duties of physicians and 
other health care providers in sport 
settings include: a. doing no harm; 
b. making the health of athletes a 
priority”. 
• Article 1.6.2: “Health care providers 
who care for athletes must possess 
the necessary education, training 
and experience in sports medicine, 
and maintain their knowledge and 
skills up to date through continuous 
professional development”. 
• Article 1.6.4: “When due to their 
medical condition, the health or well-
being of an athlete is at increased risk, 
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health care providers must inform them 
accordingly. When the risk is severe, 
they must strongly discourage the 
athlete from continuing training or 
competition including if necessary 
by providing a written certificate of 
unfitness to practise. When there is a 
risk to third parties (players of the same 
team, opponents, family, the public, 
etc.), health care providers may 
also inform the competent persons 
or authorities, even against the will 
of the athletes, about their unfitness to 
participate in training or competition, 
subject to applicable legislation”.
• Article 1.6.8: “At sports venues, it is 
the responsibility of either the 
team or competition physician 
to determine whether an injured 
athlete may continue in or return 
to the competition according to the 
rules of the competition. At all times, 
the overriding priority must be to 
safeguard the health and safety of 
athletes. The decision must not be 
influenced by the potential outcome 
of the competition”.
We definitely support and applaud 
the positive raised awareness that the 
Olympic Movement Medical Code 
brings to the protection of the health of 
the athlete. In future developments and 
discussions, the athletic career should 
be considered with a sustainable health 
and performance perspective, one which 
integrates the early phases of the sport 
career (athlete development pathways), 
the inevitable occurrence of injuries and 
setbacks, and the post athletic career 
medical and social consequences. It is 
only when these elements are integrated 
in the world of elite sports that we will 
be able to ensure that the health and 
development of the athlete is protected 
and looked after, with benevolence as 
another key element in governance.
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List of abbreviations
• AIS - Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 
• CAH – Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
• CAIS – Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 
• CAS – Court of Arbitration for Sport
• DSD – Disorders of Sex Development
• IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federations 
• IF – International Federation
• NF – National sports Federation 
• IOC – International Olympic Committee 
• Kgs. – Kilograms
• min - Minutes
• PCOS – Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome 
• PCR – Polymerase Chain Reaction
• s - Seconds
• SC – Steeple Chase
• SD – Standard Deviation
• SRY – Sex determining region Y
• UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
• WHO- World Health Organization
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‘Governance is the process 
whereby people in power 
make decisions that create, 
destroy or maintain social 
systems.’
Maria RAMOS 
(Portuguese business woman)
Author’s note: The IOC Regulations on Female Hyperandrogenism described in this study was in force 
for the London 2012 Olympic Games. It was, however, rescinded by the IOC ahead of the Rio 2016 
Olympic Games. The last IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogenism in 
November 2015 recommended stakeholders to revert to CAS with evidence to support the reinstatement 
of its hyperandrogenism policies.
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Abstract
Background: Since 1900, there have 
been increasingly more opportunities for 
women’s participation in elite sport on 
and beyond the field. Despite obvious 
gains, the environment remains tense as 
they continue to face demanding policies 
compared to their male counterparts. 
“Gender verification” tests have 
historically presented intricate situations, 
which most recently has drawn focus on 
those with disorders of sex development. 
Aims: To explore sex eligibility policies 
through history and identify challenges, 
with a particular focus on the current 
policies in place under the jurisdiction 
of the International Olympic Committee, 
whose basis of eligibility to compete 
as a woman is on the serum levels of 
androgens.
Methods: Review of available policy 
guidelines and documents was done. 
Three case studies of athletes who 
faced the gender debacle and two key 
informant interviews were conducted to 
identify issues encountered from both 
athlete and governance perspectives.
Results: From the case studies, it was 
evident that all three athletes faced 
difficulties in coping with the gender 
situation but to different degrees. 
Maria Jose and Caster Semenya had 
better support systems to enable 
them to return to sport. The themes 
raised from the interviews included the 
commitment from the IOC and IAAF to 
support female participation in sports, 
work towards addressing challenges 
of existing female eligibility policies and 
provide the most up to date and informed 
professional management for affected 
athletes. Document review showed that 
information pertaining to the policies were 
not readily available publicly. However, 
there were ongoing reviews on these 
policies at the IOC and IAAF over the 
period when this study was conducted.
Conclusions: Eligibility policies are 
necessary in sex segregated sport. 
To achieve fairness and respect for 
all athletes, further research, capacity 
building among stakeholders at all levels 
and scaling up of support systems for 
affected athletes are warranted.
Introduction
When the Olympic Games were 
established in the 8th Century, one of the 
criteria for participation included being 
male. From its inception, the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) held the 
prevailing cultural notion that women did 
not fit the strength and stamina image 
of sport, over aesthetic qualities. It was 
not until 1900 in Paris, four years after 
the first modern games in Athens, that 
22 women participated in the modern 
Olympic Games. They competed in 
sailing, croquet, equestrian, tennis and 
golf but only the latter two had events 
for women only (Committee). Female 
participation has steadily increased over 
the years. In London, at the Games of 
the XXX Olympiad, a record more than 
44% of represented athletes were female 
and for first time in history, women 
competed in every sport on the Olympic 
programme. Today, women are also 
represented beyond the competition 
field, in governance and administrative 
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structures (IOC). 
Sex segregation into men and women’s 
categories, then and now, remains the 
concept of levelling the playing field at all 
levels of sport. This is not only explained 
on a socio-cultural basis that deemed 
women unfit to partake physical activity 
but also because of how women differ 
from men biologically. Further, from a 
governance perspective, the inclusion 
of women’s categories has played a key 
role in boosting women’s participation 
in sport. Despite the obvious gains, the 
environment in elite sport remains tense 
for female athletes. While some policies 
have been used to advance women’s 
sport, others might be outright offensive 
(Sanchez, Martinez-Patino and Vilain).
As segregated competition creates the 
possibility of sex fraud, some athletes 
have attempted to gain competitive 
advantage in the past by competing 
under an assumed gender identity 
(Reeser). Also, since sports are divided 
into male and female categories, many 
female athletes consider it unfair if they 
have to compete against a woman who 
has the advantage of male physiology 
(Bermon et al.).The practice of mandatory 
gender verification by sports governing 
bodies arose following cases of 
three world champion athletes who 
competed as women in the 1930s and 
1940s but subsequently underwent 
sex reassignment surgery to become 
males. One individual, Herman Ratjen, 
competed as Dora in the 1936 Berlin 
Olympic Games and later admitted to 
being a male impostor who was forced 
into this role by Nazi Germany (Dickinson 
et al.).
The World Health Organization (WHO) 
defines the terms sex and gender as 
follows - “Sex” refers to the biological 
and physiological characteristics that 
define men and women. “Gender” 
refers to the socially constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities and attributes that 
a given society considers appropriate 
for men and women. Further, “men” 
and “women” are sex categories, while 
“masculine” and “feminine” are gender 
categories. “Gender verification policies” 
in elite sports are meant to distinguish 
competitors based on sex-linked 
biology – that is, sex rather than gender 
(Wilson; Karkazis et al.). Parameters of 
biological sex fall under six categories: 
chromosomal, genetic, hormonal, internal 
genitalia, external genitalia and brain sex. 
From the time of conception, the human 
being undergoes sex determination 
and differentiation processes which 
determines the individual’s biological 
sex (Vilain). The methodology of sex 
verification in sport can be said to 
have evolved over time based on these 
biological parameters.
In 1966, the International Association 
of Athletics Federations (IAAF) took the 
lead, by requiring all female participants 
in the European Track and Field 
Championships parade naked before 
a panel of female doctors in order to 
confirm their “femininity” (Reeser). Initial 
methods thus involved inspection of the 
athlete’s external genitalia. In 1968, the 
IOC followed suit by requiring all female 
athletes to produce proof of their sex in 
order to be permitted to participate in the 
Mexico-City summer Olympic Games. 
To spare embarrassment, all female 
athletes participating in these games 
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were tested by histological inspection 
for the presence of the Barr body in cells 
scraped from the buccal (cheek) mucosa. 
In 1985, the IAAF disqualified Spanish 
hurdler, Maria Jose Martinez-Patino from 
competitions and withdrew her records 
because she was chromosomally male 
(Martinez-Patino). However, she was born 
with 46 X,Y chromosome and Complete 
Androgen Insensitivy Syndrome (CAIS) 
which made her completely unresponsive 
to testosterone giving her a female 
phenotype (Martinez-Patino; Karkazis 
et al.). Persuant, the IAAF abandoned 
routine laboratory testing, returning to 
the initial method of physical examination 
for female athletes whose sex was 
questioned.
In 1992, in an effort to further improve 
the sensitivity and specificity of testing, 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) was 
adopted to determine the absence or 
presence of DNA sequences from the 
testes-determining gene located on the 
Y chromosome (Reeser) known as the 
Sex determining region Y (SRY). At the 
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, in 
1996, eight of 3387 female athletes had 
positive test results for SRY, seven had 
partial or complete androgen insensitivity, 
and the other had undergone 
gonadectomy and was presumed to 
have 5alpha reductase deficiency. All of 
these females were allowed to compete 
(Dickinson et al.).
Over time, it became more apparent 
that laboratory based methods were 
inadequate for the task at hand (Reeser). 
Genetic based testing identified an 
athlete whose phenotype was clearly 
female as having male genotype such 
as Maria Jose Martinez-Patino. The 
shift to PCR-based techniques replaced 
one diagnostic test with another but did 
not alleviate problems. False negatives 
arose as one of the DNA sequences 
used to prime the PCR was in fact not 
specific to males (Reeser). It failed to 
identify females who actually had a 
competitive advantage e.g. virilising 
forms of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia 
(ADH). Therefore finally in 1999, the 
IOC conditionally rescinded its 30-
year requirement for on-site gender 
screening of all athletes, starting with 
Sydney Summer Olympic Games in 
2000. Intervention and evaluation of 
individual athletes by appropriate medical 
personnel could be employed if there 
was any question about gender identity 
(Dickinson et al.).
In May, 2011, more than a decade after 
the IAAF and IOC abandoned sex testing, 
Caster Semenya, a South African athlete 
won a gold medal during the 2009 World 
Athletics Championships (Karkazis et al.) 
and concerns regarding female eligibility 
resurfaced. New policies adopted by 
the IAAF in 2011 and similar ones by the 
IOC in 2012 ahead of the London 2012 
Olympic Games, focuses on the levels 
of androgens as the determinant of 
eligibility for an athlete to compete as a 
woman, citing female hyperandrogenism 
a condition in which females produce 
amounts of androgens above the normal 
range. In the case of these regulations, it 
is defined by levels that are in the range 
of men i.e. above 10 nmol/L as measured 
by testosterone levels in serum.
Body size and composition are similar 
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in boys and girls during childhood and 
differences between the sexes begin 
to appear at puberty with the onset 
of endocrine (hormonal) changes. 
Testosterone increases bone formation 
leading to larger bones, increased protein 
synthesis leading to increased muscle 
mass and stimulates erythropoietin 
production by the kidneys leading to 
increased erythropoiesis (Wilmore and 
Costill). This has been scientifically proven 
to be linked to the advantage men have in 
the areas of strength, cardiovascular and 
respiratory function as well as metabolic 
response to exercise. It is the scientific 
basis on which both the IAAF and IOC 
regulations for female hyperandrogenism 
are founded. Androgenic hormones 
have performance- enhancing effects, 
particularly on strength, power and 
speed, which may provide a competitive 
advantage in sports (IOC).
Although women produce androgens – 
mainly secreted by their adrenal glands 
– their levels are markedly lower than the 
levels in men (Sanchez, Martinez-Patino 
and Vilain). The normal testosterone 
range i.e. the interval in which 95% 
of the population falls for each sex is 
markedly different 0.7-2.8nmol/L in adult 
women versus 6.9-34.7nmol/L in adult 
men. Statistically speaking, a woman’s 
testosterone levels would have to be 9.5 
standard deviations (SD) above the mean 
to break the lower limit. Consequently, 
the limit set by the IOC i.e. 10nmol/L 
is a very high one to cross (Vilain and 
Sanchez).
Human biology, however, allows for 
forms of intermediate levels between 
the conventional categories of male and 
female, sometimes referred to as Intersex 
(IOC) or Disorders of Sex Development 
(DSD). Intersex female athletes with 
elevated androgen production give rise 
to a particular concern in the context 
of competitive sports, which is referred 
to as female hyperandrogenism (IOC). 
DSD may be chromosomal, gonadal 
or phenotypic in origin (Dickinson et 
al.). Disorders of chromosomal sex 
occur when the number or structure 
of X or Y chromosome is abnormal. 
Disorders of gonadal sex occur when 
chromosomal sex differentiation is normal 
but the gonads is abnormal, resulting in 
conditions in which gonadal sex does 
not correspond to chromosomal sex. 
Disorders of phenotypic sex occur in 
individuals with appropriate gonadal 
sex but in whom development of the 
urogenital tract is inappropriate for 
the chromosomal and /or gonadal sex 
(Dickinson et al.).
Congenital Adrenal hyperplasia (CAH): 
21-hydroxylase or 11 beta-hydroxylase 
deficiency
3beta-Hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase 
deficiency
5alpha-Reductase type 2 deficiency
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS)
Ovotesticular DSD (previously true 
hermaphroditism)
17beta-Hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase 
type 3 (17beta-HSD3) deficiency
Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (PCOS)
Adrenal carcinoma
Luteoma of Pregnancy
Table 1: Conditions Leading to Female 
Hyperandrogenism (Karkazis et al.)
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Several medical and professional 
societies endorsed resolutions or 
adopted policy statements in the 1980s 
and 1990s calling for the elimination of 
“gender verification”, including American 
Medical Association (AMA), the American 
Academy of Paediatrics, the American 
College of Physicians, the Endocrine 
Society, the American Society of 
Human Genetics, and the Canadian and 
Australian genetic societies (Dickinson et 
al.). Previously used laboratory methods, 
and even the current IOC policies on 
female hyperandrogenism, therefore, 
single out female athletes whose genetic 
makeup (although not ‘normal’) do not 
always provide them with an undue 
competitive advantage (Reeser).
The United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
defines fair play as “much more than 
playing with the rules. It incorporates the 
concepts of friendship, respect for others 
and always playing within the right spirit. 
Fair play is defined as a way of thinking, 
not just a way of behaving. It incorporates 
issues concerned with the elimination 
of cheating, gamesmanship, doping, 
violence (both physical and verbal), the 
sexual harassment and abuse of children, 
young people and women, exploitation, 
unequal opportunities, excessive 
commercialization and corruption.”
Further it states that Governments, 
Sports and Sports related organisations 
as well as individuals must give the 
highest priority to fair-play. In particular, 
sports and sports related organisations 
have the following responsibilities in 
setting a proper context for fair-play 
(UNESCO):
• To publish clear guidelines on what is 
considered to be ethical or unethical 
behaviour and ensure that, at all levels 
of participation and involvement, 
consistent and appropriate incentives 
and/or sanctions are applied.
• To ensure that all decisions are made 
in accordance with a Code of Ethics for 
their sport which reflects the European 
code.
• To raise the awareness of fair play 
within their sphere of influence through 
the use of campaigns, awards, 
educational material and training 
opportunities. They must also monitor 
and evaluate the impact of such 
initiatives.
• To establish systems which reward 
fair play and personal levels of 
achievement in addition to competitive 
success.
• To provide help and support to the 
media to promote good behaviour. 
Different biological markers have been 
used to justify the segregation of sport 
into men and women categories. Do 
policies which single out individuals with 
DSDs achieve fairness or fulfil universal 
obligations to their human rights?
United Nations Human Rights defines 
human rights as rights inherent to all 
human beings, whatever our nationality, 
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, language, or any 
other status. We are all equally entitled to 
our human rights without discrimination. 
These rights are all interrelated, 
interdependent and indivisible. Universal 
human rights are often expressed and 
guaranteed by law, in the forms of 
98
From proving that you are not a man to proving that you are woman enough
The Challenges of Sex Policing in Elite Female Sport 
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
treaties, customary international law, 
general principles and other sources of 
international law. International human 
rights law lays down obligations of 
Governments to act in certain ways or 
to refrain from certain acts, in order to 
promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals or 
groups.
While international sports organizations 
and governments have a critical role 
in protecting all athletes, many have 
evidently been affected (Martinez-
Patino; Karkazis et al.). The aim of this 
study was to explore gender eligibility 
policies in elite female sport over a 
course of time and identify challenges 
from a multidimensional perspective, 
with a particular focus on the current 
IOC Regulations regarding female 
hyperandrogenism highlighting athletes’, 
governance, human rights and fair play 
perspectives.
Research Methodology
Case studies were conducted to analyse 
the implications of sex verification policies 
from athletes’ perspectives over a course 
of time. A search was conducted by the 
primary author in medical databases, 
grey literature and the Court of Arbitration 
in Sport (CAS) databases to identify 
cases with relevant information to answer 
the research question.
A document review was also performed. 
Based on the close theoretical 
framework, policy development and 
application similarities between the 
current IOC Regulations on Female 
hyperandrogenism (IOC 2014) and the 
IAAF Regulations governing Eligibility 
of Females with Hyperandrogenism 
to Compete in Women’s Competition 
(IAAF 2011) as well as previous policies 
in place, the theories and concepts 
pertaining to the latter were extrapolated 
to the former.
Two elite interviews were conducted 
with key persons directly involved in 
the implementation of gender eligibility 
policies at the IOC and IAAF between 
September and October 2013. Dr. 
Richard Budgett is the Director of the 
Medical and Scientific Department at 
the IOC while Dr. Martial Saugy is a 
member of the Medical and Antidoping 
Commission at the IAAF. A semi-
structured interview approach was used, 
with the aid of a questionnaire developed 
a priori. An unstructured component 
was included in the interview to give the 
interviewees freedom on the information 
that they could disclose/give. These 
interviews were mainly for purposes of 
seeking clarity and further insight into the 
regulations of the IOC and IAAF, rather 
than subjective opinions.
Results
Case studies
Due to the highly confidential nature of 
medical information in sport, the number 
of case studies was limited to those who 
suffered the unfortunate media debacle. 
Further, many organised sports have 
not implemented “sex testing” or female 
hyperandrogenism policies, limiting 
the sample space to Track and Field. 
There were no legal cases pertaining to 
disputes in the context of Regulations 
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regarding female hyperandrogenism in the CAS database. 3 athletes were identified 
for the case studies. A summary of athlete profiles for the case studies is presented in 
Table 2 below.
Athlete Maria Jose 
Martinez-Patino 
Santhi 
Soundarajan
Caster Semenya
Country 
represented
Spain India South Africa
Sport Track & Field Track & Field Track & Field
Discipline 400m hurdles 800m, 1500m, 
3000m SC
400m, 600m, 800m, 
1500m
Years active 1983 - 1992 2004 - 2006 2008 - Present
Policy in place Buccal smear Targeted 
investigation
Targeted investigation
Condition CAS Undisclosed Undisclosed
Outcome Reinstated in sport Stripped of medal 
and titles
Retained medal, prize 
money and titles. 
Fuelled development 
of the policy on female 
hyperandrogenism
Current status Professor in Political 
and Sports Science, 
University of Vigo
Retired. Attempted 
suicide in 2007
Active athlete
Table 2: Case summaries of athletes included in case studies
Kobe, she had her sex contested. She 
was diagnosed with XY karyotype and 
androgen insensitivity.In the events that 
ensued, her story was leaked to the 
media, sports scholarship revoked and 
records erased from the national books. 
She also lost her friends and fiancée. It 
was not only until 3 years later that the 
IAAF certified her to run again. She had 
support from a few medical personnel 
within the industry, who helped her get 
reinstated. She is currently a professor 
in political and sports science and 
continues to support sports women with 
genetic variance pursue their careers. 
(Martínez-Patiño). 
Maria José Martínez-Patiño
Maria José was a Spanish national 
champion hurdler who had her sex 
contested in the 1980’s, but was the first 
to successfully appeal for reinstatement 
into competition.
She was born and raised in Northern 
Spain as a girl. At the age of 22 years, 
she competed at her first international 
event. During the 1983 World Track and 
Field Championships in Helsinki, she 
passed her first ‘sex test’ and was given 
a Certificate of Femininity. However, in 
1985 at the World University Games in 
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Santhi Soundarajan
A middle-distance runner from India, 
Santhi overcame a tough childhood to 
achieve success in sport. In addition to 
more than 50 medals for her state, she 
won twelve international medals for India, 
having competed at the Asian Games, 
South Asian Games, Asian Indoor 
Games, Asian Athletics Championships, 
the Asian Sports Gran Prix and the 
International Sports Peace Festival. Her 
events were 800m, 1500m and 3000m 
(Wikipedia). Despite her success, she 
disappeared into oblivion after a short 
sports career.
In 2006, Soundarajan competed at the 
Asian Games where she won a silver 
medal in the 800m event. Following her 
triumph, she was subjected to a physical 
examination and blood tests by IAAF 
medical experts without explanation. She 
had to leave the games and learnt from 
the news that she had been stripped of 
her medal and could no longer compete 
as she was not a woman (Shapiro). She 
cited language as a major barrier to 
understand her ordeal, as everything 
was communicated in English, not her 
native language. She was soon back 
in her village, humiliated, depressed 
and attempted suicide a few months 
later (Shapiro). Santhi, watched Caster 
Semenya's case unfold with great 
interest. "The people in her country 
supported her and fought for her," she 
said. "Nobody supported me. The people 
in my government didn't support me 
and the local sports federations did not 
support me." Soundarajan thinks it's 
because of her caste. "If I came from a 
bigger, stronger caste with more power, 
or if I had been rich, they would not have 
allowed it to happen to me." (Shapiro). 
Caster Semenya
Caster was a South African middle 
distance runner competing in 400m, 
600m, 800m and 1500m (IAAF). At the 
London 2012 Olympic Games, she won a 
silver medal in the women’s 800m event.
In 2009, at the World Athletics 
Championships in Berlin, she won the 
women’s 800m race by a margin of 
2.45 seconds (Clarey). Controversy 
was sparked off by her competitors 
who questioned her sex based on her 
appearance (Levy). In the events that 
ensued, Semenya endured a humiliating 
experience particularly from the media 
ridiculing her appearance, calling her 
names including ‘hermaphrodite’ and 
cries for her medal and prize money to be 
returned (Levy). She was also subjected 
to a physical examination and reports 
from the media indicated that she had an 
intersex condition , forcing her to go into 
hiding and seek trauma care (Levy). After 
an 11-month investigation, Semenya was 
cleared to compete again by the IAAF. 
She had considerable support from the 
South African government and sports 
organisations which played a key role 
in protecting her rights. South Africans 
rallied around their 800-meter world 
champion as she returned home from 
Berlin, and even President Jacob Zuma 
vowed that he would not permit her gold 
medal to be taken away, no matter what 
gender tests say (Jacobson).
Interviews
The recurring theme was the prioritisation 
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of women’s participation to international 
sports organisations, and the need for 
sex eligibility policies to level the field in 
segregated sport.
“If men and women were competing 
together, women would never have a shot 
at the Olympic Games in many sports. 
The IOC is very committed to increasing 
women’s opportunities to take up sport 
and I also believe that is very important.” - 
Dr. Richard Budgett IOC.
“But there must be reasons why the 
federations keep competitions that way. 
In athletics, it is always separated into 
men and women.” - Dr. Martial Saugy, 
IAAF.
“As long as sex segregation in sports 
exists, we must have criteria for who is 
eligible or not eligible to compete as a 
woman. The difficulty has been and will 
always be where to draw this line.” - Dr. 
Richard Budgett IOC.
“…… but it cannot be avoided if 
competition continues to be played 
in men and women categories.” – Dr. 
Martial Saugy, IAAF.
There seemed to be a consensus that 
current policies do target people’s DSDs 
but implications were mixed.
“That is very difficult. Sex verification 
has always faced challenges because it 
tends to firstly discriminate women and 
now with this, probably a certain group 
of women will be targeted.” – Dr. Martial 
Saugy, IAAF.
“Also it comes in good timing for people 
with intersex conditions to discover life 
threatening conditions…..” - Dr. Richard 
Budgett IOC.
Interpretations of the scientific basis for 
fairplay was also mixed. 
“There has been no established 
upper limit of androgens, specifically, 
testosterone for men. There is no limit, 
which is unfair but the limit is not known. 
So men can compete with whatever 
amount of testosterone they have in 
their bodies. Biological markers are 
always looked on a continuum of normal 
distribution and for a man, it is ok for him 
to lie at the extreme end of the curve 
which end has not been determined.” – 
Dr. Martial Saugy, IAAF.
“Of course, there are many factors that 
contribute to performance but for the 
purposes of eligibility in women’s sport, 
we chose androgen levels.” - Dr. Richard 
Budgett IOC.
With regard to the Semenya case, there 
was a consensus that cases are now 
handled in a more acceptable manner 
following the incident.
“…..the rules may not be perfect but 
after the Caster Semenya case there 
have been no high profile scandals 
surrounding hyperandrogenism.” – Dr. 
Martial Saugy, IAAF.
“We managed to handle some cases 
well during the London Games and we 
hope to continue this way.”- Dr. Richard 
Budgett IOC.
Both administrators expressed 
commitment from the IOC and IAAF in 
reviewing these guidelines and handle 
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cases as professionally as possible in the 
future. 
“The policy may not be perfect but the 
IOC will aim at continuously reviewing 
it and applying the latest technology 
or scientific evidence. …… but come 
up with recommendations that can 
help sports organisations in future. It is 
important to make suggestions on what 
could be the solutions to this issue.” - Dr. 
Richard Budgett IOC.
“We continuously need to consult with 
various stakeholders to come up with 
the most practical policies.” - Dr. Richard 
Budgett IOC.
“…….but in development of policies 
for high performance sport……. The 
lawyers have a heavy role in this and they 
were consulted. There must be a legal 
perspective applied in this case……” – 
Dr. Martial Saugy, IAAF.
They also mentioned systems in place 
and activities underway, which are aimed 
at addressing challenges of the current 
female eligibility policies.
“IAAF also provides affected athletes 
with resources and solutions up to the 
level of IAAF approved specialist centre 
so that the final decision can be made by 
the athlete on what to do.” – Dr. Martial 
Saugy, IAAF.
“…….we have put in place a system 
which will enable the athlete to make 
an informed decision, however IOC will 
not meet the costs of treatment.” - Dr. 
Richard Budgett IOC.
“IAAF conducted a mandatory androgen 
profile of all competing athletes during 
the 2011 World Athletics Championships 
in Daegu with the aim to provide more 
evidence to this policy…….. But indeed, 
all athletes including the men were 
tested during the Championships. It was 
mandatory. The results of this study have 
not been published yet.”– Dr. Martial 
Saugy, IAAF.
There were also sentiments that some 
stakeholders may not be well informed 
about the policies.
“………we are not sanctioning or 
suspending athletes, we are only setting 
the bar to be eligible to compete as a 
woman. It is more like a qualification 
standard rather than a violation. This 
needs to be understood.” - Dr. Richard 
Budgett IOC.
Documents Review
At the time this research was conducted, 
the policy documents pertaining to 
current IOC Regulations on female 
hyperandrogenism (IOC 2014) and the 
IAAF Regulations governing Eligibility 
of Females with Hyperandrogenism 
to Compete in Women’s Competition 
(IAAF 2011) were not readily available 
publicly. Some of the relevant material 
was obtained from the key informants as 
these policies were undergoing review.
Discussion
Physical examination, laboratory based 
tests including buccal smear and SRY 
gene testing, as well as the current 
serum testosterone tests have been 
and are carried out on the basis of 
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single biological markers i.e. external 
sexual characteristics, chromosomes 
and hormones respectively. From this 
study, it was evident that they have been 
challenged on an array of scientific, social 
and legal grounds.
With regard to the limit indicated by both 
the IOC and IAAF, findings from the study 
suggest that a level of 10nmol/L though 
liberal has limited scientific evidence 
confirming that a female athlete confers 
advantage specifically above this level 
and is medically or even athletically 
justified to seek treatment (Karkazis et 
al.; Xavier and McGill). Female athletes 
with CAIS like Maria Jose have actually 
been successful athletes, even when 
their body in no way responds to 
testosterone. Considering sterility and 
increased risk of breast cancer from 
hormone replacement therapy, there are 
ethical concerns over seeking treatment 
and making tough lifetime decisions 
about one’s sexual identity for short-
term performance over long-term health 
(Xavier and McGill). 
From a governance perspective, a 
central focus for enforcing regulations 
on eligibility of females by both the IOC 
and IAAF was to level the playing field 
for women. Determinants of athletics 
performance come in various biological 
and non-biological forms. Considering 
the continuum of other individual 
characteristics, it is challenging to 
admit that having more testosterone 
functionally circulating in your body 
as more unfair than being taller or the 
technology, finances and environment 
that athletes may or may not have access 
to, to boost their careers. Although a 
recognized physiological factor, solely 
targeting naturally occurring testosterone 
is unfair (Karkazis et al) and raises fear 
that with this line of thought, all athletes 
will be required to be ‘normalized’ in 
different aspects so that no athlete has a 
biological advantage over others (Vilain 
and Sanchez) in order to achieve fairness.
Men are not tested to find variation 
in endogenic testosterone levels to 
determine whether there are some men 
who have so much testosterone that 
no man can hope to compete fairly with 
him (Dworkin and Cooky). On the other 
hand, female athletes have been and 
continue to be subjected to a variety of 
discriminatory and prejudicial practices 
that have affected their access to sport 
(Reeser). Ultimately, these policies could 
be seen to be sexist (Crincoli; Vilain and 
Sanchez) and the regulations further 
seeks to discriminate women with DSD in 
particular, denying them of their rights to 
participate in sport.
Although relatively rare, CAIS is in fact 
over represented in sport, with higher 
prevalence among elite athletes than in 
the normal population (Karkazis et al.). 
Overall, compared with an incidence 
of 1:20000 to 1:40000 in the general 
population, one in 421 female athletes 
had CAIS from 5 Olympic Games 
preceding Sydney 2000 (Elsas et al.). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the IOC 
regulations state that “Nothing in these 
Regulations is intended to make any 
determination of sex.”, for women 
subjected to these policies and declared 
ineligible to compete as one the implicit 
message is that they are not women 
(Viloria and Martinez-Patino). Degrees of 
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femininity are created, defined by serum 
testosterone levels and reinforce existing 
stereotypes of sports women and 
masculine females in particular. 
Perception of femininity varies across 
cultures, targeting based on subjective 
cue and the dominant Western 
ideologies of what women stirs further 
discrimination. The IAAF prioritized the 
complaints of fellow female athletes 
over human rights for the case of Caster 
Semenya (Levy). Leonard Chuene, the 
President of Athletics South Africa was 
quoted, "We are not going to allow 
Europeans to describe and define our 
children." after Semenya’s triumph in 
Berlin (Jacobson).
The case studies illustrated the impact 
that the policies had on each of the 
athletes after they were embroiled:
• The shock of being told that one is not 
actually a woman as they had believed 
all their lives;
• A general lack of awareness, 
technical skill and resources among 
coaches, team doctors and even 
sports federations to properly handle 
such cases. For the case of Caster 
Semenya, the IAAF and Athletics 
South Africa failed in their mandates to 
protect her;
• Undue media attention accorded to all 
the three athletes, including exposure 
of some very confidential and private 
medical information;
• Stigmatisation from society and even 
fellow athletes;
• Decline in (After being away from 
sport for three years, Maria Jose 
failed to qualify for the 1992 Barcelona 
Olympics) or end of a sports career, for 
the case of Santhi Soundarajan;
• Loss of records and medals, for 
the case of Maria Jose and Santhi 
Soundarajan.
All of the above are reasons for heavy 
psychological torment, especially 
for young athletes (Maria – 24 years, 
Semenya – 18 years, Santhi – 25 years 
at the time when each of their cases 
were brought to light) to drive them to 
depression and even attempted suicide. 
The ordeal suffered by Caster Semenya 
is irreversible. And in her own personal 
account, Maria-Jose attests, “I paid a 
high price for my license – my story was 
told, dissected, and discussed in a very 
public way, and my victory was bitter 
sweet” (Martinez-Patino). Mental health 
is a key component of athlete support 
that does not come by easily for many 
athletes.
Although intersex athletes can be placed 
in the male or female group on the basis 
of their legal sex (IOC), no formal system 
seems to protect or support these 
athletes (Viloria and Martinez-Patino). 
From the case studies, the situation 
varied for each of the athletes. But 
particularly for Santhi Soudarajan, she 
suffered loss of her athletic career and 
lack of a support system in India pushed 
her to isolation, poverty and finally 
attempted suicide in 2007.
Importantly, the strong commitment from 
the IOC and IAAF to support elite female 
sport was clear. It might be controversial 
to have men and women categories 
in sport where androgens confer no 
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decisive advantage e.g. shooting, but it 
does increase women’s participation. In 
this 21st century where gender identity 
and sex are fast evolving, the regulations 
governing female eligibility has a key role 
in defining boundaries and protecting 
female athletes. The IOC is also looking 
into establishing eligibility policies for 
transgender athletes.
We found that sports organisations 
have been working towards addressing 
some of the challenges of the current 
female eligibility policies. The IAAF 
collected samples from all competing 
athletes, male and female during the 
2011 World Athletics Championships 
in Daegu in a bid to conduct studies 
aiming to provide further scientific 
evidence on the role of testosterone. The 
international athletics body also provides 
resources and support for affected 
athletes. During the drafting process 
of the IAAF and IOC regulations, all 
DSD matters were discussed (genetics, 
endocrinology, gynaecology, sports 
physiology, psychology, ethics) and 
this diversity was maintained for both 
the Miami and Lausanne IOC meetings 
(Bermon et al.). Those affected by these 
policies were not involved (Viloria and 
Martinez-Patino), but the administrators 
from both organisations expressed 
their commitment to constantly review 
the guidelines through engagement of 
various stakeholders.
Since the Caster Semenya case came 
into light, there have been no major 
media spectacles surrounding athletes 
with DSDs. For example, affected 
athletes identified during the London 
Games were handled with utmost 
professionalism and confidentiality. 
From a governance perspective, these 
are sources of considerable optimism 
and confidence in sports leadership 
at the highest level to implement their 
sex eligibility mandate with respect 
for all athletes, including those with 
hyperandrogenism.
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
The basis of the IOC and IAAF policies 
to define eligibility to compete as a 
woman and level the playing field is 
justified to some extent. Drawing a line 
at any point on a complex continuum 
historically has, and will continue to target 
women with DSD. This leads to undue 
unfairness on their side and violation of 
their rights to equal opportunity. Modern 
sex segregated sport, however, cannot 
do without policies to define eligibility. In 
this respect, existing policies could be 
streamlined to address challenges that 
have emerged from the current study.
Further research is warranted to provide 
sound scientific evidence on the 
specific levels and to what extent they 
contribute to unfair advantage in athletic 
performance. Medical guidelines on 
management of athletes with DSD are 
also needed to guide practice beyond 
the International Federations (IF) or IOC 
levels. Mental health care is also needed.
Athlete support systems from various 
stakeholders: entourage, other IFs, 
NFs, governments, lawyers and media 
need to be strengthened. Firstly, 
guideline documents need to be 
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made more available to sensitize and 
empower them for these situations 
when they arise. Clarification of each 
of their roles in the guidelines as well 
as provision of resources will facilitate 
the implementation of these policies. 
Practical aspects such as language 
services for athletes receiving specialised 
care also need to be considered.
The integration of athlete perspectives is 
paramount to fill the gaps. By involving 
those who are affected most, i.e. the 
athletes with DSDs in the policy making 
process, IOC and IAAF can further 
advance the cause for these athletes. 
Because sports can never be a truly 
“level playing field” (Vilain and Sanchez), 
fair sports does not require that athletes 
be equal in every imaginable respect 
(Murray). The IOC has an opportunity 
to live up to its values of Friendship, 
Excellence and Respect by embracing 
and promoting diversity through 
harmonising the participation of all 
women in sport.
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Adopted to Overcome the Crisis
‘Fighting corruption is not 
just good governance. It’s 
self-defense. It’s patriotism’
Joe BIDEN 
(Former Vide-President of the United States)
Editor’s note: 
Sections of this paper were published in Bayle E. and Rayner H., Sociology of a scandal: the emergence 
of ‘FIFAgate’, Soccer and society, Routledge, September 2016 
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Abstract 
The article examines the social forces 
underlying FIFAgate. Why do corrupt 
practices, which are often highly 
consolidated or even institutionalised, 
suddenly become scandalous? Why 
did FIFA fall into crisis in 2015 and not 
before? What are the scenarios for 
overcoming the crisis?
The only way to answer these questions 
is to examine the sequence of thrusts and 
parries between the parties involved. In 
order to study how the FIFAgate scandal 
unfolded, we compiled information 
from numerous sources. By centring 
our scandal analysis model around the 
notion that social processes are based 
on relationships, we were able to obtain 
insights into why and how denunciations 
can lead to long-tolerated corrupt 
practices suddenly becoming sufficiently 
compromising to force an organisation’s 
leaders to implement measures that 
would previously have been unimaginable 
(resignations, desertions, revisions to 
rules). 
Our research shows that FIFA’s structures 
and practices gave the Federation a large 
degree of “resilience”, which enabled it 
to overcome previous critical situations 
and successfully neutralise allegations 
against it. When a concentrated series 
of “mobilisations” against FIFA created 
a domino effect and facilitated further 
denunciations of wrongdoing, however, 
FIFA’s resilience finally broke down, 
allowing the FIFAgate scandal to break. 
The scale of the scandal and public 
outrage against the corruption within 
FIFA forced the Federation to introduce 
a series of unprecedented measures in 
order to overcome the crisis. We discuss 
the limitations of these reforms took in 
2016 and ways in which they could be 
extended. 
Introduction
Christian Favre, journalist, radio news 
presenter: “To conclude, does Sepp 
Blatter, as we are often told, does he run 
his FIFA honestly or not?”
Joël Robert, journalist, head of the sports 
desk: “Well, you know, he runs it honestly 
because, logically and legally, there have 
been legal proceedings, but Blatter and 
FIFA have never been caught out. There 
are still proceedings under way. I tell 
you that Blatter will be re-elected very 
comfortably. He will keep going. He’s 
been at FIFA for 30 years, president since 
‘98, but, clearly, if a corruption or some 
other sort of scandal breaks, well, in that 
case, Blatter will fall from his throne. But, 
at the moment, he is solidly seated on 
that throne.”
RSR (Radio Suisse Romande), 
Forum, 28 August 2014.
This exchange between two journalists 
speaking live on Swiss public radio 
shows that suspicions of corruption 
within the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) had already 
emerged long before the “FIFAgate” 
scandal broke in 2015. More than just 
rumours, they were explicit allegations 
of wrongdoing within FIFA, levelled by 
whistleblowers, linked to varying degrees 
with national interests (Andrew Jennings, 
ChangeFIFA, Transparency International, 
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Play the Game), police enquiries and 
media investigations. Nevertheless, 
these allegations never managed to 
directly tarnish the organisation’s Swiss 
president, Sepp Blatter. The ability 
of the world’s most powerful sports 
institution, alongside the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), to neutralise 
allegations of corruption contributed 
to the widely shared idea, even among 
Blatter’s opponents, that its leader (“the 
unbudgeable”) would always manage 
to dodge accusations against him. 
This reputation of invincibility made it 
more difficult to denounce goings on at 
FIFA and added to Blatter’s aura. Like 
all organisations, however, FIFA was 
vulnerable to changes in its relationships 
with other institutions (sport, political, 
economic, legal, media), and “FIFAgate”, 
like every other scandal (Rayner, 2015), 
is the result of a sudden reconfiguration 
of these intra- and inter-institutional 
relations.
The present article examines the social 
forces underlying FIFAgate. Why do 
corrupt practices, which are often highly 
consolidated or even institutionalised, 
suddenly become scandalous? Why 
did FIFA fall into crisis in 2015 and not 
before? Why did some accusations 
have much greater impact than others? 
What are the possible scenarios for 
overcoming the crisis? In order to answer 
these questions, it is necessary to look 
at the sequence of thrusts and parries 
between the numerous parties involved, 
including sports executives, public 
relations companies, sports marketing 
agencies, politicians, journalists, 
magistrates, lawyers, heads of television 
networks and multinational sponsors. 
By embracing the notion that social 
processes are based on relationships, 
our analysis model provides insights into 
why and how denunciations can lead to 
long-tolerated corrupt practices suddenly 
becoming compromising enough to force 
an organisation’s leaders to implement 
measures that would previously have 
been unimaginable (resignations, 
desertions, revisions to rules). We begin 
by discussing the limitations of most 
previous research into corruption, which 
has tended to focus on governance (in 
management) or transgressions (in the 
social sciences), and which have paid 
little attention to a factor we believe 
to be crucial, that is the extremely 
variable and sometimes exceptionally 
high cost of denouncing wrongdoing. A 
presentation of our relational approach 
to analysing scandals and the methods 
and sources used in our case study is 
followed by an examination of the way 
FIFA overcame previous critical situations 
(bankruptcy of the marketing company 
ISL, allegations against former president 
João Havelange, etc.). We then analyse 
the constituent mobilisations of FIFAgate, 
and their domino effect, including the 
measures FIFA took to contain the 
scandal. The final section presents the 
governance strategy chosen to overcome 
the crisis and its limitations.
Corruption as a 
Research Object: the 
State of the Art
Although corruption has been widely 
researched in the social sciences, few 
studies have examined corrupt practices 
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in the world of sport (exceptions include 
Duret & Trabal, 2001, and Hill, 2009). 
Studies of corruption by researchers 
in sports management are equally rare 
(Chappelet, 2001) and have tended to 
focus on deficiencies in control and 
reforms to the governance of international 
sports organisations (Mason et al., 
2006, at the IOC; Geeraert & Drieskens, 
2015, at UEFA and FIFA), accountability 
(Pielke, 2013, at FIFA; Chappelet 2011, 
at the IOC) and, more recently, social 
responsibility (Chappelet, 2009; Parent 
& Chappelet, 2013; Bayle, 2015b). The 
issue of “good” or “better” governance 
first appeared on sports organisations’ 
agendas following the introduction of new 
legislation and regulations introduced 
in response to a number of high-profile 
scandals (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, in the United States, which 
was drawn up after the Enron crash 
in order to prevent and more severely 
punish fraudulent accounting practices). 
Since then, around 40 studies of 
the governance of international and 
national sports organisations have been 
published (Chappelet, 2015). 
Corruption is a more sensitive issue in 
the field of sport than it is for for-profit 
companies, as international sports 
organisations present themselves as 
non-profit bodies with humanistic goals 
such as “building a peaceful and better 
world through sport”, in the case of the 
IOC, and “to build a better future through 
the power of the game”, for FIFA. The 
fact, however, that these bodies oversee 
flourishing businesses while advocating 
the sport ethic means they have to 
reconcile potential conflicts of identity 
and values. In today’s globalised and 
multi-polar world, the increased stakes 
(economic, media, political) surrounding 
football also explain the vast potential 
for instrumentalising the “king of sports”. 
What is more, four characteristics of 
sports institutions mean they are less 
able to take effective steps to prevent 
corruption:
• They are hybrid organisations (Bayle, 
2007) with both non-profit and 
commercial goals (termed “mixed 
rationale” organisations by Koski & 
Heikalla, 1998); consequently, they 
are complex to manage (commercial 
activities to obtain finance but hard-
to-evaluate social goals, collaboration 
between volunteers and paid staff).
• They are international organisations 
at the head of large networks of 
continental and national associations 
that are very heterogeneous in terms 
of their professionalism and culture. 
The “political equilibrium” within the 
international federation is conditioned 
by the fact that their constituent 
associations are legally and politically 
independent.1 
• Systems of control, both external 
(the market, public regulators, 
NGOs) and internal (members), 
and counterbalances are weak or 
inexistent.
• Their administrators, some of who 
receive a form of remuneration, do 
not always have the skills and/or 
1 FIFA is made up of six continental 
confederations, each of which has a seat on the 
Executive Committee. Sepp Blatter understood 
the importance of this issue in the run up to 
his election as president, which is why he 
campaigned extensively outside Europe-UEFA 
(2/3 of the votes at the general assembly and at 
the Executive Committee).
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time needed to run and control these 
organisations effectively. 
Corruption has been a research object 
in the social sciences for many years, 
giving rise to numerous studies (Rose-
Akerman, 1999; Dard et al., 2014) based 
on a variety of concepts, methods, 
disciplines, sources and fields of 
observation. Nevertheless, analyses of 
political corruption continue to dominate 
this vast literature (Heidenheimer, 
Johnston & Levine, 1989; Johnston, 
1996; Cartier-Bresson, 2008). Although 
the tortious dimension of these shadowy 
practices makes observation, especially 
participant observation, difficult, there is 
no lack of sources. Whether information 
is provided by administrative, judicial, 
police (including the secret services) 
or journalistic sources, it is rarely 
collected scientifically and is, therefore, 
likely to contain biases that have to 
be taken into account. Furthermore, 
much of the research into corruption 
has been carried out at the instigation 
of powerful international organisations 
(IMF, World Bank, UNO, OECD, 
Council of Europe and the Group of 
States Against Corruption - GRECO), 
NGOs (Transparency International) 
or government ministries. This has 
greatly influenced the focus of studies, 
which have tended to concentrate on 
practical issues (how to measure and 
fight corruption), thereby impinging on 
the objectification required for scientific 
enquiry. For example, since the 1960s 
numerous researchers have examined 
the effects of corruption on development 
in third world countries. Some consider 
corruption to be a necessary step 
towards economic growth and the 
emergence of “civil society”, whereas 
others see it as a vicious circle, especially 
for public confidence. Outside the 
developing world, corruption is often 
analysed in the light of its supposed 
influence on social inequalities (Ward, 
1989; Uslaner, 2009). The resulting focus 
on costs (economic, political, social) 
within comparative quantitative studies 
raises the risk of decontextualisation. 
In the wake of the corruption indices 
produced by Transparency International, 
researchers are increasingly using 
surveys and questionnaires to examine 
“ordinary” citizens’ perceptions of 
small-scale and large-scale corruption 
(Lascoumes, 2011; Giannakopoulos, 
Maras, & Tänzler 2011). Here, corruption 
is seen as contributing to people’s 
distrust of both government authorities 
and business. 
All this work has furthered understanding 
of corruption but a fundamental point 
in understanding the mechanisms 
underlying corruption scandals the - 
feasibility of denouncing corruption - is 
never addressed. Nevertheless, the 
practices covered by the catchall word 
corruption (misappropriation of funds, 
bribery, breach of trust, fraudulent 
use of property, etc.) only become 
scandalous when the people who would 
like to see them considered scandalous 
manage to gain support in several social 
spheres. Although the committing of 
scandalous acts and scandal are often 
considered synonymous, including by 
many researchers, scandalous acts only 
turn into a scandal when their revelation 
strips the people and institutions 
accused of committing them of their 
credibility (Rayner, 2012). In addition, a 
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simple revelation of wrongdoing may not 
always be enough to create a scandal, 
as indignation cannot be taken for 
granted. The mobilisations underlying 
denunciations of wrongdoing must be 
strong enough and wide enough to 
create an outcry that cannot be ignored.
A Model for Analysing 
Scandals 
Although scandals are frequent events 
in contemporary societies, they remain 
ill defined by social scientists, most of 
who consider them to be controversies 
centred around wrongdoings by well-
known figures, minor affairs inflated 
by the media. Hence, the research 
community’s attention continues to focus 
on the misdeeds committed, rather than 
on the process that allowed the scandal 
to break, with the result that, despite 
a small number of general studies 
(Sherman, 1989) and reviews (Thompson, 
2000; Adut, 2008) of scandals, little is 
known about the processes by which 
scandalous acts are revealed. 
Scandals occur when the people 
challenging another person’s or 
organisation’s probity are supported 
by simultaneous “multisectoral 
mobilisations”, that is mobilisations that 
take place in and between several social 
sectors (Dobry, 1986). A scandal can 
occur even if the “scandalous facts” 
are unfounded (e.g., false accusations), 
but most “scandalous facts” (such as 
paying bribes) fail to lead to scandals. 
Consequently, it would be misleading to 
equate scandal with transgression. The 
multisectoral mobilisations needed to turn 
a dispute between a few individuals into 
a scandal, are quite rare because they 
require concurrent action by separate, 
and often isolated, parties. Initiating 
and maintaining such collective actions 
becomes even more difficult when the 
people and practices being challenged 
are protected by collusions, which may 
not be illegal or explicit, within and 
between powerful institutions. These 
collusions are frequently the result of 
the shared expectations of leaders, 
who tend to close their eyes to another 
party’s activities (accepted as a field of 
competence), feeling that they would 
have acted in a similar way. Such tacit 
agreements contribute greatly to the 
consolidation of institutions (Dobry, 
1986). As a result, only a miniscule 
fraction of supposedly scandalous acts 
result in scandals. Moving the focus 
from transgressions to the protagonists’ 
mobilisations and perceptions makes 
it easier to consider another central 
property of scandals, that is, their 
configuration as a series of feedback 
loops in which “causes” produce 
“effects” which, in turn, react on the 
“causes”. This process is extremely 
important in determining changes in how 
the protagonists perceive a situation 
(Rayner, 2015).
A scandal depends on an entanglement 
of independent and reversible 
points of view produced in the light 
of the mobilisations. Without these 
mobilisations, there is no scandal; if 
the mobilisations stop, the scandal 
stops. These mobilisations, which 
create and re-create each scandal, 
are highly dependent on changes in 
the protagonists’ evaluations. They are 
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linked to the concomitance of oscillations 
in perceptions of what is (im)possible 
(Rayner, 2005), that is, assessments 
of a situation arising from the senses, 
calculations and habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) 
of the parties involved. If an individual’s 
opinion of what is (un)feasible convinces 
or dissuades that person to relay an 
accusation, other parties will do so, too, 
because people base their actions on 
their perceptions of what others are doing 
or will do and of what is/is not doable. 
Because perceptions of what is possible 
are interconnected, they can change very 
quickly, with one perception reflecting on 
another. People’s contributions and their 
dependence on the “context” (i.e., the 
meaning they give to their environment) 
depend on this reflective interplay. People 
act by observing others and react to 
fluctuations in their expectations. This 
is why scandals can abruptly invert the 
balance of power. During the Festina 
affair at the 1998 Tour de France, the 
“law of silence” that had long been 
obeyed by most of the protagonists 
(cyclists, doctors, sports managers, 
journalists, organisers, politicians, etc.) 
was suddenly challenged when the 
Festina team doctor was arrested in 
possession of a stock of performance-
enhancing drugs and then cooperated 
with investigators by giving details of how 
teams obtained banned substances. 
Our main thesis is that analysing these 
variations in what the different players 
are prepared to do (and, therefore, the 
things they are not prepared to do) will 
provide insights into how scandals, of 
any sort, erupt, grow and die out. Hence, 
accurately mapping the sometimes-
disconcerting variations in the feasibility 
of denouncing transgressions is central 
to understanding scandal, especially for 
explaining the collapse of collusions – a 
crucial factor in removing a protagonist’s 
credibility. For example, in 2007, the 
credibility of the organisers of the Tour 
de France was threatened by desertions 
and threats of desertion by the media 
(two German television networks 
suddenly stopped broadcasting the 
race), sponsors (two major German 
companies stated they would not renew 
their sponsorship), the IOC (leading to a 
rumour that cycling would be excluded 
from the Olympics) and the Danish 
cycling federation (which excluded 
yellow-jersey holder Michael Rasmussen 
from the national team for the world 
championships), etc.
An often-neglected aspect is that 
scandals evolve as they progress. 
Whether to continue or halt one’s efforts, 
accuse or remain silent, desert or stay 
loyal, deny, counter-accuse or retract 
– all these decisions depend on their 
makers’ evaluations of the situation. 
These intersubjective evaluations may 
be hazy and fickle, but they are crucial 
to the relations between protagonists. 
Swept along by unpredictable changes 
in relationships, new projections lead 
people to adopt a (new) position on 
whether to support or oppose a public 
accusation. A scandal’s dynamic 
depends on these micro-turning points 
(Rayner, 2007). This type of self-
propagation means that each scandal, 
rather than following a pre-established 
path, can be viewed as an open process 
whose players, location, duration, 
stakes, balances of power and outcome 
are not fixed in advance. Instead, they 
depend on a complex series of thrusts 
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and parries with an uncertain and 
partly contingent outcome. The size of 
a scandal depends on the size of the 
mobilisation and the amplitude of the 
oscillations in perceptions of what is 
(im)possible. These two processes are 
correlated as the more the occupiers of 
a space are confronted with intrusions by 
outsiders, the more likely it is that these 
intrusions will affect their assessments 
and actions. Thus, in the case of the 
scandals affecting the Tour de France, 
the sudden and unexpected scrutiny 
of their actions by journalists, police 
officers, customs officers, investigating 
magistrates and sports ministers, etc., 
may have increased the temptation 
felt by some competitors to spill the 
beans about doping. Using a relational 
perspective to move on from studying 
the object of scandal to studying 
scandal as an object allows this type 
Figure 1 - Model for analysing scandals
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of dynamic to be resituated in the 
continuum of social relations. A scandal 
is a reconfiguring process involving the 
restructuring of relations between and 
within several sectors. The motors of this 
dynamic – multisectoral mobilisations 
and oscillations in perceptions of what 
is (im)possible – co-vary by varying the 
feasibility of denunciation.
Scandals can pose a major threat to 
the targeted institution, as they have the 
potential to wreak havoc on its hierarchy, 
rules and agenda. This is why officials, 
whether they like it or not, have to set 
in motion institutional countermeasures 
(implement reforms, suspend staff who 
have been targeted, adopt or strengthen 
a code of ethics, etc.) in order to contain 
or neutralise the accusation. From the 
officials’ point of view, the effectiveness 
of these countermeasures, which 
sometimes go against powerful interests 
and can therefore be very costly (in 
2012, the Union Cycliste Internationale 
was forced to stop protecting Lance 
Armstrong after years of collusion), is 
measured in terms of their ability to stop 
the multisectoral mobilisations. Reducing 
these mobilisations and oscillations in 
perceptions of what is (im)possible allow 
the threatened institution to overcome 
the crisis by enabling it to regain some of 
its autonomy. If this is not achieved, the 
crisis worsens and becomes systemic 
(see Figure 1). 
Our case study examined an on-going 
scandal and, therefore, faced a number 
of methodological problems, including 
the protagonists’ lack of time and/or 
reticence to give interviews, no access to 
archive records, a fluid chronology and 
dependence on journalistic sources. On 
the other hand, an advantage of this type 
of situation is that it is not subject to the 
“retrospective illusion” (Dobry, 1986). 
We collected data from newspaper 
articles from around the world 
(Switzerland, France, United States, 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom – 
approx. 500 articles), FIFA’s files, general 
investigative media (Mediapart in France, 
Il Fatto Quotidiano in Italy, Der Spiegel 
in Germany, Sunday Times and The 
Guardian in the UK, the New York Times 
in the USA, Le Temps in Switzerland), 
specialist sports newspapers (most 
notably, L’Equipe and France Football), 
materials produced by the protagonists 
(investigative journalists: Jennings, 
2006, 2014, 2015, Yallop, 1999), a 
FIFA consultant (Pieth, 2014), television 
documentaries (ARD, BBC, RTS etc.), 
USA v. J. Webb et al. (2015), NGO 
reports (Transparency International, 2011, 
2015; Play the Game), governmental and 
inter-governmental reports (FATF, 2009; 
GRECO, 2015), the IOC (report, 2014), 
and reports of measures taken by FIFA 
(FIFA.com) between 2010 and 2015. We 
also interviewed an executive close to 
Sepp Blatter about FIFA’s governance 
(on 30 April 2015; this person declined 
a further interview after the scandal 
had broken). These data allowed us to 
reconstruct the exceptional dynamics of 
the scandal and to show the customary 
ability of FIFA’s leaders to protect 
themselves. We were also able to look 
back on earlier FIFA crises and, therefore, 
to more clearly describe the context 
surrounding the FIFAgate scandal. 
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FIFA’s Resilience: 
Neutralising Allegations 
Although allegations of corruption 
have been levelled at FIFA officials at 
numerous times in the Federation’s 
history, especially since João Havelange’s 
long presidency (1974-1998), until 2015 
FIFA had always been able to isolate its 
accusers and quash any litigation. A non-
comprehensive list of more recent cases 
includes the circumstances surrounding 
Blatter’s election as president in 1998, 
the awarding of the World Cup to 
Germany in 2000, the bankruptcy of 
ISL in 2001, and Blatter’s re-election in 
2011 after the attribution of the 2018 and 
2022 World Cups. Before analysing the 
measures introduced by FIFA to contain 
these crises, we will look back at the 
accusations and the people who made 
them, most of who were journalists or 
senior managers/staff at FIFA.
In his book How They Stole the Game, 
the English journalist and best-selling 
author David Yallop (1999) suggests 
that Blatter, supported by the powerful 
outgoing president, João Havelange, 
for whom Blatter served as secretary 
general, was elected president of FIFA 
(by 111 votes to 80) thanks to votes 
bought from African representatives. 
These allegations were never proven and 
Blatter won a legal battle to prevent the 
book being published in Switzerland. 
In 2006, the Scottish journalist Andrew 
Jennings, working for the BBC’s 
current affairs programme Panorama, 
investigated allegations of bribes paid 
in relation to the attribution of the World 
Cup. This was the first of a long series 
of documentaries and books about 
corruption within FIFA (Jennings, 2006, 
2014, 2015), with Jennings willingly 
taking on the role of public accuser, as 
he had done previously in relation to 
corruption at the IOC and the attribution 
of the Olympic Games (1992, 1996, 
2000). In FIFA's Dirty Secrets, broadcast 
by the BBC in 2010, he accused the 
president of the Confederation of African 
Football (CAF), Issa Hayatou, and the 
president of the South American Football 
Confederation (CONMEBOL), Nicolas 
Leoz, of accepting bribes. In 2010, 
journalists from The Sunday Times, a 
newspaper that had been in the front 
line of accusations of doping in cycling, 
published compromising recordings 
obtained by presenting themselves to 
FIFA officials as lobbyists for the USA’s 
bid to host the World Cup. In April 2010, 
South African journalists associated 
with Jennings published a book (Schulz 
Herzenberg, 2010) lambasting FIFA for 
its predatory way approach to the World 
Cup, accumulating revenues and tax 
breaks while leaving all expenditure to the 
host country. In June 2014, The Sunday 
Times claimed that a FIFA vice-president, 
the Qatari Mohamed Bin Hammam, had 
spent $5 million to obtain votes, most 
notably from the presidents of 30 African 
federations, for Qatar’s bid to host the 
World Cup. One of FIFA’s most influential 
representatives, Jack Warner, was once 
again implicated. It was claimed that 
Warner, a Trinidadian businessman 
and politician, FIFA vice-president 
and president of the Confederation of 
North, Central American and Caribbean 
Association Football (CONCACAF) since 
1990, had accepted $1.6 million from 
Bin Hammam. In April 2015, two Sunday 
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Times journalists published The Ugly 
Game (Blake, Calvert, 2015), a blistering 
account of how Qatar allegedly bought 
the votes of members of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee.
Criticisms by FIFA officials and managers 
are by no means rare, especially in 
the run up to or following election 
congresses and Executive Committee 
votes to choose host countries for the 
World Cup. Although these squabbles 
are picked up by the media and 
prolong infighting, they are of no real 
consequence. In 2000, Germany was 
narrowly awarded the 2006 World Cup 
(by 12 votes to 11) ahead of South Africa, 
possibly thanks to the abstention of 
the Oceania Football Confederation’s 
president, the New-Zealander Charles 
Dempsey. One of the reasons Dempsey 
gave for his subsequent resignation from 
FIFA’s Executive Committee was the 
pressure he had been put under. In 2002, 
it was the turn of FIFA’s secretary general, 
Michel Zen-Ruffinen, to resign after 
noting in his report “abuses of power” 
and Blatter’s “dictatorial” management 
(Suisse-info, 3 May 2002). In May 2011, 
Blatter’s challenger, Bin Hammam was 
accused by Chuck Blazer, the secretary 
general of CONCACAF, of attempting 
to buy votes at a meeting of Caribbean 
representatives by distributing envelopes 
containing $40,000. He allegedly did 
this with the complicity of Jack Warner, 
who was suspended from FIFA during an 
internal enquiry and who then accused 
Blatter of making a donation of $1 million 
to his confederation. The accusation was 
quickly swept aside and Bin Hammam 
withdrew shortly before the election, 
making Blatter the only candidate. 
Although the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) quashed Bin Hammam’s 
suspension due to a lack of evidence, 
on 17 December 2012, FIFA’s new ethics 
commission banned him for life from all 
activities linked to football.
Accusations can also come from 
whistleblowers who take part in or 
who witness illicit transactions. In a 
documentary shown on the German 
public television channel ARD on 4 May 
2015, a former employee of the Qatar 
bid, already named by the Sunday 
Times in 2011, repeated her accusations 
(published in France Football in 
December 2014), this time naming three 
African members of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee who had been offered 
$1.5 million “incentives” by the Qatar 
delegation. Nevertheless, no sanctions 
were handed down. More commonly, 
FIFA is called to task, or even targeted, in 
critical reports published by NGOs (FATF, 
2009; Transparency International, 2011). 
Because these accusations are not just 
allegations by journalists and/or insiders 
and are in the public domain, FIFA is 
forced to react.
Through a repertoire of actions ranging 
from threatening libel suits (against 
Jennings or the Sunday Times) to sacking 
one or more administrators, and from 
adopting a code of ethics to reforming 
the federation’s rules, FIFA is usually 
successful in quashing such accusations. 
Thanks to its crisis-management experts, 
the co-option of members of internal 
commissions of inquiry and a large 
degree of (self-)censorship, investigations 
intended to get to the bottom of 
allegations always remain confidential 
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and only the resulting decisions are 
divulged. This is also the case for external 
checks, such as those carried out by the 
auditors KPMG, which reported hardly 
any irregularities in FIFA’s accounts for 
2007-2010. Critical voices within FIFA 
are removed by pushing people to 
resign (Michel Zen-Ruffinen in 2002, 
the marketing director Guido Tognoni 
in 2003), expelling representatives who 
lack protection, often those from small 
federations, launching disciplinary 
procedures, which have been unending 
since 2013 to the detriment of officials 
from Sri-Lanka, Mongolia, Nepal, India 
and Tahiti, and, more rarely, sanctioning 
important officials (vote carriers). In 2006, 
a FIFA-commissioned report by the 
auditors Ernst & Young found that Warner 
had lined his own pockets to the tune of 
$1 million through the illegal sale of World 
Cup tickets. 
The reforms introduced by FIFA are one 
of the main ways in which it responds 
to mobilisations it sees as hostile. An 
ethics committee and code of ethics 
were set up in 2004, with revisions 
added to the code of ethics in 2006, 
2009 and 2012. In 2011, following 
Blatter’s campaign promise to steer the 
“FIFA boat back into clear, transparent 
waters”, an independent governance 
committee was formed, presided by 
Mark Pieth, a Swiss university professor 
and expert in governance. Some of the 
recommendations contained in Pieth’s 
report (Pieth, 2014), including dividing the 
ethics commission into investigatory and 
adjudicatory chambers, were adopted. 
On 25 May 2012, the amendments to 
FIFA’s statutes were put to the vote at 
the Federation’s congress and massively 
approved. They included strengthening 
the audit and compliance commission, 
introducing a code of conduct, 
appointing a woman to the Executive 
Committee, appointing two women as 
observers, and attributing one World 
Cup at a time. Age limits and length of 
mandate were not addressed but the 
measures that were passed increased 
FIFA’s credibility. Nevertheless, they did 
nothing to challenge the organisation’s 
culture of clan-ism, conflicts of interest 
and nepotism (one of Blatter’s nephews 
heads Infront, the company responsible 
for managing FIFA’s TV rights; Blatter’s 
daughter is the press officer for the Sepp 
Blatter Foundation). Pieth (2014) called 
this system a “patronage network”. 
These shady dealings provide enough 
revenue to satisfy the 24 members of the 
Executive Committee and 10 directors, 
who received a total of $36.3 million 
in “indemnities” in 2014 (Jennings, 
2015), and FIFA’s partners, especially 
as the Federation’s turnover has never 
grown so quickly. Between 2011 and 
2014, FIFA’s revenues amounted to 
$5.7 billion, most of which came from 
television rights for the World Cup ($2.45 
billion in 2014, 20 times more than in 
1998) and sponsorship contracts ($1.6 
billion). During the same period, FIFA 
redistributed over $1 billion to national 
Federations. These funds are intended 
to finance development projects, but 
some of them end up in the pockets 
of individuals who, in return, provide 
“packets of votes” for the president. 
These powerful forms of collusion are 
based on an institutional architecture 
that sanctions the “political” power of 
the continental associations and the 
independence of national associations, 
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over which the Zurich head office has 
no direct control and whose officials are 
careful to keep their eyes closed. 
The way in which the collapse of 
International Sport and Leisure (ISL) 
was handled shows that FIFA’s ability 
to protect itself also depends on the 
benevolence of other institutions. ISL 
was founded in 1982 by the head of 
Adidas, Horst Dassler, as a specialist 
sports marketing company. Although it 
had exclusive responsibility for managing 
FIFA’s media rights during the 1990s, 
the company went bankrupt in 2001. 
An investigation was carried out by 
Swiss magistrates, but the case file was 
not made public until 2012. In fact, ISL 
had paid out CHF160 million in bribes 
between 1989 and 2001 (Jennings, 
2015). According to documents quoted 
by PlaytheGame, former FIFA president 
J. Havelange and his son-in-law, 
Ricardo Teixeira, who was president 
of the Brazilian Football Confederation 
(CBF) and a member of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee, received payments totalling 
CHF41 million Nevertheless, Swiss 
magistrates refused to prosecute. In 2011 
Havelange resigned from the post he 
had held at the IOC for 48 years and in 
July 2013 he stepped down as honorary 
president of FIFA. In 2012 Teixeira also 
left FIFA, for “medical reasons”, after 
22 years at the head of the CBF, where 
he had survived numerous allegations 
of embezzlement (Jennings, 2015), 
avoiding conviction despite several police 
investigations. At FIFA, the new ethics 
commission cleared Blatter in 2013: 
“President Blatter’s conduct could not be 
classified in any way as misconduct with 
regard to any ethics rules… … (even if it) 
may have been clumsy”. 
The collusion that helped protect FIFA 
from the accusations made against 
it arise from a vast network of inter-
institutional relationships, starting with 
those that are tolerated under Swiss law. 
Corrupt practices in the private sector are 
not prosecuted automatically and it was 
not until 2004, in response to pressure 
from the OECD (and its Financial Action 
Task Force - FATF) and GRECO, that 
the Swiss government made private 
corruption a misdemeanour (included 
in the Unfair Competition Act but not 
in the Penal Code). Until then, bribes 
paid abroad by Swiss companies had 
been tax deductible! On the grounds 
that international sports organisations 
are not subject to competition, on 10 
November 2004 Switzerland’s Federal 
Council (government) assured them 
they would not be subject to the Unfair 
Competition Act. Corrupt practices 
would be prosecuted only if one or 
more of the protagonists (corrupter or 
corrupted) filed a complaint. As a result, 
there were no convictions for private 
corruption between 2004 and 2014. 
This form of immunity, alongside other 
powerful collusions (banking secrecy, 
failure to prosecute tax evasion, little 
regulation, low rate of corporation tax - 
4.25%) and other advantages (political 
stability, protection of privacy) explain 
why around 60 international sports 
organisations are based in Switzerland, 
earning the country more than CHF1 
billion every year (Rutter & Partner, 
2013). Nevertheless, on 12 December 
2014 the Swiss parliament passed a bill 
clamping down on money laundering. 
The bill’s title, “Lex FIFA”, clearly indicates 
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its main target. According to one of the 
bill’s main supporters, Roland Büchel, 
who works for the IOC’s marketing 
department, “Switzerland’s Parliament 
and people of are fed up with corruption. 
And they haven’t understood that at 
FIFA” (Le Monde, 11 December 2014). 
Between 2000 and 2014, 25 of the 35 
parliamentary speeches concerning FIFA 
mentioned suspicions of corruption (Le 
Temps, 30 May 15). Although the legal 
pressure in Switzerland has increased 
slightly, a large majority of MPs are happy 
to let the status quo continue.
On 26 September 2014 Hans-Joachim 
Eckert, the president of the adjudicatory 
chamber of the ethics commission, 
minimised the conclusions of a report 
by the president of the investigatory 
chamber, Michael J. Garcia, into 
suspicions of corruption in the attribution 
of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. 
FIFA announced that it would not 
publish the report, as the requirement 
to maintain confidentiality contained 
in its code of ethics did not allow it to 
do so. Nevertheless, on 18 November 
2014 Eckert ordered FIFA to provide 
Switzerland’s attorney general with a 
copy of Garcia’s report. This ruling was 
not enough to stop the former U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York resigning (on 17 December) 
because of his indignation over the 
censorship of his findings. The reason 
Garcia gave for quitting was a feeling of 
impotence: “No independent governance 
committee, investigator or arbitration 
panel can change the culture of an 
organisation”.
Although for decades many players 
inside and outside FIFA saw the 
Federation as almost untouchable, FIFA’s 
resilience was situational – as long as 
accusations were not simultaneously 
and massively relayed in several sectors, 
the Federation could easily maintain an 
image of stability. 
FIFAgate: How the 
Scandal Damaged 
FIFA’s Credibility
For many years, the accusations of 
corruption against FIFA led to no more 
than internal sanctions and sectoral 
crises. So, why did things change in 
2015? In order to grasp the size of the 
scandal and the Federation’s sudden 
vulnerability, it is necessary to consider 
the multisectoral and simultaneous 
dimension of the accusations that, from 
27 May, turned the situation upside down 
and allowed the unthinkable to happen. 
On 27 May, the eve of the 65th FIFA 
congress, the United States Department 
of Justice (DoJ) published a 161-page 
indictment against 14 defendants (9 FIFA 
officials, including 2 vice presidents, 
and 5 sports company executives), 
drawn up by the Brooklyn federal court 
on 20 May. The indictment refers to 
corruption that had become “endemic” 
within the FIFA “system” (United States 
v. J. Webb et al., 2015, p. 32) “over a 
period of approximately 25 years” (p. 
31), and lists 47 counts of racketeering, 
fraud, money laundering, bribes and 
kickbacks amounting to $150 million. 
The investigation, carried out under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
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Organizations Act (RICO), which 
encourages defendants to cooperate 
with the justice system, had taken 
several years. Jennings and Garcia also 
provided information to the investigation. 
The bribes related to FIFA’s presidential 
election in 2011, broadcasting rights, 
marketing contracts for competitions 
such as the Copa America, and 
sponsorship agreements with Nike for 
Brazil’s national football team (p. 74). 
Ten other defendants pleaded guilty 
between July 2013 and May 2015, 
including Blazer and two of Warner’s 
sons. Over a period of 19 years, Blazer 
(“Mr 10%”) had accumulated $11 million 
that he had not declared to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). Following his 
indictment, he resigned as secretary 
general of CONCACAF and pleaded 
guilty to ten charges of racketeering, 
money laundering and tax evasion, etc., 
in an American court with which he had 
secretly cooperated for 16 months while 
remaining a member of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee. In fact, the collusion between 
Warner and Blazer had come to an end 
in 2010 when Warner supported Qatar’s 
bid for the World Cup and Bin Haman’s 
attempt to become FIFA president, while 
Blazer had supported the United States 
and Blatter. 
In conjunction with the publication (on 
the Internet) of this indictment, the Swiss 
police, acting on an American warrant, 
arrested seven officials in a luxury hotel 
in Zurich (New York Times journalists, 
tipped off by Brooklyn’s district attorney, 
were at the scene). FIFA’s head office 
was searched under a warrant issued 
by Switzerland’s attorney general, who 
was investigating the attribution of the 
2018 and 2022 World Cups, while the 
US authorities searched CONCACAF’s 
headquarters in Miami. At the same 
time, the head of the DoJ, Loretta Lynch 
(who, importantly, had supervised the 
investigation as a federal prosecutor in 
Brooklyn) held a news conference in 
New York alongside the heads of the 
FBI, James Comey, and of the IRS’s 
Criminal Investigation Division, Richard 
Weber, who spoke of a “World Cup of 
fraud” spanning “at least two generations 
of football officials”. Lynch stated: “the 
indictment alleges corruption that is 
rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted 
both abroad and here in the United 
States” (Financial Times, 28 May). The 
cooperation between the Swiss and 
American authorities surprised many 
commentators (“Switzerland is playing 
an unexpected double role”, 24 Heures, 
28 May), as it had no solid legal basis. 
In fact, this action was part of the wider 
cooperation between the USA and 
Switzerland that had arisen out of the 
banking scandals involving Swiss UBS 
(fined $780 million) and Crédit Swiss 
(fined $2.6 billion, paid in 2014 in order 
to keep its trading licence in the USA), 
which were prosecuted under the 2010 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), which came into force in 2014. 
This operation, which was 
unprecedented in terms of the 
resources employed and its multi-level 
coordination, led to an almost immediate 
response from FIFA. On 27 May the 
ethics commission’s adjudicatory 
chamber temporarily suspended 11 
FIFA representatives. Another three 
officials were suspended between 
28 May and 2 June. FIFA’s director of 
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communications, Walter de Gregorio, 
repeatedly stated that Blatter was not 
implicated and many people, including 
Blatter’s declared opponents, believed 
he would be re-elected president once 
the scandal had blown over. Jennings 
went as far as to say: “all the evidence is 
against Blatter, but he is still there. This 
entire affair, which mostly concerns the 
last nine years, is already ancient history 
for him and will have no impact on his 
re-election” (Le Nouvelliste, 28 May). 
At the end of a congress marked by an 
unprecedented media mobilisation and 
demonstrators brandishing signs reading 
“Game over for Blatter”, the president’s 
re-election (by 133 votes against 73 
votes for Prince Ali, who decided not 
to force a second round) suggested 
that the “unbudgeable” would extricate 
himself again: “Despite the scandals, 
Sepp Blatter manages to win” (Le Temps, 
30 May), “The secrets of the unsinkable 
“captain” (24 Heures, 30 May). 
Nevertheless, the prediction by the 
chairman of the English Football 
Association that Blatter would last no 
more than two years was soon borne 
out, as subsequent desertions on an 
unprecedented scale quickly precipitated 
Blatter’s fall. In fact, by 28 May most 
Swiss newspapers had already turned 
against him: “Mr Blatter, go” was the 
title of an editorial in the Vaud canton’s 
biggest daily paper, 24 Heures; “Blatter 
has lost his credibility” was the headline 
in Le Matin, while an editorial in Le Temps 
announced “The end of impunity” and 
L’Hebdo wrote of “Sepp Blatter’s seven 
deadly sins”. In the UK, members of 
parliament called for a boycott of the 
2022 World Cup and, as a gesture of 
protest, England’s FIFA representative 
David Gill refused to serve on the 
Executive Committee. At the same 
time, FIFA’s corporate sponsors (more 
than a third of its revenues) voiced their 
concerns by threatening to review their 
sponsorship, as the scandal had given 
them the opportunity to renegotiate 
their contracts. Long-term critics of the 
“FIFA system” were even harsher, with 
Guido Tognoni writing: “for the last 40 
years, since Havelange was enthroned, 
FIFA has had a culture of corruption. 
Blatter didn’t start it, but he has always 
tolerated corruption. It was a way of 
staying in power” (he estimated Blatter’s 
annual “salary” to be CHF15 million 
L’Hebdo, 28 May 2015). Two members 
of the Swiss parliament put forward an 
action plan to combat corruption in sport 
and, on 3 June, the New York Times 
noted “the widespread impression of 
FIFA as a corrupt rogue state”. At the 
same time, the European newspapers 
behind many of the investigations of FIFA 
renewed their enquiries (Mediapart in 
France, Il Fatto Quotidiano in Italy, Der 
Spiegel in Germany, etc.). Some referred 
to “practices worthy of a mafia clan” 
(L’Hebdo, 4 June 2015), and it became 
quite common to draw parallels between 
FIFA and a mafia organisation. Others, 
which had previously supported Blatter, 
distanced themselves from him. 
Nevertheless, some collusion continued. 
By sitting next to Blatter at the opening 
of the congress and having defended 
him the day before at the Swiss Media 
Forum, Switzerland’s Minister of Defence 
and Sports, Ueli Maurer, showed 
his continuing support, while Peter 
Gilliéron, the president of the Swiss 
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Football Association and a member of 
UEFA’s Executive Committee, carefully 
avoided direct criticism. In the eyes 
of some of FIFA’s staff, Blatter had 
not lost his credibility and on 3 June 
he was applauded when he arrived 
at FIFA headquarters. The same 
day, Switzerland’s Council of States 
(the upper chamber of parliament) 
refused by 23 votes to 22 to follow the 
Federal Council’s recommendation on 
prosecuting private corruption, which 
would not, therefore, be prosecuted 
automatically. What is more, some 
people were still happy to publicly 
acknowledge instances of give and take. 
For example, the president of the French 
Football Federation, who had supported 
Blatter’s election because France had 
just been awarded the 2019 Women’s 
World Cup, claimed: “our relations with 
FIFA are extremely good (…) I like to 
return a favour when someone has given 
us something” (Reuters, 28 May 2015).
After his re-election, Blatter insisted on 
the impossibility of controlling FIFA: “It 
has to stop here and now. I know many 
people hold me ultimately responsible 
for the actions and reputation of the 
global football community… … (but) I 
cannot monitor everyone all of the time.” 
In another dramatic turn, on 2 June, 
Blatter, who was visibly marked by 
events, announced: “I have decided to 
lay down my mandate at an extraordinary 
elective congress”. This decision was 
taken following an article in the New 
York Times accusing Jérôme Valke, FIFA 
secretary general and Blatter’s right-
hand man, of involvement in a payment 
of $10 million to CONCACAF in 2008 as 
a “commission” in exchange for votes 
to award the 2010 World Cup to South 
Africa. This turnaround made denouncing 
FIFA much easier (“Blatter, the fall of 
FIFA’s big boss”, ran the headline in Le 
Nouvelliste on 3 June), with the American 
media suggesting that the FBI was 
investigating Blatter. The destruction 
of Blatter’s and FIFA’s reputations led 
Swiss political leaders to voice their 
fears about Switzerland’s reputation 
(“Switzerland fears for its image”, Le 
Matin, 4 June). The heads of several 
western governments (especially in the 
UK, France and Germany) simultaneously 
came out against Blatter, something 
that only the British prime minister, in 
2010, and the Brazilian president, Dilma 
Roussef, had done previously. In fact, in 
2014, Roussef had seriously admonished 
FIFA officials: “we were hoping for 
harmony, but FIFA and our football 
confederation have brought conflict and 
corruption…” (quoted by Jennings, 2015). 
On the other hand, President Putin gave 
Blatter his official support against “yet 
another flagrant attempt (by the United 
States) to extend its jurisdiction to other 
states” (New York Times, 29 May). These 
official positions reflected other powerful 
geopolitical interests, with governments 
seeing sport as an important vector of 
soft power (Gygax, 2012).
Many people quickly realised how 
vulnerable FIFA had become, a 
turnaround (effect) resulting from a series 
of defections (cause), which, in turn, 
facilitated further defections, thereby 
creating a form of chain reaction. The 
crisis achieved a dimension never 
before seen at FIFA, which had to face 
a concomitance of large oscillations in 
perceptions of what was (im)possible. 
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“It is a shock, the surprise we no longer 
expected to happen, we had got so 
used to seeing Sepp Blatter weather 
every storm”; “The extent of the abuses 
exposed in recent days is such that 
other continents, other federations could 
be affected” (Le Temps, 3 June). The 
term FIFAgate, first used as a Twitter 
hashtag on 27 May and quickly picked 
up by most other media (“what is now 
commonly referred to as FIFAgate”, Le 
Monde, 6 June), neatly summarises 
these tumultuous events. The scandal 
has affected positions and stances, with 
the head of the audit and compliance 
commission, Domenico Scala, who was 
given the task of devising a programme 
of reform, suddenly being seen as a “Mr 
Clean” and the reformer of FIFA. The 
sudden departure from Zurich of the 
CBF’s president, Marco Polo del Nero, 
just after his predecessor was arrested, 
shows the extent of the turnaround in 
the thinkable that produced and was 
produced by the scandal. It forced 
many people to change their plans. 
These events also explain why, on 29 
May, Brazilian senators hastily decided 
to set up a parliamentary commission 
of enquiry into the CBF and the justice 
minister’s announcement that Teixeira 
was to be investigated in relation to 
suspicions of money laundering and 
fraud. Brazilian police had found that 
several of his bank accounts had been 
swollen by “unusual” payments totalling 
€133.5 million between 2009 and 2012, 
when Teixeira was president of the 
2014 World Cup organising committee. 
Several attacks that had formerly 
been considered too risky, such as 
threatening to withdraw the 2018 and 
2022 World Cups, were suddenly seen 
as doable, especially in the eyes of British 
and American officials. For example, 
the chairman of the English Football 
Association said: “We can go back and 
look at those two World Cups. If I was 
in Qatar today, I wouldn’t be feeling too 
confident” (Wall Street Journal, 2 June). 
Encouraged by the multisectoral 
mobilisations and large oscillations 
in perceptions of the (im)possible, 
FIFAgate has triggered a flood of other 
revelations and accusations. On 4 May 
John Delaney, the president of the Irish 
Football Federation, admitted that his 
federation had accepted a large sum 
of money from FIFA in exchange for not 
pressing a complaint against France for a 
refereeing error during a 2010 World Cup 
qualifying match (a figure of €5 million 
has been suggested). On 26 October 
the German World Cup affair resurfaced. 
Der Spiegel claimed that a slush fund 
had been set up and, for the first time, 
Franz Beckenbauer admitted “a mistake” 
had been made while insisting that “no 
votes had been bought” (L’Equipe, 26 
October). Some allegations were made 
in order to colour opinions of certain 
protagonists. For example, on 3 June, 
the DoJ made Blazer’s confession public. 
The same day, in an interview with the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Lynch 
said information had been passed on to 
other countries, including Switzerland. 
In this context of great uncertainty 
linked to the desectorisation of the 
dispute, the standings of the leading 
contenders to succeed Blatter as FIFA 
president fluctuated as the scandal 
went on. Originally the firm favourite 
due to his opposition to Blatter, Michel 
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Platini soon found himself the subject 
of new allegations. On 29 July he 
officially announced his candidature in 
a letter to officials of FIFA’s 209 member 
associations. Prince Ali went on the 
attack and Blatter was quick to point 
out that Platini had voted for Qatar 
(recruitment of his son, agreement 
between president Sarkozy, Qatar’s 
crown prince Al-Thani, his prime 
minister and a representative of Colony 
Capital, the owners of PSG, during a 
dinner Platini attended at the Elysée 
Palace on 23 November 2010). On 
25 September Switzerland’s attorney 
general began investigating Blatter for 
“disloyal management” and “abuse 
of trust” in relation to the signature of 
“an unfavourable contract” with the 
Caribbean Football Union. Blatter was 
also accused of making a “disloyal 
payment” of €1.83 million to Platini, 
with the result that Platini lost a section 
of his support from the French media. 
On 2 October FIFA’s largest American 
sponsors (Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, 
Visa, Budweiser) demanded Blatter’s 
immediate resignation after a criminal 
investigation against him was launched 
in Switzerland. On 8 October Platini, 
Blatter and Valcke (who had already been 
relieved of his functions as FIFA secretary 
general and who had been rumoured 
to have had his eye on the presidency) 
were given 90-day suspensions by the 
ethics committee. In addition, a former 
FIFA vice president, Chung Mong-oon 
(candidate in the forthcoming presidential 
election), was suspended for six years 
and fined CHF100,000. At the deadline 
for registering as a candidate in the 
presidential election, on 26 October, 
Platini was one of eight candidates, 
but the decision by UEFA’s Executive 
Committee to support the candidacy of 
its secretary general, Gianni Infantino, 
was seen as a “disavowal of Platini”. 
On 21 December 2015 FIFA’s ethics 
committee finally sanctioned Platini and 
Blatter for "conflict of interests" and 
"disloyal management", suspending them 
for eight years and imposing heavy fines.
At FIFA’s extraordinary congress on 26 
February 2016, Gianni Infantino was 
elected the organisation’s new president 
and a number of governance reforms were 
passed. What were these reforms and 
how could they modify an organisational 
culture that has allowed so many abuses 
and protected their perpetrators?
The Governance 
Strategy Chosen to 
Overcome the Crisis 
and its Limitations
In the minds of its protagonists, 
FIFAgate has a precedent in the scandal 
surrounding the awarding of the Olympic 
Games to Salt Lake City in 1998, 
especially as the measures subsequently 
taken by the IOC were generally seen “as 
effective, if partial” (Chappelet, 2011). The 
Salt Lake City scandal is what Thomas 
Schelling called a “focal point” (Schelling, 
1960), that is, a point where expectations 
converge (“The IOC, an example to 
follow?”, 24 Heures, 5 June 2015). Many 
of the players involved felt that similar 
measures to those introduced by the 
IOC would provide a way for FIFA to 
overcome its crisis. Hence FIFA’s riposte, 
announced on 11 August 2016, was to 
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create a reform committee, to be chaired 
by 77-year-old Swiss lawyer, François 
Carrard, a former general manager of 
the IOC and the coordinator of the “IOC 
2000” reform committee.
Although the reforms announced by FIFA 
modified the Federation’s organisational 
governance, they had little impact on 
its “network” or on the systemic (Henry 
& Lee, 2005) or collaborative (Shilbury 
& Ferkins 2015) governance of FIFA’s 
ever-expanding network of stakeholders. 
In fact, FIFA’s response to the crisis was 
to set out a pathway to “responsible 
autonomy” (Chappelet, 2015), as had 
been done earlier by the IOC. Previous 
micro-changes to FIFA’s governance, 
introduced between 2013 and 2015 
in response to earlier accusations 
of corruption, had been applied and 
monitored internally. In contrast, the latest 
round of reforms would be supervised 
by external institutions, including the 
US DoJ and the FBI. In fact, the DoJ 
required FIFA to stand as a plaintiff in the 
corruption cases being brought against 
its members. The DoJ’s work at FIFA’s 
headquarters is being carried out in 
conjunction with an American law firm 
(Quinn Emanuel).
The most recent step in this direction was 
taken at an Extraordinary FIFA Congress 
in Zurich on 26 February 2016, which 
approved a set of reforms presented 
by the chair of the 2016 FIFA Reform 
Committee, Dr François Carrard. These 
principles and recommendations were 
incorporated into an amended version 
of the FIFA Statutes and pave the way 
for further significant and much-needed 
changes to FIFA’s governance structure. 
The main reforms introduced by FIFA 
are to its organisational governance and 
the way its headquarters is run. They 
include ensuring a clear separation 
between “political” and commercial 
decision-making, introducing term limits 
for the president and council members, 
eligibility and integrity checks for elected 
directors, and disclosure of individual 
compensation packages.
Other reforms, such as promoting 
women in football, controlling money 
flows and introducing statutory principles 
of good governance for confederations 
and member associations, concern 
FIFA’s network. 
Two additional reforms are designed 
to improve the federation’s systemic 
governance by creating a Football 
Stakeholder Committee and reinforcing 
FIFA’s commitment to human rights.
The separation between “political” 
and commercial decision-making 
functions will be achieved by making 
the FIFA Council (replaces the Executive 
Committee) “responsible for setting the 
organisation’s overall strategic direction, 
while the General Secretariat oversees 
the operational and commercial actions 
required to effectively execute that 
strategy”. 
Another possibility would have been to 
introduce a dual board system in order 
to limit the president’s powers. In the 
first instance, more effective control 
could be achieved by remodelling the 
Executive Committee, which should meet 
frequently, not just four times a year, as is 
currently the case. In addition, it should 
have a wider spectrum of members, not 
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just representatives of the continental 
associations, be reduced in size, contain 
more women, be more professional and 
include independent administrators with 
skills in areas such as marketing, law 
and finance. Although FIFA announced 
the creation of a “Football Stakeholder 
Committee”, this committee does not 
appear to be a true “Football Supervisory 
Council” capable of overseeing the 
work of  football’s administrative bodies. 
Hence, this new committee, which 
has no equivalent at the IOC, could 
go much further and include more 
representatives of all of  football’s key 
stakeholders (players’ unions, managers’ 
associations, referees’ associations, 
professional leagues, professional clubs, 
continental confederations), together 
with independent experts. Transparency 
International has also suggested 
appointing outside observers to key 
commissions and committees, which 
have been reduced in number from 
26 to 9. Revising FIFA’s organisational 
governance in this way would avoid 
having the same individuals “involved 
in both the management and control of 
decision-making” (Mason et al., 2015) 
and improve accountability, control and 
organisational performance. This would 
prevent future FIFA presidents signing 
“cheques with no counter signature by 
another official” (Jennings 2015). As 
Pielke (2013) noted “it is no exaggeration 
to conclude that in both design and 
practice, FIFA has no formal hierarchical 
mechanisms under which the president 
and Executive Committee can be held 
accountable. The scope and pace of 
any reform effort will be dictated by 
what is deemed acceptable by the FIFA 
leadership”. Pielke’s analysis was echoed 
by Carrard’s conclusions as president of 
the 2016 Reform Committee: “controlling 
the role of the continental confederations 
is a fundamental aspect of FIFA. These 
bodies are not members of FIFA, but 
they can take decisions within the 
organisation… I don’t know what I would 
do if I were president and had to live with 
23 people over whom I had no authority 
and who are responsible to me” (Le 
Matin, 9 September 2015).
• “Term limits for the FIFA President, FIFA 
Council members and members of 
the Audit and Compliance Committee 
and of the judicial bodies (max. 12 
years)”. This reform mirrors the limits 
on terms of office introduced by 
the IOC (8 years + 4 years for the 
IOC president; 8 years for a certain 
category of IOC members), but FIFA 
has not introduced any restrictions 
on terms of office for the presidents 
of the continental confederations and 
national associations. Doing so would 
improve democracy throughout the 
organisation and prevent cults building 
up around omnipotent, lifelong leaders. 
The question of officials simultaneously 
occupying several positions must also 
be addressed. Should someone be 
allowed to be president of a national 
association and, at the same time, a 
member of a continental association 
and/or a member of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee? The IOC also tackled the 
question of the age of its members and 
president by introducing an age limit of 
70. FIFA has not done this.
• “Election of Council members 
supervised by FIFA and in accordance 
with FIFA’s own electoral regulations; 
all candidates are subject to 
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comprehensive eligibility and integrity 
checks conducted by an independent 
FIFA Review Committee”. This proposal 
does not explain how and by whom 
eligibility and integrity checks will be 
conducted.
• “Disclosure of individual compensation 
on an annual basis of the FIFA 
President, all FIFA Council members, 
the Secretary General and relevant 
chairpersons of independent standing 
and judicial committees”.
In order to ensure true transparency, 
FIFA headquarters and the continental 
and national associations2 must publish 
full accounts, including statements of 
the remuneration and benefits awarded 
to executives and any fees paid. FIFA 
should also publish the fees it pays to 
advisers and marketing agencies. Since 
2014, the IOC has published details of 
the remuneration it pays to its president 
and members. As a result, we know that 
the IOC’s president receives an annual 
indemnity of €225,000, a sum approved 
by the ethics commission, in addition 
to the reimbursement of expenses and 
accommodation costs. The annual report 
does not, however, mention how much 
tax the president pays. Members of 
the IOC’s Executive Committee receive 
2 x $450 per day, whereas ordinary 
IOC members receive $450 per day, in 
addition to expenses (IOC, 2014). Each 
member also receives $7,000 per year in 
administrative support, and is considered 
to be a volunteer whose indemnities, 
recorded as “losses in earnings”, are not 
2 A report by Transparency International (2015) 
noted that 179/209 national federations did not 
publish an annual report or financial records, 
and only 2/6 continental federations (UEFA and 
African football) publish annual accounts.
subject to income tax. 
Other reforms concern FIFA’s network 
include:
• “Greater recognition and promotion of 
women in football with a minimum of 
one female representative elected as 
a Council member per confederation; 
promotion of women as an explicit 
statutory objective of FIFA to create 
a more diverse decision-making 
environment and culture”. Compared 
with the IOC’s objective of reserving 
30% of decision-making positions in 
NOCs and IFs for women, this reform 
looks like an entirely token measure. 
What position will FIFA’s woman 
administrator hold and how much 
power will she have?
• “Enhanced control of money flows”. 
This measure seems very vague 
and no details have been given of 
how and who will control the huge 
amount of money redistributed across 
FIFA’s network. The ways in which 
FIFA handles and redistributes its 
huge revenues could be reformed by 
separating the management of funds 
for developing football (e.g., through 
the ‘Goal’ programme) from the 
political system. Entrusting the control 
of these projects to an independent 
organisation, such as a foundation, 
would lead to more effective evaluation 
and reporting of their implementation 
and success
• “Universal good governance principles 
for confederations and member 
associations”. These principles were 
adopted by the IOC in 2008 but have 
not really been applied across the 
Olympic movement (Bayle, 2015). How 
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and by whom will be it done?
• “FIFA’s commitment to human rights 
to be enshrined in the FIFA Statutes”. 
This measure seems to relate mostly to 
the organisation of the World Cup but, 
again, no details have been given as to 
how and by whom it will be done. 
• “New Football Stakeholder Committee 
to ensure greater transparency and 
inclusion through broader stakeholder 
representation (including players, 
clubs and leagues)”. This proposal is 
coherent with FIFA’s new governance 
model (see above). UEFA, has already 
set up a similar committee (the UEFA 
Strategy Council), consisting of UEFA 
members, representatives of the clubs, 
professional leagues and players. 
Another issue the 2016 reforms do not 
cover is FIFA’s performance model, 
that is, the way it evaluates its success 
and that of the football movement. We 
would suggest modifying this model 
so societal performance becomes its 
central measure of performance (in a 
specific societal report evaluated by 
an independent expert and included 
in the published annual report). Sports 
organisations to have done this include 
the French Football Federation, which, 
through its foundation, has tried to draw 
up an overview of football’s social impact 
(Bayle, 2014; see Hoye et al., 2015, for an 
evaluation of social return on investment 
within a community Australian-rules 
football club). FIFA could adopt similar 
ideas and tools, which have emerged 
since 2010, and promote their use 
within the football system. A first step 
for FIFA would be to decide which areas 
of society to target, which indicators to 
use to assess success, which reporting 
systems to use, and how to ensure 
accountability (via societal indicators).
Going beyond football, FIFA could bolster 
its image by helping create a world 
agency for regulating sports governance, 
perhaps modelled on the World Anti-
Doping Agency, which was founded in 
1999 (Chappelet, 2001 & 2002), as a 
partnership between the international 
sports movement, governments and 
NGOs. Such an agency would facilitate 
the implementation of new forms of 
governance and regulatory mechanisms 
at the international and national levels. 
A step toward achieving this could be 
made by creating national agencies for 
regulating both governance, as some 
countries have done for doping (national 
anti-doping agencies - NADA), and online 
sports betting. The resources needed 
(police and tax enquiries, Interpol etc.) to 
successfully combat misconduct, whose 
stakes go far beyond the international 
sport movement, justify the involvement 
of national governments and the 
European Union. 
As Mark Pieth noted: “pure self-regulation 
is a slow and uncertain process” (2014). 
Michael Garcia, the former president 
of the ethics commission, was more 
circumspect when he suggested that 
it was difficult, or even impossible, for 
such institutions to reform themselves 
without intense outside pressure to do so 
(Pielke, 2013; Bayle, 2010). Sociologically, 
this is very understandable, given 
such organisations’ inertia and the 
“arrangements” between their officials. 
These new principles of governance 
must change the culture of the FIFA 
system (Pieth, 2014), although this will 
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be a long and difficult process given 
the specificities of national contexts (in 
non-democratic or barely democratic 
countries, in countries where anti-
corruption systems are non-existent or 
extremely weak, etc.). This is why we 
believe that certain measures, most 
notably the creation of a world agency for 
the governance of sport, are essential.
Conclusion
We have shown how, for many years, 
FIFA’s executives managed to contain 
the mobilisations that formed around 
allegations of corruption. Then, on 27 
May 2015 these mobilisations became 
multisectoral, creating an uncontrollable 
and self-perpetuating process consisting 
of serial feedback, most notably with 
respect to the feasibility of denunciation. 
Within just a few weeks, it became much 
easier for numerous protagonists with 
a variety of motives to level accusations 
at FIFA’s top executives, resulting in 
an irresistible public outcry against the 
corrupt practices within the federation.
The primary contribution of the present 
paper is to propose a new theoretical 
and methodological framework for 
analysing scandals. It also describes the 
measures introduced by FIFA in order to 
try and overcome the crisis, highlighting 
weaknesses in the current proposals and 
possible ways of reinforcing the reform 
process.
The lessons to be learnt from the IOC 
scandal (in 2000) and the current 
FIFAgate scandal are that the involvement 
of a powerful institution (in this case, 
the DoJ and FBI) is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for a scandal 
to break, as the multisectoral and 
simultaneous dimension of mobilisations 
is a decisive factor in generating a crisis 
within the collusions that allow a culture 
of corruption to form within an institution. 
In this respect, the current situation, 
arising from changes in perceptions of 
what is (im)possible, which have led to 
a series of sport scandals (IAAF, FINA 
in November 2015, etc.), is a window of 
opportunity for introducing innovative 
governance reforms. 
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‘Governance and leadership 
are the yin and the yang of 
successful organisations. If 
you have leadership without 
governance you risk tyranny, 
fraud and personal fiefdoms. 
If you have governance 
without leadership you risk 
atrophy, bureaucracy and 
indifference.’
Mark GOYDER 
(British author, speaker and business man)
Editor’s note: the original text of this paper was written in 2013
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Abstract
The governance of para-sports has 
always been a contested issue by the 
sport movement. This report analyses 
what steps have already been taken 
in terms of integration and what the 
opportunities and challenges are for 
International Federations (IFs) interested 
in integrating a para- division.
This study included a lecture on sports 
governance in the specific area of para-
sports, an understanding of our role as 
future leaders in sports management and 
an analysis of official documents.
In addition to this review, the research 
covered interviews with key para-sports 
coordinators, as well as a data analysis 
of the evolution of the Paralympic Games 
since 1960.
The key objective of the study was 
to understand the challenges and 
opportunities for IFs to integrate a 
para-discipline and how the para-
organisations could work towards joining 
the movement correctly.
By combining the results of the analysis, 
it could be concluded that integration 
is a long process but IF’s structure are 
a strength that can benefit the fast and 
professional growth of para-sports. They 
should work primarily on breaking down 
the barriers, simplifying the movement 
and communicating correctly with all the 
stakeholders involved.
Introduction
“No country can afford to turn its back on 
10% of its population.” – ILO/UNESCO/
UNICEF/WHO proclamation, 3 December 
1997 
Will one of the legacies of London 2012 
Paralympic Games be a stimulus for 
even greater inclusion for individuals with 
disabilities both in society and in sport 
that resonates a “within, not beside” 
paradigm shift in both philosophy, values 
and action? (Wolff, 2012).
The legacy left by the London 2012 
Paralympic Games and this research has 
the purpose of making an inventory of 
what exists today concerning integration 
and to propose useful recommendations 
to IFs interested in integrating a para-
division within their structure in the future. 
Since the origins of the Paralympic 
Games at Stoke Mandeville, the key 
challenge has been putting basic building 
blocks in place and overcoming issues of 
prejudice. The Beijing 2008 Paralympic 
Games was a clear breakthrough, as 
illustrated in various press reports, but 
the London 2012 Paralympic Games 
heralded the real coming of age for the 
movement: full stadiums, magnificent 
athletic performances, consistent brand 
values that resonated with the public, and 
true global coverage of the event (Craven, 
2013).
The Paralympic Games are gaining 
international recognition as an elite 
sports product. Along with this growth, 
numerous questions arise regarding 
the Paralympic movement. One of the 
first issues deals with the integration of 
athletes with disabilities into mainstream 
able-bodied sport. Some IFs have 
already integrated competitions and rules 
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(Grevemberg, Hums, & Wolff, 2001). This 
research paper supports the integration 
and believes sports managers will have 
to deal with the integration of para-
divisions in the future. As the Paralympic 
Games continue to grow, the governing 
bodies associated with the Games, 
including the IPC, National Paralympic 
Committees (NPC), and International 
Federations (IFs) will need to adjust to 
an ever-changing environment. They will 
need to be responsive to governance 
decisions made by able-bodied sports 
organisations that may impact events, 
rules, and eligibility for athletes with 
disabilities. (Hums, 2004).
There is an opportunity to benefit 
from the momentum given by the last 
Paralympic Games’ legacy and move 
forward rapidly to educate organisers, 
federations and specialists. The 
integration and equity between women 
athletes, athletes with a disability and 
able-bodied athletes must be the same, 
it is a social responsibility, which must be 
taken into account.
Sport remains simply another area where 
discriminatory attitudes and practices 
toward persons with disabilities are 
perpetuated. Even when the decision is 
made to make sport more accessible 
and inclusive, without basic steps to 
foster understanding, knowledge and 
communication about how to adapt 
sports appropriately, intolerance can be 
intensified and discord can ensue. With 
appropriate communication, knowledge 
and skills, sport can be a powerful tool 
for transforming community attitudes 
and empowering individuals through 
the acquisition of new physical and 
social skills, self-confidence and positive 
relationships (Right to Play, 2013).
In 1993, the United Nations adopted 
The Standard Rules for the Equalisation 
of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities, which also addressed the 
right to sport for persons with disabilities. 
The variety and flexibility of sport makes 
it an excellent showcase for strategies of 
inclusion and adaptation (Right to Play, 
2013).
The purpose of the research is to 
analyse the way sports for athletes with a 
disability are evolving and what the next 
steps are in the future to enable it to grow 
in a professional and sustainable manner. 
The goal is to focus on the specific 
managerial aspect of the movement, 
which is the integration through its 
International Federation.
The first part of the research paper is an 
investigation into how the stakeholders 
of para-sports are connected and what 
kind of agreement exists concerning 
sports for athletes with a disability.This 
part focuses on the IPC. We analyse how 
it works, what is its vision and mission. 
The second part is an analysis of the 
relation existing between the IPC and 
International Federations, which already 
fully integrate a para-division within their 
structure.
Then the purpose is to know more about 
the agreement that exists between the 
IPC and the IOC, the umbrella of all 
International Federations.
The red thread of the research is 
to understand the principles and 
challenges of integration. To have a 
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better understanding of this concern, 
we interviewed two experts in para-
cycling and paratriathlon working in two 
International Federations, the ITU and the 
UCI. We also reviewed different shared 
documents from these two Federation 
and undertook an analysis of the data to 
answer our questions.
Literature Review
The International Paralympic 
Committee
The final stage in the evolution of the 
institutional basis for the Paralympic 
Games was the establishment of the 
International Paralympic Committees in 
1989: an organisation similar in structure 
to the IOC itself.
Based in Bonn, it serves as the umbrella 
organisation for 177 National Paralympic 
Committees, four regional bodies, and 
17 International Federations recognised 
by the IPC as the sole representative 
of a Paralympic Sport. Its purpose is 
to organise the summer and winter 
Paralympic Games and it also acts as 
the international federation for ten sports, 
which date back to the origins of the 
IPC, supervising and coordinating World 
Championships and other competitions. 
(IPC, 2016).
Its vision is to enable ‘Paralympic athletes 
to achieve sport excellence and inspire 
and excite the world’ (IPC, 2006c, p.3). 
Crucially, since 1992, it is now the sole 
coordinating body for Paralympic sport 
recognised by the IOC.
It employs nearly 70 people from 20 
countries and is composed of a General 
Assembly (highest decision making 
body), a Governing Board (executive 
body), a Management Team and various 
Standing Committees and Councils 
(Appendix I: IPC Operational Structure).
As members of the IPC, International 
Sport Federations (IFs), National 
Paralympic Committees (NPCs), 
International Organisations of Sport for 
the Disabled (IOSD’s), and Regional 
Organisations have the right to submit 
motions, vote at meetings, nominate 
candidates for appropriate IPC bodies 
and participate in IPC activities (IPC, 
2013).
International Sport Federations
International Federations are independent 
sports federations recognised by the IPC 
as the sole representative of a Paralympic 
Sport.
International Federations’ responsibilities 
include technical jurisdiction and 
guidance over the competition and 
training venues of their respective sports 
during the Paralympic Games.
The IPC currently recognises 17 
International Federations:
• Boccia International Sports Federation 
(BISFed)
• Badminton World Federation (BWF)
• World Archery (WA)
• International Equestrian Federation 
(FEI)
• World Rowing Federation (FISA)
• International Canoe Federation (ICF)
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• International Federation for CP Football 
(IFCPF)
• International Tennis Federation (ITF)
• International Table Tennis Federation 
(ITTF)
• International Triathlon Union (ITU)
• International Wheelchair Basketball 
Federation (IWBF)
• International Wheelchair Rugby 
Federation (IWRF)
• International Cycling Union (UCI)
• World Curling Federation (WCF)
• World ParaVolley (WPV)
• World Sailing
• World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) 
National Paralympic Committee
National Paralympic Committees (NPCs) 
are national organisations recognised 
by the IPC as the sole representatives 
of athletes with an impairment from their 
respective countries.
The IPC currently has around 177 NPCs, 
which are responsible for the entry, 
management and team preparation for 
the Paralympic Games and other IPC-
sanctioned competitions (IPC, 2013).
Recognised International Sport 
Federations
In its Mission Statement, the IPC 
commits to ‘promote and contribute to 
the development of sport opportunities 
and competitions, from initiation level to 
elite level, for Paralympic athletes as the 
foundation of elite Paralympic sport’.
To achieve this, the IPC recognises the 
importance of creating a Paralympic 
Family network of recognised 
international sport federations that are 
not eligible to be IPC members but 
contribute to the development of sports 
opportunities for athletes associated 
with the Paralympic Movement and have 
organisational goals that are compatible 
with the Vision and Mission of the IPC.
The following are IPC recognised 
international sport federations:
• International Bobsleigh & Skeleton 
Federation (IBSF)
• International Federation of Powerchair 
Football (FIPFA)
• International Golf Federation (IGF) 
• International Handball Federation (IHF)
• International Hockey Federation (FIH)
• World Flying Disc Federation (WFDF)
• Union Internationale de Pentathlon 
Moderne (UIPM)
• World Armwrestling Federation (WAF)
• World Squash Federation
• World Karate Federation
The IOC and the IPC: The Evolution 
of a Relationship
Since the late 70s, the IPC and IOC have 
managed to overcome their difference to 
create what the current IOC President, 
Jacques Rogge (2001), describes as a 
‘fruitful relationship’. This relationship 
ensures that consultation takes place 
between the two bodies on financial, 
sponsorship and marketing deals, and 
that the Paralympic Games is always 
staged after the Olympiad using the 
same facilities and technical support. 
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Another step forward was made in 2000 
by the appointment of the IPC President, 
Dr Robert Steadward (1989-2001), to the 
IOC Commission of Ethics and Reform, 
and his election as a full member of the 
IOC itself (IOC, 2012).
• Four agreements between the IOC 
and IPC signed between 2000 and 
today clarified the relationship between 
the two organisations, set out the 
principles for further cooperation 
and provided financial support for 
the IPC.An agreement in October 
2000 brought the workings of the two 
organisations closer by co- opting the 
IPC President to the IOC and including 
an IPC representative on 11 of the IOC 
Commissions, including the Evaluation 
Commission – the body that examines 
the competing bids from cities seeking 
to host the Olympic Games. The 
IOC also undertook to pay an annual 
subvention towards IPC administration 
costs ($3 million per annum), annual 
sums for development projects, and 
specific assistance to help athletes 
from developing countries attend the 
2002 Salt Lake City Winter Paralympic 
Games and the 2004 Athens Summer 
Paralympics (IOC 2000a).
• An agreement in June 2001 elucidated 
the organisation of the Paralympic 
Games, confirming that the location 
would always be the Olympic host city 
and would take place ‘shortly after’ 
the Olympic Games using the same 
facilities and venues. From the 2008 
Summer Games and 2010 Winter 
Games onwards, there would be 
full integration of the two Organising 
Committees (IOC, 2001).
• An agreement on revenues for 
broadcasting and marketing the 
Paralympics (August 2003) guaranteed 
IOC payments to the IPC of $9 million 
for the 2008 Games and $14 million 
for 2010 and 2012 (IOC, 2003a). The 
final agreement (June 2006) extended 
these arrangements through to 2014 
and 2016, increased funding for the 
IPC, and set out the respective roles 
of the IOC and IPC in the planning, 
organisation and staging of the 
Paralympics, the use of technical 
manuals, the sports programme, and 
the number of accredited individuals 
(IOC, 2006a).
• In May 2012, the IOC and the IPC 
signed an extension to their current 
agreement, which will continue to 
see the IOC support the IPC and the 
Paralympic Games through to 2020. 
The extension of the agreement 
continues in the same vein as the 
previous document signed in 2006 
and underlines the IOC’s continued 
support for the IPC and commitment 
to help ensure the Paralympic Games’ 
long-term future. This support includes 
not only an increased financial 
contribution from the IOC but also 
the systematic inclusion of the IPC 
in a wide range of programmes and 
activities such as IF development, 
Olympic Solidarity and Transfer of 
Knowledge, and greater cooperation 
in the areas of event planning and 
delivery. IOC President Jacques Rogge 
commented on the signing of the 
agreement: “Our continued financial 
support to the Paralympics shows that 
the Olympic Movement is universal and 
also indicates the importance that the 
Paralympic Games have in promoting 
sport to the youth of the world – one 
148
The Governance of Para-divisions in Olympic Sport Federations 
Opportunities and Challenges 
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
of the fundamental principles of 
Olympism (IOC, 2012).
Paralympic Sports Governance
Sports Independence and Model of 
Governance
In the past 10 years, significant steps 
have been made to integrate para-
sports into the overall world sport stage. 
Para-sports is benefiting from better 
media coverage, new partners, and new 
sponsors. Its recognition throughout the 
world of international sport is greater 
than ever and the recognition/meaning 
of the movement has never been higher. 
In fact, there is a reduction of barriers: 
for example, the United Nations Office 
on Sport for Development and Peace 
partnered with SportAccord for a social 
responsibility project. Participants, 
builders, athletes, organisers, volunteers 
and structures need to surf on that wave 
and ensure the viability, the development, 
the growth and the explosion of the 
Paralympic movement.
In 2003, the IPC officially included in its 
constitution and mission a direction to 
encourage and support integration of 
sports:
“To promote the self-governance of each 
Paralympic sport either as an integral 
part of the international sport movement 
for able-bodied athletes, or as an 
independent sport organisation, whilst at 
all times safeguarding and preserving its 
own identity.”
At this point in time, there are different 
situations in the world of international 
para-sports. There are para-sports with 
a counterpart, such as cycling, tennis 
or judo. There are specific sports with 
no counterpart, as they have been 
created specifically for people with a 
disability, such as goalball and boccia. 
Then there are sports with a counterpart 
but which cannot easily be integrated 
such as wheelchair rugby or wheelchair 
basketball.
As a result of these different situations, 
different models of governance are 
emerging. In the actual sports system 
there are three models: 
1. Integrated within IF or as independent 
sport organisation
2. International Organisation of Sport for 
Disabled
3. IPC Sports.
Each of the existing para-sports and 
any future ones will choose a model of 
governance according to its situation 
and that is in compliance with its reality, 
needs, mission and vision (Philie, 2011).
The Cycling Case (UCI)
Since 1994, the UCI Disability Committee 
has cooperated closely with the IPC 
Cycling and meetings have been held 
once each year. Those meetings ensured 
that technical regulations of the UCI 
have been used in all IPC sanctioned 
competitions including the 1988 and 
1992 Paralympic Games.
From 1997, there was a period of 
stagnation within IPC Cycling and many 
changes needed to be made.
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In 1999, the UCI Committee and the 
IPC Cycling Committee have effectively 
worked as a single committee with 
common goals. A great deal of progress 
was made.
At the Sydney 2000 Cycling Sport 
Assembly, a complete re-write of IPC 
Cycling Rules was approved, together 
with an endorsement for the continued 
use of UCI Technical Regulations for all 
IPC Cycling Competitions. The Sports 
Assembly also approved the IPC Cycling 
plan to seek close collaboration with the 
UCI, with a view to the incorporation of 
regulations for Cyclists with Disabilities 
into the UCI Technical Regulations.
In 2011, the IPC Cycling and UCI disability 
Committee agreed that both instances 
would work closely together for their 
mutual benefit. Their proposition to create 
an “Agreement of Cooperation” and a 
4-year Disability Cycling Development 
Plan for integration was approved by 
the UCI Management Committee. From 
that moment, the UCI dedicated a part 
time staff resource to follow the different 
steps of the joint committee toward the 
integration process.
In 2006, the UCI hosted the last IPC 
Cycling World Championships together 
with the last IPC Cycling Sport Forum, 
where the official motion of change 
of governance was presented and 
accepted:
“The IPC Cycling Sports Forum 
recommends to the IPC Governing Board 
to approve the transfer of governance 
of IPC Cycling from the IPC to the UCI, 
based on mutually agreed “Terms and 
Conditions”.
In February 2007, at UCI headquarters, 
the complete transfer of governance was 
signed and the first UCI para-cycling 
Commission was appointed by UCI 
President, Mr Pat McQuaid (Philie, 2011 
and Cheseaux, 2013)
The Triathlon Case (ITU)
The first ITU World Championship took 
place in Cleveland, USA in 1996 with 
athletes with disabilities as part of the 
Age Group races.
In 2005 an annual World Championship 
under the ITU as part of the Age Group 
took place and was monitored by the 
athletes with a disability commission until 
2005.
The election of Marisol Casado as 
ITU President in 2008, triggered ITU’s 
determination to take Paratriathlon to a 
higher level of success.
ITU Secretary General, Loreen Barnett, 
commits ITU Senior staff to support 
the promotion of Paratriathlon towards 
Paralympics inclusion (2008). Thanos 
Nikopoulos was appointed as ITU staff 
liaison for Paratriathlon in 2005, as well 
as Eric Angstadt in 2011.
In 2009, the ITU created the Paratriathlon 
Committee. Their work was to set and 
deliver the strategic plan for Paratriathlon.
The British Triathlon Federation led 
the development of profile based 
classification system, later amended and 
adopted by the ITU in 2007 (Angstadt, 
2013). 
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Research Methodology
This study is an investigation of four 
areas, all having an impact on the 
integration of para-sports within their own 
International Federations.
The Complex Structure of Disability-
specific Sport Governance 
To investigate this area, we decided to go 
to the IPC library in Bonn, Germany and 
to read literature on sports governance 
in the specific area of sports for athletes 
with a disability. 
Studying sports governance requires 
the ability to see the big picture, to 
understand how individual sports 
organisations fit into the greater industry, 
and to see the similarities and differences 
among the different industry segments. 
Learning about the governing structures 
and documents for sports organisation 
illustrates where power and authority 
exist within the industry (Hums, 2004).
The Social Responsibility of 
International Federations 
The goal of this part was to have a 
better understanding of our role as 
future leader in sports management. 
What is our social responsibility while 
working in an International Federation 
and how can we work with this agenda 
in mind? We visited and used all the 
relevant documentation coming from 
“SportAccord”, “inside the games”, 
“sportanddev.org”, and “United Nations 
Millenium Development goals” official 
websites. 
The Strategies in Place 
The actual strategies in place for this 
topic were primarily found in press 
releases of General Assemblies 
or meetings but also found on the 
official documents received from 
the International Triathlon Union, the 
International Paralympic Committee, and 
the Union Cycliste Internationale. 
The Reality on the Ground 
Data was also collected from the 1st 
Paralympic Games in 1960 to the last 
one in London 2012 to challenge or 
confirm our thoughts.
Interviews 
Two interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were recorded with the 
permission of the respondent and notes 
were taken during the conversation. The 
selection criteria for choosing the two 
interviewed individuals was to be the 
coordinator of a para-discipline within an 
International Federation. 
The objective of interviewing Eric 
Angstadt from the ITU and Christophe 
Cheseaux from the UCI was to learn 
more about their role as an agent of 
change in the question of integration of 
sports for athletes with a disability. 
A semi-standardised interview script was 
used with a number of predetermined 
questions and special topics. Additional 
questions arose from interactions 
during the interview itself. This method 
of interviewing was chosen as authors 
were unfamiliar with the exact role of 
para-divisions coordinators within an 
International Federation. Interviews were 
fully transcribed and analysed.
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Data analysis 
The goal of this data analysis is to 
find useful information, suggesting 
conclusions and set recommendations. 
We studied all Paralympic Games 
since 1960 in terms of the number of 
participants, number of medal events, 
differences between men and women, 
number of sports, etcetera.
A SWOT Analysis: 
Integration of a Para-
division within an 
International Federation
Strengths
• a.1. Integration into a large structure 
(Cheseaux, 2013)
• a.2. More than simply following the 
UCI rules to organise their event, 
organisers now have a UCI Para-
cycling Commissioner present at their 
competition (Cheseaux, 2013)
• a.3. Experience and internal resources 
(Angstadt, 2013)
• a.4. The best athletes competing 
frequently at iconic venues on iconic 
courses with passion, before the eyes/
ears of the sport world (Angstadt, 
2013)
• a.5. Integration, inclusion and sharing 
resources across the whole IF (policies 
and procedures, events, education-
certification, coach development, 
science & technology, media 
opportunities) (Angstadt, 2013)
• a.6. Financial support through 
sponsorship and core funding 
(Angstadt, 2013)
Weaknesses
• b.1. If the IF is not 100% involved, 
athletes might suffer from the 
integration (Angstadt, 2013)
• b.2. Development of the discipline 
needs to fit in with the IF structure 
(Cheseaux, 2013)
• b.3. Integration is a long process 
(Cheseaux, 2013)
• b.4. Must receive support from the 
President or Executive Board to work 
(Angstadt, 2013)
Opportunities
• c.1. Agreement between the IOC 
and the IPC. The IOC will continue 
to support the IPC through 2020. 
A financial contribution but also 
systematic inclusion of the IPC in 
a wide range of programmes and 
activities such as IF development, 
Olympic Solidarity and Transfer of 
Knowledge (IOC, 2012)
• c.2. Platform and annual opportunity 
for exchanges of information and 
feedback from nations
• c.3. Still space for other sports in the 
Paralympic Programme (Appendix 
IV: Data analysis – Evolution of the 
Paralympic Games)
• c.4. Media coverage, new partners and 
new sponsors
• c.5. Professionalisation of the 
movement
• c.6. Increase in participants 
• c.7. As there are not specific 
statements about how to integrate the 
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para-sport, a certain freedom is given 
to the IFs and this can help it to act 
more rapidly (Angstadt, 2013)
Threats
• d.1. Complex and fast evolving 
structure
• d.2. Still in process, no clear statement
• d.3. Critical mass and knowledge 
about Para-sport (Angstadt, 2013)
• d.4. Implementing IPC principles/
guidelines (Angstadt, 2013)
• d.5. Achieving IPC classification code 
compliance (Angstadt, 2013)
• d.6. Disabled-specific Federations are 
not as open as we imagine about the 
integration. They might slow down the 
process more than the able-bodied 
Federation (Cheseaux, 2013)
• d.7. Problem of communication with 
the NFs: The politics of each country 
is different concerning para-sports 
(Angstadt and Cheseaux, 2013)
Table 1: Summer Paralympic Sports Organisation
Paralympic Games
IFs Specific IFs IOSD IPC Sport
International Level
• Badminton World 
Federation (BWF)
• World Archery (WA)
• International Equestrian 
Federation (FEI)
• World Rowing 
Federation (FISA)
• International Canoe 
Federation (ICF)
• International Tennis 
Federation (ITF)
• International Triathlon 
Union (ITU)
• International Cycling 
Union (UCI)
• World Curling Federation 
(WCF)
• World Sailing
• World Taekwondo 
Federation (WTF) 
• Boccia 
International 
Sports 
Federation 
(BISFed)
• International 
Federation for 
CP Football 
(IFCPF)
• International 
Wheelchair 
Basketball 
Federation 
(IWBF)
• International 
Wheelchair 
Rugby 
Federation 
(IWRF)
• World ParaVolley 
(WPV)
• Cerebral Palsy 
International 
Sports and 
Recreation 
Association 
(CPISRA
• International 
Blind Sports 
Federation 
(IBSA)
• International 
Sports 
Federation for 
Persons with 
an Intellectual 
Disability (INAS)
• International 
Wheelchair 
and Amputee 
Sports 
Federation 
(IWAS)
• IPC Athletics
• IPC 
Powerlifting
• IPC Shooting
• IPC Swimming
• IPC 
Wheelchair 
Dance Sport
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The Social Responsibility of 
International Federations
“The practice of sport is a human right. 
Every individual must have the possibility 
of practicing sport, without discrimination 
of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, 
which requires mutual understanding 
with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and 
fair play.” 
(Fundamental Principles of Olympism, 
Olympic Charter) 
The integration within an able-bodied 
Federation allow athletes to compete 
at iconic venues on iconic courses with 
passion, before the eyes/ears of the sport 
world (a.4)
The goal of London 2012 was to break 
down stereotypes and to bring equality. 
The purpose was to break down societal 
barriers, stigmas and stereotypes and 
to help foster a broader paradigm shift 
to see individuals with disabilities from 
the perspective of inclusion and equality 
and not from the perspective of pity and 
charity. International Federations could 
also help to foster empowerment and 
social change for individuals with and 
without disabilities throughout the world.
Involvement of IFs have the potential 
to inspire a greater awareness, 
understanding, and commitment 
for building inclusive and equitable 
communities. The power of sport to 
engage many to give back and to work 
toward building the next generation of 
leaders, on and off the field (Wolff, 2012).
The Strategies in Place
There are agreements that exist between 
Discussion
The Para-sport movement is a complex 
structure (d.1), not only at the international 
but also at the national level (d.7). See 
Table 1 for an overview of the summer 
sports.
Because of this complexity, two relevant 
issues came out of the research and one 
solution is suggested:
1. Some sports are in the Paralympic 
Games with only one or two 
paradiscipline (i.e. judo only for 
blind athletes, football only for 
cerebral palsy and blind athletes). It 
is because these are governed by 
one or two IOSDs. Because of this, 
athletes with other disabilities cannot 
compete in the Games 
2. The International structure is complex 
and the national structure is even 
more complicated due to other 
stakeholders as, for example, the 
politics of each country. It makes 
everything complicated for the 
sports managers but also for the 
athletes.
It is suggested for the para-sport to follow 
the same linear structure as the IOC. 
Today the different governances divide 
the athletes by disability (IBSA) or by 
sport (IPC, IFs) or by the way they move 
(IWAS). It could be worth considering 
dividing governing bodies only by sport 
and be governed by the actual able-
bodied IFs or by a specific IF if it is not 
possible (such as the BISFED for Boccia).
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the IOC and the IPC (c.1). Specially for the 
organisation of the Paralympic Games 
but it is possible that some agreements 
are missing in the governance part of the 
International Federations. Considering 
this, there are two approaches:
1) Leave the freedom to IFs to integrate 
para-sports or not and the way they want 
to integrate it (as is happening today c.7)
2) Require the integration and set a 
deadline.
The interview with Mr Cheseau and Mr 
Angstadt suggested the first approach. 
They are thinking the same by saying 
that if the IF is not 100% dedicated (b.1) 
and if the Executive Board do not give its 
support (b.4) to integrate its para-sport, 
it will not be good for the movement. It 
could end up even worse than the way 
it works today. On the opposite, if the 
governing bodies do not set regulations 
and deadlines (d.2), some para-sports 
could lose years in their development 
and the more they wait, the more the 
others develop. Going this way, we 
could see a huge difference in term of 
professionalism, performance (c.5) and 
increase of participants (c.6) between 
sports.
Event #Men #Women #NFs
2007 Hamburg 38 13 13
2008 Vancouver 24 14 10
2009 Gold Coast 30 10 14
2010 Budapest 66 17 16
2011 Beijing 55 21 19
2012 London 165 43 N/A
Event #Men #Women #NFs
2016 Rotterdam 92 43 26
The Reality on the Ground
The movement is still in process, there 
are no clear statement (d.2) but there 
are some required principles/guidelines 
(d.4) to follow coming from the IPC. 
Some of these guidelines, like the IPC 
classification code compliance (d.5) 
is very complicated and experts are 
needed. We think the IFs interested in 
integrating the para-sport must not take 
the whole responsibility directly on their 
shoulders.
This is a long process (b.3) and even 
longer if the sport is new and wants to be 
integrated in the Paralympic programme. 
The IF should use its large structure, 
expertise (a.1), experience and internal 
resources (a.3) but also consult the 
senior IPC representative athletes about 
decision-making and ongoing changes 
(Angstadt, 2013). The integration is about 
sharing resources across the whole 
IF structure (a.5). The Federation must 
identify the added value it can offer to the 
Paralympic movement. The Paralympic 
programme had 24 sports in London 
Table 2: Paratriathlon World Championships Participation
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and had 26 sports in Rio. The Olympic 
programme has 41 sports. The Olympic 
Games will have to remove sports if they 
want to add new sports while there is 
still space for new sports (c.3) for the 
Paralympic Games. Disabled-specific 
Federations are not as open as we 
imagine about the integration. They might 
slow down the process more than the 
able-bodied Federations (d.6). This is why 
it is very important to work together in 
the same direction. More platforms and 
annual meetings should be organised 
for IFs but also for sports manager 
to exchange information and gather 
feedback (c.2).
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
The Para-sport movement is a complex 
structure. Because it is complex at 
the international level, it is even more 
complex at the national level. This way, 
the Paralympic movement cannot evolve 
normally and the movement is losing time 
trying to deal with all the stakeholders 
involved.
Our main and first recommendation is 
to break down the barrier, stop thinking 
that the management of para-sports is 
complicated and only high level experts 
are capable of doing it. Actually, it is the 
opposite. International Federations have 
all the system already in place. They must 
consider para-sports as a division of their 
Federations and integrate them in exactly 
the same way as they integrate other 
disciplines.
According to Slack (1997), planned 
change can occur in four different areas 
of a sports organisation: the structures 
and systems of the organisation, the 
conduct of the organisation’s personnel, 
the products and services delivered 
through the organisation, and the 
technology supporting the organisation 
(Hums, 2004). The three first points must 
be considered for a good integration. 
Personnel should receive a training to 
be able to work toward developing it 
correctly within the structure and to offer 
good services to para-athletes.
At the beginning of the research, we 
focused only on able-bodied IFs. Now we 
also open the research to independent 
specific IFs (i.e. WOVD for sitting 
volleyball) because we understood that 
it is not always possible to integrate the 
para-sport as we thought. We suggest 
to adopt a linear structure, the same as 
the IOC. The governance of para-sports 
must be as simple as possible, definitely 
more simple than the complex structure 
that exists today.
The practice of sport is a human right. 
Today, the access to sport for all is 
not respected. It cannot be tolerated 
anymore. The IPC and the IOC should 
work together more and require IFs to 
set policies and regulations. They must 
require it in the same way they require 
the promotion of women in sport. The 
problem is that it is not an easy task. 
Tools, services and platforms must be 
available to help the able-bodied IF or 
independent specific IFs to develop para-
sports effectively.
SportAccord might be a solution to 
the question of help, services and 
156
The Governance of Para-divisions in Olympic Sport Federations 
Opportunities and Challenges 
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
platforms. SportAccord is the umbrella 
organisation for all (Olympic and non-
Olympic) federations. The organisation 
provides services to its international sport 
federations and associate members 
(SportAccord 2016). We understood, 
due to this research, that integration only 
works with the support of executives. 
Changing mindsets is not an easy task 
and is a long process. Awareness should 
be raised through conferences and 
conventions, where this subject should 
be integrated and open discussions 
between federations enabled.
Para-sports organisations already in 
place are, understandably, not eager 
to leave the management of their sport 
to another Federation. It has, however, 
happened already and should continue 
in this way. The communication and 
collaboration between the different 
bodies must be the main focus at 
the beginning. A mixed commission 
must be created with existing bodies, 
IFs and para-athletes. There will be a 
moment when the complete transfer of 
governance will be signed. 
The Paralympic programme will have 22 
sports in Tokyo. The Olympic programme 
has 33 sports scheduled for 2020. The 
Olympic Games has to remove sports 
if they want to add new sports while 
there is still space for new sports for 
the Paralympic Games. Para-sport is a 
developing sector. It is growing fast and 
IFs should be aware of that and try to 
leverage the opportunity from the last 
Paralympic Games’ legacy to work on it.
Integration is a long process and even 
longer if the sport is new and wants 
to be integrated in the Paralympic 
programme. The Federation must be 
100% prepared and open to integrate it. 
Change is inevitable. The future of para-
sport will be full of changes. How sports 
governing bodies respond to these facts 
will determine their success in the future. 
The international sports movement 
possesses considerable potential to 
contribute positively to change, IFs must 
identify the added value they can offer to 
the Paralympic movement.
Through our research we faced some 
issues and limitations. The first and 
most important was the impossibility of 
interviewing employees of one or more 
IPC sports. At the beginning, the aim was 
to compare two kind of governance: The 
IPC and the IFs.
In the end, it was decided to focus on 
IFs and instead of doing a comparison, 
to work on opportunities and challenges 
of this kind of governance and to make 
recommendations for the IFs.
From the beginning, we decided to work 
with a certain kind of disabilities, the one 
integrated in the Summer Paralympic 
Games, meaning sensorial (blind), motor, 
physical and intellectual disabilities.
Deaf athletes are completely separated 
from the Paralympic movement and, for 
the moment, wish to remain that way. 
This should not stop future research to 
work on their integration too.
The website Right to Play makes Policy 
and Programme recommendations 
about the inclusion in sport of persons 
with disabilities and is a good source of 
articles.
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From what we learned from the research, 
we adapted some of the points to 
make them specific for the International 
Federations.
Policy Recommendations:
• Federations are encouraged to formally 
include the full participation of persons 
with disabilities in the federation’s 
development strategies and allocate 
resources accordingly
• Identify and eradicate stigmatising and 
discriminatory attitudes, policies and 
practices within the Federation itself
• Emphasise the importance of 
developing sports opportunities 
for people with different types of 
disabilities and equal opportunities for 
females and males to participate
• Ensure that policies and practices 
are rights-based, with suitable and 
effective enforcement mechanisms. 
Define the terms “sports for all”, 
“disability”, “participation”, “mainstream 
sport”, and “disability-specific sport”
Programme Recommendations:
• Ensure that coaches, technical 
delegates and organisers are trained in 
the technical aspects and inclusion of 
para-sports (Angstadt, 2013)
• Invest in programmes to produce and 
make available low-tech, low-cost 
adaptive aids (Cheseaux, 2013)
• Disseminate resource materials on 
the sport for athletes with a disability 
to include photographs and positive 
role models, including women with 
disabilities
• Organise forums where National 
Federations can gather, share 
experiences and ideas, and network
• Encourage partnership and 
collaboration
• Exercise flexibility when partnering with 
national Federations (Angstadt, 2013)
• Develop a forum to enhance the 
capacities of stakeholders globally to 
include para-sports
As already mentioned, the world of para-
sport is wide and is developing. Future 
research could investigate the point of 
view of the IPC about the integration 
through the IFs. Surveys could be 
distributed to all the IFs to understand 
their needs. Interviews with para-
athletes would be interesting in order to 
understand their point of view and what 
they think is the best for the development 
of their discipline.
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‘Gender equality is more 
than a goal in itself. It is a 
precondition for meeting 
the challenge of reducing 
poverty, promoting 
sustainable development and 
building good governance’
Kofi ANNAN 
(7th United Nations Secretary General and Nobel Prize winner)
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Abstract
Sport has been recognised as a 
powerful tool to promote gender 
equality and empower women, both 
on the playing field and in leadership 
roles in the work place. Numerous 
international frameworks support 
women’s participation in sport with some 
international laws requiring equal access 
and opportunities for females. The 
United Nations, the Brighton Declaration, 
the International Working Group on 
Women and Sport as well as the many 
numerous international and national 
organisations all call for the development 
of programs designed to empower 
women and promote health, education 
and gender equality. The purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the impact that 
specific International Federation Women’s 
Development Programs are having on 
their stakeholders. The main stakeholders 
have been identified as female athletes, 
women in ‘non-sport’ roles and women 
in leadership. Three International 
Federations are assessed by interviewing 
their programme coordinators and also 
surveying top level athletes from these 
federations. Furthermore the aspect of 
whether women are working in these 
programs in non-sport roles such as 
management, administrative, coaching or 
officiating roles will also be evaluated.
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the impact that specific 
International Federation Women’s 
Development Programs are having 
on their stakeholders. The main 
stakeholders have been identified as 
female athletes, women in ‘non-sport’ 
roles and women in leadership. Current 
research has recognised the fact that 
barriers exist between the creation and 
implementation of women’s development 
programs (Hancock et al. 2013). Three 
International Federations are assessed 
in regards to their strategic objectives, 
their implementation process and the 
outcomes being achieved. Furthermore 
the aspect of whether women are 
working in these programs in ‘non-
sport’ roles such as management, 
administrative, coaching or officiating 
roles will also be assessed, as this is 
a key element for the success of such 
platforms (Hancock et al. 2013).
Women have always been 
underrepresented in all areas and in all 
levels of sport (Pfister & Radtke 2009). 
Initiatives from various organisations 
have attempted to address the invisibility 
of women within all areas of sport, 
however barriers still exist. Sport has 
the potential to facilitate change. Two 
different approaches to sport and 
development have been suggested: 
a dominant vision, in which sport 
essentially reproduces social relations, 
and an interventionist approach in which 
sport is intended to contribute to more 
fundamental change and transformation 
(Hartmann & Kwauk 2011). Hence, the 
overall theory of this latter approach 
believes that sport development 
programs should be constructed 
with educational initiatives designed 
specifically to address the strategic 
ideals and objectives. Along with this 
method, the Sport for Development 
theory states that if programs reflect the 
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social and cultural needs of a group or 
community then this assists in identifying 
the specific needs and concerns of its 
participants and also help practitioners 
tailor education information (Hancock 
et al. 2013). Training of coaches and 
instructors is vital and women should 
also play a key role within the programme 
as coordinators, coaches, mentors or 
in leadership. In addition, defining and 
measuring outcomes to determine if a 
programme is achieving its intended 
objectives and goals is also vital 
(Hancock et al. 2013). Both theories are 
taken in to consideration throughout the 
methodology and discussion stages of 
this paper.
The findings discussed in this paper draw 
from three semi-structured interviews 
with Women’s Development Programs/
Commissions coordinators and fifty-four 
top level athletes who completed an online 
survey. Raw data was also collated from 
all International Federation’s websites 
in relation to how many programs are 
currently operating and how many women 
hold current leadership positions within 
these federations. This data was then 
utilised to decide what federations were to 
be interviewed, and a selection was made 
also in regards to the type of sport and its 
culture.
It was found that general improvements 
across all three federations have included 
the formation of women’s commissions, 
the creation of full time women’s 
coordinator positions, the implementation 
of various new events, series and world 
cups and the creation of successful social 
media presence by all. 75% of all athletes 
surveyed stated that they felt that their 
sport had grown in popularity, increased 
in participant numbers and also attracted 
more media attention. The statistics and 
numbers of women involved in ‘non-sport’ 
roles within each federation however 
is difficult to ascertain, and this reflects 
the invisibility of women within these 
organisations.
The common theme that was evident 
through all three federations was that 
of male traditionalism. Although each 
sport comes from a different history 
and involvement in such events like the 
Olympic Games, the depth of this tradition 
seems to have cemented the barriers 
and challenges that regularly arise for 
women’s presence in both the sport 
and non-sport worlds. It is partly due to 
this that a lack of women represented in 
either administration or officiating roles is 
evident. This element was also stated at 
the recent 6th International Working Group 
on Women and Sport World held this year 
in June, 2014.
The media also plays an important role 
in maintaining the invisibility of women in 
sport structures (Wadesango et al. 2010). 
The media still continues to display men 
playing sport as a ‘normal’, but at the 
same time giving less time, credit and 
respect to women, therefore reinforcing 
the gendered stereotypes common in 
today’s society (Packer et al. 2014). This 
dominant vision or position is evident by 
the underrepresentation of female athletes 
in the public eye and is an explicit reminder 
that sport is a male domain and women 
should not participate in ‘men’s sports’. 
Federations need to develop stronger links 
with the media to ensure the appropriate 
portrayal of their female participants is 
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occurring.
However, sport can combat this type of 
prejudgement and can offer a valuable 
pathway to provide information on 
important social issues, including health 
and wellbeing. It can be used as an 
educational tool for social empowerment, 
via participation and competition, through 
the learning of skills and values such as 
leadership, communication, teamwork, 
respect and negotiation. Gender education 
has a role to play in promoting change and 
forming positive gendered notions in the 
younger generation, rather than reinforcing 
the pre learned dominant notions that are 
still common today.
Measures are being developed through 
various federations for the increase 
of female decision makers, however 
further support and guidance is needed.  
Women’s specific programs must address 
the needs of their stakeholders through 
opportunities and education, and measure 
outcomes regularly. Success breeds 
success and sport has the potential 
to facilitate change. As more positive 
outcomes arise for women within sport 
organisations and more role models are 
evident within society, sport for women will 
continue to increase in priority and attain 
equal place on the podium.
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to evaluate 
the impact that specific International 
Federation (IF’s) Women’s Development 
Programs are having on their 
stakeholders. The main stakeholders 
have been identified as female athletes, 
women in ‘non-sport’ roles and women 
in leadership. Current research has 
recognised the fact that barriers exist 
between the creation and implementation 
of women’s development programs 
(Hancock et al. 2013). Three IF’s are 
assessed in regards to their specific 
women’s development programs and 
their impact they are having on their 
current stakeholders. Furthermore the 
aspect of whether women are working in 
these programs in non-sport roles such 
as management, administrative, coaching 
or officiating roles will also be assessed, 
as this is a key element for the success of 
such platforms (Hancock et al. 2013). The 
impact and worth of these programs will 
be assessed in regards to their strategic 
objectives, their implementation process 
and the outcomes being achieved.
Sport has been recognised as a powerful 
tool to promote gender equality and 
empower women, both on the playing 
field and also in leadership roles in the 
work place. Women’s participation in 
sport has a long history. It is a history 
marked by division and discrimination, 
but also one filled with significant 
accomplishments by female athletes 
and important advances for gender 
equality and the empowerment of 
women and girls (United Nations 2009). 
A concerted effort to remobilize sport 
as a vehicle for various modes of social 
development, especially amongst 
the minority sectors of the world, has 
become very popular (Kidd 2008). In 
particular, the international movement for 
promoting women’s involvement in sport 
has slowly risen in stature. Numerous 
international frameworks support 
women’s participation in sport, with 
some international laws requiring equal 
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access and opportunities for females. 
The United Nations, the Brighton 
Declaration, the International Working 
Group on Women and Sport (IWG) as 
well as the many numerous international 
and national organisations all call for the 
development of programs designed to 
empower women and promote health, 
education and gender equality (Hancock 
et al. 2013). Such initiatives from various 
organisations have tried to address the 
invisibility of women within all areas of 
sport, however there are still barriers that 
exist. This study will attempt to identify 
these barriers for women in both sport 
and non-sport roles within federations 
and recommend future initiatives that 
may contribute to the positive visibility of 
women in sport.
Literature Review
There is a plentiful amount of research 
into women, gender inequalities, sport 
and development and women in 
leadership, particularly over the past few 
decades. Women have always been 
underrepresented in all areas and in all 
levels of sport (Pfister & Radtke 2009). The 
question of whether research should be 
focused on men, rather than women, has 
also been raised by numerous authors 
and raises a number of issues, reactions 
and opinions that are very relevant to the 
gender debate in sport today. The literature 
on women in sport draws upon many 
different aspects in regards to inequality 
and disparity on and off the field. “There 
is a historical basis in the difficulty, largely 
but not wholly experienced by men, of 
accepting the female body participating in 
sport activities” (Ferez 2012). The process 
of acceptance has been long and slow 
due to historical known opinions like 
Barron Pierre de Coubertin stating during 
the 1912 Stockholm Olympics.
“The true Olympian hero is, in my opinion, 
is the individual male adult. The Olympic 
Games have to be restricted to men, the 
role of women should first be to crown the 
winners” (Ferez 2012, p.273).
Twenty years ago the ‘Women, Sport 
and the Challenge of Change’ conference 
took place in Brighton, England. It was 
organised and hosted by the British Sports 
Council and supported by the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC). The outcome 
of the conference was the ‘International 
Strategy on Women and Sport’ and 
included in this was the landmark ‘Brighton 
Declaration on Women and Sport’. This 
declaration set forth ten essential principles 
to be considered for the development of 
a sport culture that enabled and valued 
the full involvement of women in every 
aspect of sport (Fasting et al. 2014). Since 
then the Declaration has been signed 
by 415 organisations, federations and/or 
associations and continues to be a guiding 
force for equality in sport (Fasting et al. 
2014). The purpose of the Declaration was 
to use it as a lever of change (Fasting et al. 
2014). There were numerous examples of 
the Declaration being used as a basis for 
specific charters and platforms, and the 
need for early success to continue was 
crucial. Other conferences and legacies 
built on this progression and all have 
focused on continuing this momentum. 
The Sydney Scoreboard was developed 
in 2010 with a change in focus to women 
‘beyond sport’. Its aim was to increase 
women’s representation on sports boards 
globally with an interactive online tool to 
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assess this progress. The twenty year 
anniversary for the first conference was 
marked this year in Helsinki at the IWG for 
Women and Sport Conference and it can 
be seen that progress has been made, 
however there is still more work to be 
done.
Since women’s inclusion in the modern 
Olympics, women have struggled to 
participate as equals (Teetzel 2011, p.273). 
The rules of participation and eligibility for 
various events have progressed slowly 
over time, with inequities still evident today 
in some aspects of the Games. In the last 
20 years, the IOC has gradually increased 
the number of women’s events on the 
Olympic programme, in cooperation with 
the IF’s and the Organising Committees, 
however the treatment of women as 
unequal or inferiors is still evident (Teetzel 
2011). Some events are still less in either 
length, time or distance when compared 
to men’s events which implies value 
judgments about women’s skills and 
fitness capabilities (Teetzel 2011). Sport 
influences some people’s assumptions 
about women’s value as human beings 
and the organisation of sport can create 
and magnify gender differences in 
society (Teetzel 2011). A small selection 
of researchers have suggested that 
sport is adding to this gender gap and 
that the separation of women’s sport 
could contribute more to the gender 
inequalities that are evident in today’s 
society. Hegemonic masculinity is said to 
exist when the attributes of masculinity 
are viewed as superior to femininity and 
holding more power, reinforcing the 
dominant ideology and gender inequalities 
(Massengale 2009). It is argued that sport 
cultures tend to affirm male dominance 
and this can be seen in leadership and 
coaching roles within sport organisations 
as well (Massengale 2009).
Sport does have the potential to facilitate 
change. Hartman and Kwauk have 
suggested two different approaches to 
sport and development: a dominant vision, 
in which sport essentially reproduces 
social relations and a interventionist 
approach, in which sport is intended to 
contribute to more fundamental change 
and transformation. Sport offers a vehicle 
for reproducing dominant conceptions 
of masculinity and unfortunately can 
be counterproductive (Smith 2010). 
This conception involving men having 
a dominant social position over women 
in society can be accentuated in sport, 
hence nullifying the fundamental purpose 
of a women’s development programme. 
Simply having a sport programme or 
initiative of some kind will not automatically 
or inevitably serve the development goals 
of equality and fairness (Hartmann and 
Kwauk 2011). Hartmann and Kwauk state 
that a combination of sport and non-
sport programming necessities need to 
be designed to specifically address the 
requirements of the focus group, enabling 
participants to discover and acquire new 
life skills, social knowledge and values and 
leadership qualities.
The interventionist approach, on the other 
hand, looks to sport to play an alternative 
role in society. It recognises the social 
inequalities and seeks to reshape social 
order by focusing on the empowerment 
of the focus group through education, 
socialisation and intervention (Hartmann 
and Kwauk 2011). This approach is a 
more radical approach where sport is 
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re-theorized in its political engagement and 
educative practice to contribute to more 
fundamental, systemic changes in social 
life (Hartmann & Kwauk 2011). Hartmann 
and Kwauk believe that sport development 
programs should be constructed with 
educational initiatives designed specifically 
to address the strategic ideals and 
objectives. Sports programming and 
participation does not automatically lead 
to prosocial outcomes and effects. These 
effects intensify only under the correct 
or sufficient conditions, with appropriate 
resources and with comprehensively 
designed and directed programming 
(Hartmann and Kwauk 2011).
Sport for Development (SFD) programs 
have focused on empowering girls 
and women through participation and 
increased access, however with an onus 
on them changing their behaviours, 
actions and attitudes in order to achieve 
gender equality (Hayhurst 2011). The SFD 
theory more specifically was designed 
to address the gap between theory and 
practice by using scientific procedures 
to assess three components: content, 
process and outcome (Hancock et al. 
2013). Content refers to the type of sports 
(individual or team) and educational 
themes (health, relationship, conflict 
resolution, environmental etc.) used in 
the development initiatives. The SFD 
theory states that if programs reflect the 
social and cultural needs of a group or 
community then this will help in identifying 
the specific needs and concerns of its 
participants and also help practitioners 
tailor education information (Hancock et 
al. 2013). Collection of basic demographic 
data is also important. Process refers 
to the examination of organisational 
structures including policies, staffing 
structure, programme agenda and 
goals and the delivery of the programme 
activities. Training coaches and instructors 
is vital and women should play a key role 
within the programme as coordinators, 
coaches, mentors or in leadership. 
Furthermore, programs should connect 
with a range of stakeholders so as to 
provide the most up to date educational 
information. According to the SFD theory 
the content and process stages should 
promote organisational change, utilise 
problem based learning and aim for the 
transfer of knowledge to the community 
(Hancock et al. 2013). Lastly the SFD 
theory suggests that long term and short 
term monitoring and evaluation plans 
should be used to measure the impact 
or outcomes of the experience for its 
different levels of stakeholders. Defining 
and measuring outcomes are vital to 
determining if a programme is achieving its 
intended objectives and goals (Hancock et 
al. 2013). The SFD theory is an important 
tool for examining development programs 
across the world and can be used as 
a tool to assess programs that lead to 
development (Hancock et al. 2013).
Barriers for women participating in 
sport include not only gender notions, 
stereotypes and segmentations but 
also other obstacles like gender identity, 
culture, body image, assumed concepts 
of femininity, sexuality and homophobia. 
How each of these aspects effect the role 
of women in sport and leadership could 
benefit from further research.
Not surprisingly, limitations experienced 
within this study were mainly in regards 
to inadequate data from federations. 
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Data is a key measure when assessing 
the impact of development programs, as 
stated in the SFD theory. Two out of three 
federations did not have current official 
statistics or numbers of their stakeholders 
involvement, in either participation or 
administration levels, and also did not 
complete the questionnaire. The details 
of the questionnaire were discussed, 
however the document was not returned. 
Another significant limitation is the difficulty 
of measuring ‘impact’. This is due to the 
fact that impact needs to have measurable 
indicators. If these indicators are not 
appropriate then the ability to monitor a 
programme’s effectiveness is extremely 
difficult. Also most IF’s do not have direct 
access with a lot of athletes, so a snowball 
selection, participants contacted through 
mutual associations within each federation, 
had to be made in regards to the online 
survey. Lastly, the results discussed 
are solely the opinion of the women’s 
programme managers so therefore may 
hold some bias.
Data from these surveys were collated 
and analysed with respect to the 
relevant themes addressed within the 
semi- structured interviews and the main 
concepts of this research task. Raw data 
is presented in table and graph form on 
the number of programs and the number 
of women in leadership positions presently 
and also relevant survey results.  Due to 
confidentiality the specific federations will 
not be named in this research.
Methodology
The findings discussed in this paper draw 
from three semi-structured interviews 
with Women’s Development Programs/
Commissions coordinators and fifty-four 
athletes who completed an online survey. 
Semi structured interviews were the 
most appropriate for this study as each 
federation has its own unique history 
and culture within the organisation and 
also within the sport. Raw data was also 
collated from all IF’s websites in relation 
to how many programs are currently 
being run and how many women there 
are currently in leadership positions 
within these federations. This data was 
then utilised in regards to the selection of 
federation’s interviews, and a selection 
was made in regards to the type of sport 
and its culture. The size of the federation, 
the gendered history and the age of the 
programme were all taken into account, 
and an encompassing selection was 
made from this. The federations will remain 
anonymous throughout this paper and will 
be referred to as A, B and C.
Federation A has a long-standing history 
as both a recreation activity and a sport, 
and offers a variety of individual disciplines. 
Federation B’s history dates back to the 
late 1800’s and is a male dominated, 
team sport. Federation C is an individual 
sport with a rich and thrilling history of 
male participation, in both recreational 
and racing events. The phrase ‘women 
in men’s sports’ is unfortunately very 
common and is applicable to all three 
federations, due to the nature, culture and 
historical notions of each sport.
The interviews were conducted in October 
and lasted from one to two hours. 
Interviewees were asked to complete a 
questionnaire prior to the interview on 
the more statistical data and information 
needed so as to streamline the interview 
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process. The interviews were structured 
into six different sections. These sections 
were created after consulting the SFD 
theory and also various federations’ 
strategic outlines. Out of the federations 
chosen, two have specific women’s 
programs; one that was established five 
years ago and the other established nine 
months prior to the interview. The third 
federation was chosen because it has 
a long standing women’s commission, 
rather than a specific programme. This 
commission was formed eight years ago. 
From the raw data collected there is a 
large proportion of commissions when 
compared to specific programs and this 
was why a commission was investigated. 
Two interviews were with women who 
were directly coordinating the women’s 
programme within their federation and one 
interview was with a retired commission 
coordinator. The current coordinator is on 
leave. Variables identified for the analysis 
of the interviews were the IF’s participation 
rates and numbers, the strategic goals and 
mission of the programme, the structure, 
system and culture of the federation, 
educational programs, media portrayal 
and the gender gap.
 All interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed and analysed in regards to 
their themes and concepts. Athletes 
from within these federations, ranging 
from amateur to professional, completed 
an online survey of twenty questions in 
regards to the role their federation was 
playing in their career. Questions were 
asked in relation to how their federation 
had helped them in regards to events, 
finances, coaching, leadership, equality, 
media attention, funding and further 
career opportunities. Snowball sampling 
of elite athletes occurred via the women’s 
development programme coordinator or 
commission coordinator. Another group 
of randomly selected amateur athletes 
were also contacted through various clubs 
and teams via the women’s coach or 
coordinator. From the fifty four total entries 
the majority came from North America and 
from Federation B (see Figures 1 & 2).
The results from these surveys were 
collated and analysed with respect to the 
relevant themes addressed within the 
semistructured interviews and the main 
concepts of this research task. Raw data 
is presented in table and graph form on 
the number of programs and the number 
of women in leadership positions presently 
and also relevant survey results. Due to 
confidentiality the specific federations will 
not be named in this research.
Results
From the list of ninety IF’s currently 
functioning a total of seven federations 
have specific women’s programs. Sixteen 
women’s commissions currently exist and 
two federations have their own specific 
entity (WTA, WPGA) (see Figure 3). Within 
the total number of federations, nineteen 
women are currently in the position of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and eight women 
are currently Chair of the Board. 
At present, women throughout the world 
are largely underrepresented in decision 
making positions in sports organisations 
and institutions in all areas, at all levels. 
(Olympia: European Chart of Women’s 
Right in Sports December 2011). Whilst 
there has been a marked increase in 
the number of women participants in 
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sport in recent years, the role of women 
as top-level administrators has not 
always increased to the same degree 
(Wadesango et al. 2010). Various initiatives 
like that from the IOC and the IWG are 
slowly helping to shift the barriers that still 
prevent women from gaining access to 
leadership roles, however more work is 
needed. At present 22.6% of the active 
IOC members are women, this figure has 
improved since 2011 when it was just 17% 
(Olympia: European Chart of Women’s 
Right in Sports December 2011). However 
the average women as board chairs 
across all IF’s is currently only 13% (Sydney 
Scoreboard September 2014).
A similar underrepresentation can be found 
in the current results from this research 
within the three federations interviewed. 
One federation had no female board 
directors, whilst the other two federations 
had one female representative each.
In regards to gender and the total IF’s 
Chair of the Board members there are 
eight women in 2014 in these positions 
(Sydney Scoreboard 2014). This figure has 
increased from 2013 where there were six 
women in chair positions (Sport Accord 
2013).
Semi-Structured Interviews
All interviews were digitally recorded, 
transcribed and analysed. These 
interviews concerned the rationale, 
strategies, structures, experiences and 
perceptions of two women’s development 
programs and one women’s commission. 
The interviews were split into six main 
sections focusing on current statistical 
Figure 1: Survey response by region
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data, the programs strategic goals, 
education within, gender equality, media 
and empowerment. This was done after 
consultation with various strategic plans 
that were available online from different 
federations and also using the SFD theory 
as a guide, with a particular focus on the 
content, process and outcome of each 
programme.
The interviewees all had different 
backgrounds. Federation A’s interviewee 
is an active athlete within the sport, and 
has competed professionally for a number 
of years. Federation B’s interviewee, 
although not a player of the game, is an 
official referee and umpires matches on 
a regular weekly basis. Federation C’s 
interviewee, although a retired commission 
coordinator, still works within the federation 
in a different role and is a recreational 
participant of the sport.
Statistical Data and Numbers
Statistical data from all three federations 
interviewed showed a marked increase 
in female participation within each sport 
discipline. This data is difficult to measure 
though, and each federation commented 
on the variance in data depending on 
what target group was being addressed.  
Differences occurred within the individual 
sport discipline in somecases, however 
generally though there was a clear rise in 
female participants. The differences within 
these disciplines related to the history of 
the sport and its strong masculine origins.
The history of all federations in regards 
to women participating in sport is quite 
recent. Federation C’s commission 
commenced in 2006, Federation B 
women’s programme commenced in 2009 
and Federation A commenced as a full 
time programme in 2014. Federation C is 
not an Olympic sport, Federation B will be 
played for the first time in the upcoming 
Rio 2016 Olympics and Federation A has 
been part of the Olympics since 1980’s. 
For women, all sports are relatively ‘new’ 
and have a limited history of equality and 
empowerment.
Generally speaking, the main stakeholders 
identified by the three federations are 
athletes and participants, followed by event 
organisers, national federations and the 
media.
Sport development over the years has 
established the ‘sports development 
metaphor’ of the participation pyramid. 
The base of the pyramid represents mass 
participation and the top, elite participation. 
This metaphor has shaped the thinking, 
conceptualizing and planning for sport 
development in many countries and was 
referred to throughout the semi-structured 
interviews by all three federations 
(Sotiriadou et al. 2008). In simple terms, 
the aim of a development programme has 
been to attract a large participant base, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of a 
larger number of elite athletes progressing 
to higher levels in the pyramid. Throughout 
the interviews though it became apparent 
that each federation had a slightly different 
approach to this pyramid, and this is 
illustrated below (Figure 4).
The key element when using this type 
of development metaphor is to give 
grassroots participants the opportunity 
to progress through the sports pathway 
to a level that is appropriate for them, 
with the pinnacle being an elite athlete. 
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The pyramid involves the foundation of 
the basic skills required for the sport, 
followed by participation for either health, 
fitness and/or social reasons, thirdly 
the performance at a competitive level 
withincreased proficiency, and then 
lastly excellence, reaching the top of the 
pyramid and accomplishing national and 
internationally recognized performance 
(Sotiriadou et al. 2008). Federation A has 
a focus on the general public mainly due 
to the recreational component of the 
sport. It has a long history of both genders 
participating, however competitively 
women were only allowed to compete 
thirty years ago. Since then the elite 
level athletes have performed well at the 
Olympics, but there are large gaps within 
different disciplines. Federation A reported 
that their focus within their participation 
pyramid was to the:
“… elite sports and to provide excellent 
elite series, excellent media exposure, 
excellent quality of work for them [women], 
then it will inspire the rest of the pyramid to 
come and be part of it”.
Hence, Federation A’s pathway for 
development starts from the top of the 
pyramid and moves down, providing 
growth and development from elite to 
grassroots. This ‘trickle down’ effect 
asserts that successful performances by 
elite athletes encourages people to take 
part in physical activity, and specifically in 
Federation A’s sport, and will lead to an 
increase in mass participation numbers at 
the base of the pyramid (Sotiriadou et al. 
2008).
Federation B has very deep male 
roots, with the team sport being played 
historically by upper-middle class males. 
It has a strong school sport presence 
for boys and therefore its grassroots 
programme is very important. Federation 
B, however, is doing the opposite to 
Federation A and appears to be putting 
more emphasis on the foundation 
Figure 2: IF impact on women
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and participation phases within their 
programme, thus using the ‘trickle up’ 
effect. The goal of the ‘trickle up’ is to 
increase the number of participants at 
each level so as to increase the number 
of potential elite athletes flowing through 
to the top of the pyramid (Sotiriadou 
et al. 2008). They have a developed a 
successful grassroots programme that is 
bringing large numbers of players to the 
sport. Through this programme there are 
pathways that focus on attraction, retention 
and advancement, with a key focus on 
girls in a mixed gender environment.
Federation C is an individual sport that 
Figure 3: Female coaches
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requires expensive equipment and has 
always been very male dominated. Women 
have been invisible within the sport until 
recently due to the gendered notions 
associated with the sport. Federation C do 
not focus on their grassroots participants 
due to the nature of the sport and the 
high costs involved. Sports that depend 
on expensive and scarce facilities, might 
not build their competitive excellence 
from a broad foundation of participation 
(Sotiriadou et al. 2008). Their focus is 
on athletes already participating in the 
sport, and developing their skills and 
competencies through gender specific 
training camps.
In general, it can be seen that 
improvements across all three federations 
have included the formation of a women’s 
commission, the creation of a 100% 
women’s coordinator, the implementation 
of various new events, series and world 
cups and a successful social media 
presence. Athletes were asked the 
question of how their federation women’s 
programme had helped them as an 
individual and an increase in events was 
the most popular response, followed 
by training and performance and media 
attention.
The statistics and numbers of women 
involved in ‘non-sport’ roles however, 
within each federation, was difficult to 
ascertain. Only Federation A was able to 
provide up to date figures on the presence 
of women in their organisation. These 
numbers however are a clear indication 
that a larger presence of women in 
leadership positions is required within the 
non-sport environment.
Federation B, although greatly lacking in 
female leadership, stated that:
“... we have to focus on [some] key pillars 
before we could really make a case at a 
leadership level. In terms of getting an 
impressive competition structure in place, 
have the girls playing at a standard that 
is impressive so that actually they get 
[positive] attention and people notice them, 
to get numbers up so people recognise 
that [the sport] is for girls; then you create 
an environment where we can now move 
on and progress at all levels at all areas, 
and I think that is where we are”.
In regards to top-level elite coaching, 
in Federation B, at the recent women’s 
World Cup there was only one female 
coach out of twelve teams. Federation C 
unfortunately did not have any current data 
available.
Athletes were asked if they currently had a 
female coach, how many female coaches 
they had had over the past five years, an 
estimation of how many female officials, 
referees, umpires currently involved in their 
sport and lastly whether female athletes 
within their sport were encouraged to take 
on non-sport roles.
The final result for non-sport roles is mixed. 
Female coaches are not very common 
however there is proof that women are 
becoming more involved in ‘beyond’ 
their sport. Further research is needed to 
see what specifically these roles are and 
whether they are volunteered positions or 
paid. Research does state that a majority 
of women involved in sport are in unpaid 
positions when compared to men, and are 
only given a small remuneration (Pfister 
2013).
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Strategic Planning and Goals
All three federations had varying ideas 
and opinions on their strategic plans and 
goals. Federation A had a relatively new 
document that was still a work in progress 
in some small areas. Federation B had 
planned and extensively developed a very 
effective and functional document that 
had been revised and simplified so that all 
stakeholders could be engaged. Finally, 
Federation C had a strong emphasis on 
the ‘beyond sport’ sector for women and 
their involvement. All federations measured 
their programs developments by data 
collection, media attention and social 
media engagement. Broadcast figures 
was particularly important for Federation 
Figure 4: IF support to athletes
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A and B, however this is a new aspect to 
the sport. 
History and Culture
The common theme that was evident 
through all three federations was that 
of male traditionalism. Although each 
sport comes from a different history 
and involvement in such events like the 
Olympic Games, the depth of this tradition 
seems to have cemented the barriers 
and challenges that regularly arise. The 
belief and inherent culture that women 
should not be playing a ‘man’s sport’ has 
been lengthy and ingrained within these 
federations sport subcultures. Federation 
B stated that:
“... [it’s] a man’s sport, only men played it, 
watched it, got involved in it. Women made 
the tea and sandwiches”.
Hence a change in culture is needed 
within all three federations. The traditional 
events or disciplines seemed to enhance 
the gender divide, however, the newer 
more modernised events seem to obtain 
more equality. Federation A said that this 
was because these newer disciplines had 
begun around the same time women’s 
emancipation began, so because of this 
the event and equality grew together, 
creating a new culture. The need to 
change the culture of the more traditional 
disciplines is required, but this however 
is a ‘journey’. This journey was referred 
to throughout each interview, and it is a 
positive process that has already begun. 
Federation A sees the requirement to 
create the same events and the same 
opportunities for both sexes as crucial for 
this journey, and believes that through this 
an equal culture can be cultivated.
 Federation B stated that:
“[due to] the nature of it, I do think we face 
challenges of it all the time because it is 
such a traditional male sport… I see this as 
a process and we are helping to facilitate 
movement through it”.
Attitudes are changing within this 
federation as the skills and performance of 
elite female athletes are being recognised. 
Federation B stated that:
“... we are just trying to create opportunity”.
Unfortunately though, within Federation B 
there are no female representatives on the 
international council. This is something that 
is in the process of being addressed by 
the federation but due to the culture of the 
sport may take some time.
Federation C has also a very strong 
male dominated culture and history. 
Money, culture and time were all listed 
as the biggest obstacles for women’s 
involvement, however the federation has 
been working on getting women involved 
in ‘beyond the sport’ for some years now. 
There is a presence of women through 
some commissions and an equal amount 
of female presence in the federation’s 
working environment.
Education
Federation A offers a variety of educational 
programs through their training centre, 
‘academy’, which target athletes, 
coaches and officials. A women’s specific 
camp was organised this year and 
was successful, along with women’s 
specific coaching courses. Also within 
the commission there is now one female 
180
Women’s Development Programs in International Federations
What Impact are they having on their Stakeholders?
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
representative on each committee. This 
is helping to challenge gendered notion 
and promote women’s presence within all 
aspects of the sport.
Federation B, within their grassroots 
programme, has an educational section 
to assist coaches who may not have 
experienced working with girls due to the 
nature of the sport. The federation also 
delivers training and courses to coaches, 
however nothing specific for women or 
girls.
Federation C has developed training 
camps this year for women to become 
more involved in their main discipline. 
These camps have been a success 
and will continue in the future. Seminars 
are offered to all officials and referees 
within the federation but there are vast 
differences in the number of men and 
women participating in these. Specific 
seminars for women are being investigated 
as this may provide a preferred 
environment for women in a very male 
dominated culture. 
Specific promotion by the media on 
certain female athletes on social media 
and YouTube as proven to be successful 
for Federation C and has increased 
the general public’s awareness about 
women in their sport. Similar to the other 
federations though, women’s presence in 
the media is quite new so increased time 
is required for a greater impact to occur. 
Another positive step for Federation C is 
the recognition of the top female athletes 
at the annual awards ceremony. Although 
only small, these steps are continuing to 
challenge the gendered notion within each 
federation and influence and change the 
culture both within the sport and also the 
governance.Athletes were asked for their 
general opinion on whether they felt they 
had experienced improvement within their 
sport and also what impact their IF has 
had on them as an athlete. 50% of athletes 
said that they had seen improvements 
occur, which is a positive result, however 
there was mixed opinions on whether the 
IF had had any impact on them personally.
As a final question in the online survey 
athletes were asked as to what specifically 
their federation could do more to help 
them. The three main areas that athletes 
saw as a priority are funding, more events 
and more media attention.
All of these factors mentioned above are 
interrelated. Funding is needed to create 
more events, sponsorship is needed for 
events to occur, the media is needed to 
attract sponsorship, sponsorship and 
gender equality are affected by each other 
and the media can reinforce the gender 
divide in society. Hence a complicated 
puzzle of needs and requirements must be 
carefully placed together to gain a positive 
outcome for all stakeholders involved.
Discussions
Sport is a powerful tool. The United 
Nations have recognised this and with 
great optimism believe that sport can 
address all eight of UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (2003). The UN states 
that:
“The world of sport presents a natural 
partnership for the United Nations 
system. By its very nature sport is about 
participation. It is about inclusion and 
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citizenship. Sport brings individuals 
and communities together, highlighting 
commonalities and bridging cultural or 
ethnic divides. Sport provides a forum to 
learn skills such as discipline, confidence, 
and leadership and teaches core principles 
such as tolerance, cooperation, and 
respect. Sport teaches the value of effort 
and how to manage victory as well as 
defeat. When these positive aspects of 
sport are emphasized, sport becomes a 
powerful vehicle through which the United 
Nations can work towards achieving its 
goals” (United Nations Inter-Agency Task 
Force on Sport for Development and 
Peace 2003, p. i).
Sport has the potential to change social 
order and decrease the gendered gap 
that is still prevalent in today’s society. It 
can be used as a tool to promote gender 
equality and empower women, however to 
do this, carefully planned women’s specific 
programs must be implemented that 
emphasise the positive aspects of sport 
and meet the needs of all stakeholders, 
Figure 5: Female representation in IFs
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on all levels. These levels can be ranked in 
a similar style as the ‘sports development 
metaphor’ and are illustrated below 
through the pyramid of participation and 
involvement (see Figure 5).
In this example the ‘trickle up’ effect 
would be the most effective pathway, 
with the main group being athletes and 
participants. From this main group, 
pathways for individuals to become more 
involved in their sport through refereeing, 
officiating, coaching, being members 
of a commission or working within the 
federation must be made available. The 
‘opportunity’ for all women involved within 
their sport is key, not only through active 
participation but also the governance 
of the sport. This will progress to more 
women being involved within the sport and 
hence provide the much needed stepping 
stones into leadership positions within 
federations, clubs, organisations and 
councils.
It is clear from the results of this study that 
there has been an increase in elite and 
amateur levels of women’s participation 
within the three federations. However, 
a lack of women represented in either 
administration or officiating roles is evident. 
The 6th IWG World Conference on Women 
and Sport held this year in June (2014) 
states that:
“Despite growing participation of women in 
sport and physical activity in recent years 
and increased opportunities for women to 
participate in domestic and international 
arenas, increased representation of 
women in decision making and leadership 
roles within sport and physical activity 
has been slow to follow. Women are 
significantly under-represented in 
management, administration, coaching 
and officiating, particularly in higher levels”.
One of the barriers for women in obtaining 
a leadership or board position has been 
the male-dominated culture of sports 
organisations (Adriaanse 2013). Sport 
organisations are often immersed in 
tradition. The people and events in 
history often reflect the views and values 
of particular groups (Shaw 2007). The 
implications of favouring such historical 
moments can have long-lasting effects on 
sport organisations. All three federations in 
this study have strong male governance, 
each with a long, traditional history of 
male participation. Subsequently this is 
reflected within the administration of each 
federation, in particular within leadership 
roles. Steps are being taken to address 
this under- representation, however 
gendered relations within each federation 
need to be better understood. Further 
studies on how gender is working in sports 
governance and the how the role of men 
can help to advance gender equality 
should be examined so as to help develop 
more effective leadership pathways. A lack 
of female administrators, coaches, referees 
and officials can promote the stereotypical 
belief that women do not possess the 
competence and leadership abilities 
necessary for holding such positions 
(Wadesango et al. 2010).
“This may act as a stumbling block for all 
those females who may want to penetrate 
the domain of sports management” 
(Wadesango et al. 2010, p. 72).
The media also plays an important role in 
maintaining the under-representation of 
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women in sport structures (Wadesango 
et al. 2010). Women still receive lower 
levels of media coverage and in a recent 
study done by Packer et al. (2014) in the 
United Kingdom found that the coverage 
of women’s sport in UK newspapers is 
still extremely low and there is a large 
disproportion of written articles. The study 
also found that there was no evidence 
that hosting an Olympic Games would 
improve the representation of women in 
newspapers, even though the London 
2012 games had the highest level of 
female athletes ever and at least one 
female representative from every country. 
This under-representation or absence 
of female athletes in the public eye has 
been argued by Harris and Clayton (2012) 
to be an explicit reminder that sport is a 
male domain and relates to Hartman and 
Kwauk’s theory of dominant vision. The 
media portrays sports as a normal activity 
for men, but at the same time is giving less 
credit and respect to female athletes and 
sportswomen, therefore reproducing the 
social relations of masculinity and power. 
This portrayal contributes to girl’s and 
women’s views about their ongoing and 
future participation in sport and can greatly 
affect all levels of sport organisations from 
development through to elite competitions 
(Packer et al. 2014). The Gender Equality 
in Sport Proposal (2014) states that 
women are often framed as suitable only 
for individual sports or sports with an 
aesthetic element, not ‘men’s sports’. 
They are portrayed differently than male 
athletes, both in images and language. 
Often they are presented in a non-sport 
context and in traditional feminine poses 
or roles. Moreover, female athletes are still 
being depicted in a way that contributes to 
the marginalisation of women’s sport due 
to the emphasis placed on femininity and 
sexual attraction, instead of strength and 
beauty (Gender Equality in Sport Proposal 
2014). This gendered stereotyping needs 
to change to promote a fair portrayal of 
female and male athletes, particularly for 
sports where women are not playing the 
so called ‘men’s sports’ like Federation’s 
B and C.
The relationship between the media and 
sponsorship for female competitions or 
athletes can also add to these gendered 
issues. Skogvang (2013) states that the 
relationship between these two entities 
seems to increase the gender gap in some 
sports, in particular women’s football. The 
differences in media coverage and salaries 
between men and women create tension 
and conflict within individual sports and 
this adds to the gender gap. Federations 
need to develop strong links with the 
media to ensure appropriate portrayal of 
their female participants is occurring. The 
need to increase media attention is vital 
for the success of any sport event and 
the commercial value of women’s sport 
needs to be a priority for this to occur. The 
media shapes the public’s perceptions of 
the accomplishments of women playing. 
It also shapes the dreams and aspirations 
of girls. Boys grow up watching television, 
bombarded by heroic and confident 
images of themselves playing sports and 
being honoured for their accomplishments. 
They know they are expected to play 
sports and are encouraged to do so 
by everyone around them. Girls do not 
receive these messages (Lopiano 2008). 
Athletes identified this need within this 
study, however the necessity of portraying 
women’s sport appropriately is vital. A 
study completed, in the UK during the 
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time of the London Olympics, found that 
women, when they were represented in 
the media, tended to be demonstrated 
in non-active roles or feature ‘female 
appropriate sports’, and that much of 
the commentary of female athletes was 
irrelevant to their sport role and was a 
‘major contributor to the trivialisation of 
sportswomen’s accomplishments’ (Harris 
& Clayton 2012). The need for sport 
federations to enforce gender equality and 
fairness upon their media stakeholders is 
essential. If an increase in positive media 
attention occurs for women’s sports 
then a stronger commercial value will be 
produced, resulting in more sponsorship 
and funding. Federation A has gained 
some success already with this aspect of 
their programme by educating their media 
clients in being ‘gender aware’.
Sport is not only about achieving equality 
in women’s participation and treatment 
within sports, but it is also about 
promoting sport for gender equality and 
social empowerment. Sport offers a 
valuable pathway to provide information 
on important social issues, as well as 
health and wellbeing. It can be used as an 
educational tool for social empowerment 
through the skills and values learnt such 
as leadership, communication, teamwork, 
respect and negotiation. Hartmann and 
Kwauk’s interventionist approach main 
focus is to reshape social order through 
education. Education can provide a very 
effective pathway for fundamental and 
systematic changes in social life. The 
Strengthen Sport for Development and 
Peace Strategy (2014) states that a number 
of studies have shown that education 
through sport and play allows children and 
youth to better enjoy and engage with the 
learning process, while enhancing social 
contentedness between participants. 
Gendered notions and beliefs are created 
at a young age and are learnt from 
social environments. Gender education 
could be implemented into grassroots 
programs through formal and non-formal 
settings to help change and form positive 
gendered notions, rather than reinforcing 
the dominant ones of today. Federation 
B through their grassroots programme 
does not separate the boys from the girls 
at a young age. This is purposely done 
so as not to segregate or imply that the 
genders are different, or one gender is 
more important within the sport than the 
other.  They do not however have any 
type of formal or non-formal education in 
regards to such topics of gender, equality 
and other such social issues. This could 
be integrated within the programme and 
be beneficial in the long term in helping to 
confront gender norms.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it is clear from this research 
that women’s specific programs and 
commissions are playing a positive role 
in the sport world and are having an 
impact on their main stakeholders, female 
athletes. The organised international 
women in sports drive has slowly gained 
momentum, and more recently has started 
to climb in stature. Although there are 
a limited number of specific women’s 
programs within IF’s, it seems that these 
programs are helping in providing girls 
and women with an opportunity to be part 
of the sport environment. Results from 
this research suggest that most athletes 
have seen improvements within their 
sport, particularly for professional female 
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athletes. More growth is needed though in 
sponsorship, education and future career 
opportunities within this main group. 
To gain a clearer picture on this further 
research could be conducted into other 
IF’s that have specific women’s programs. 
More data could be collected and then 
compared with other non-specific IF’s to 
see what differences are occurring.
An increase of women’s presence is 
also needed in leadership roles. Despite 
the fact that generally male and female 
members of executive bodies have 
similar qualifications, similar positions 
in their professional lives and a similar 
commitment to sport, women are not 
represented in positions of leadership in 
equal volumes as their male counterparts 
in sports organisations (Pfister 2009). 
A clearer pathway for women to 
advance from a participant towards an 
administrative role, and then if applicable, 
into a leadership position within their sport, 
is needed if an increase in female decision 
makers is sought after. The barriers that 
affect this are largely associated with 
the gender gap and the dominant social 
position that men have within sports 
federations that is still present in todays 
society. It has been said that sport can 
accentuate this notion, however this was 
not the case with the three federations 
analysed in this study. Each federation is 
aware of the importance of women within 
their organisation and, although slowly, 
they are making provisions to balance their 
administrative numbers. Other research 
states that women require assistance in 
being able to balance work and home 
life, as it is women who are faced with the 
responsibility of balancing work inside and 
outside the home. This, therefore, affects 
their position in the labour market (Pfister 
2009).
Finally, the various initiatives and 
frameworks that have been set up to 
support women’s participation in sport, 
like the IWG and IOC framework, need to 
continue to further develop pathways for 
women into decision making positions. 
Measures are being developed through 
various federations, however further 
support and guidance is needed. 
Women’s specific programs must address 
the needs of their stakeholders through 
opportunities and education, and measure 
outcomes regularly. Funding for athletes 
needs to be allocated more equally to 
each gender, as well as the need for 
media coverage to represent both genders 
equally. Sponsorship, funding and the 
media are all linked together and all 
greatly impact the opinion and attitudes 
of society and their views on gender. 
Success breeds success and sport 
has the potential to facilitate change. As 
more positive outcomes arise for women 
within sport organisations and more role 
models are seen within society, sport for 
women will continue to increase in priority. 
Developing a positive change for women 
in all sports requires a cohesive effort by 
everyone involved.
186
Women’s Development Programs in International Federations
What Impact are they having on their Stakeholders?
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
References
Adriaanse, J. (2013). The role of men 
in advancing gender equality in sport 
governance. Gender and Sport: Changes 
and Challenges, 50-70. Retrieved 
September 1, 2014.
Bell, B. (2012). Levelling the playing field? 
Post-Euro 2005 development of women’s 
football in the north-west of England. 
Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, 
Media, Politics, 15(3), 349-368.
Beutler, I. (2008). Sport serving 
development and peace: Achieving the 
goals of the United Nations through 
sport. Sport in Society, 11(4), 359-369. 
doi: 10.1080/17430430802019227
The Brighton Declaration on Women and 
Sport. (1994). Retrieved April 7, 2014.
Burke, M., & Hallinan, C. (2006). 
Women’s Leadership in Junior Girls’ 
Basketball in Victoria: Foucault, Feminism 
and Disciplining Women Coaches. 
Sport in Society, 9(1), 19-31. doi: 
10.1080/17430430500355758
Collins, D., Bailey, R., Ford, P. A., 
Macnamara, Á, Toms, M., & Pearce, 
G. (2011). Three Worlds: New 
directions in participant development 
in sport and physical activity. Sport, 
Education and Society, 1-19. doi: 
10.1080/13573322.2011.607951
Collins, D., Bailey, R., Ford, P. A., 
Macnamara, Á, Toms, M., & Pearce, 
G. (2011). Three Worlds: New 
directions in participant development 
in sport and physical activity. Sport, 
Education and Society, 1-19. doi: 
10.1080/13573322.2011.607951
European Commission Sport. (2014, 
February). Gender Equity in Sport: 
Proposal for Strategic Actions 2014-
2020. Retrieved April 7, 2014, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/events/2013/
documents/20131203-gender/
finalproposal-1802_en.pdf
Ferez, S. (2012). From Women’s 
Exclusion to Gender Institution: A Brief 
History of the Sexual Categorisation 
Process within Sport. The International 
Journal of the History of Sport, 29(2), 272-
285. doi: 10.1080/09523367.2012.641221
Gender and Education | Education | 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization. (n.d.). Retrieved 
November 14, 2014, from http://www.
unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/
leading-the-internationalagenda/ gender-
and-education/
Green, M., & Collins, S. (2008). Policy, 
Politics and Path Dependency: Sport 
Development in Australia and Finland. 
Sport Management Review, 11(3), 225-
251. doi: 10.1016/S1441-3523(08)70111-6
Haasler, J. (n.d.). Sport as a vehicle 
for social change: A case study from 
Zambia. Retrieved October 27, 2014, 
from https://www.mysciencework.com/
publication/file/1936695/sport-as-a-
vehicle-forsocial-change-a-case-study-
187AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
from-zambia.
Hancock, M., Lyras, A., & Ha, J. (2013). 
Sport for Development Programmes for 
Girls and Women: A Global Assessment. 
Journal of Sport for Development, 1(1), 
15-24. Retrieved April 8, 2014.
Hanlon, C., Morris, T., & Nabbs, S. (2010). 
Establishing a successful physical activity 
program to recruit and retain women. 
Sport Management Review, 13(3), 269-
282. doi: 10.1016/j.smr.2009.10.003
Hartmann, D., & Kwauk, C. (2011). Sport 
and Development: An Overview, Critique, 
and Reconstruction. Journal of Sport 
& Social Issues, 35(3), 284-305. doi: 
10.1177/0193723511416986
Hayhurst, L. M. (2011). Corporatising 
Sport, Gender and Development: 
Postcolonial IR feminisms, transnational 
private governance and global 
corporate social engagement. Third 
World Quarterly, 32(3), 531-549. doi: 
10.1080/01436597.2011.573944
Hedenborg, S., & Pfister, G. (2012). 
Introduction. Sport in Society: Cultures, 
Commerce, Media, Politics, 15(3), 283-
286. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
Hoffmann, R., Ging, L. C., Matheson, 
V., & Ramasamy, B. (2006). International 
women’s football and gender inequality. 
Applied Economics Letters, 13(15), 999-
1001. doi: 10.1080/13504850500425774
International Olympic Committee. (2012). 
Together Stronger — The Future Of 
Sport. 5th IOC World conference on 
women and sport. Retrieved April 7, 
2014, from http://www.olympic.org/
Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/
women_and_sport/report_5th_
conference_women_and_sport_EN.pdf
International Olympic Committee. (2014). 
Women in the Olympic Movement. 
Retrieved June 1, 2014, from http://www.
olympic.org/Documents/Reference_
documents_Factsheets/Women_in_
Olympic_Movement.pdf
International Working Group on Women 
in Sport. (2002). The Montreal Tool Kit 
A Legacy of 2002 World Conference. 
Retrieved September 1, 2014, fromhttp://
assets.sportanddev.org/downloads/53__
the_montreal_tool_kit__a_legacy_
of_2002_world_conference.pdf
Kidd, B. (2008). A new social movement: 
Sport for development and peace. 
Sport in Society, 11(4), 370-380. doi: 
10.1080/17430430802019268
Kidd, B. (2011). Cautions, Questions 
and Opportunities in Sport for 
Development and Peace. Third 
World Quarterly, 32(3), 603-609. doi: 
10.1080/01436597.2011.573948
Little, C. (2014). Gender, Class and 
Sporting Opportunity: Working-Class 
Women and Sport in Early Twentieth-
Century Australia. The International 
Journal of the History of Sport, 31(13), 
1677-1693. Retrieved November 13, 
2014.
188
Women’s Development Programs in International Federations
What Impact are they having on their Stakeholders?
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
Lyras, A., & Peachey, J. W. (2011). 
Integrating sport-for-development 
theory and praxis. Sport Management 
Review, 14(4), 311-326. doi: 10.1016/j.
smr.2011.05.006
Olympia. (2011). European Chart of 
Women’s Right in Sports. European 
Chart of Women’s Right in Sports, 1-15. 
Retrieved September 1, 2014, from 
European Chart of Women’s Right in 
Sports
Pfister, G., & Radtke, S. (2009). Sport, 
women, and leadership: Results of 
a project on executives in German 
sports organizations. European Journal 
of Sport Science, 9(4), 229-243. doi: 
10.1080/17461390902818286
Pfister, G. (2010). Women in sport – 
gender relations and future perspectives. 
Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, 
Media, Politics, 13(2), 234-248. Retrieved 
November 13, 2014.
Pfister, G. (2013). Gertrud Pfister 
Outsiders: Female Coaches Intruding 
Upon a Male Domain? Gender and 
Sport: Changes and Challenges, 71-99. 
Retrieved September 10, 2014.
Pfister, G. (2013). Outsiders: Female 
Coaches Intruding Upon a Male Domain? 
Gender and Sport: Changes and 
Challenges, 71-99. Retrieved September 
1, 2014.
Phillips, P., & Newland, B. (2013). 
Emergent models of sport development 
and delivery: The case of triathlon in 
Australia and the US. Sport Management 
Review. doi: 10.1016/j.smr.2013.07.001
Phillips, P., & Newland, B. (2013). 
Emergent models of sport development 
and delivery: The case of triathlon in 
Australia and the US. Sport Management 
Review. doi: 10.1016/j.smr.2013.07.001
Saavedra, M. (n.d.). Women, Sport and 
Development. Retrieved February 28, 
2014, from http://assets.sportanddev.org/
downloads/56__women__sport_and_
development.pdf
Shaw, S. (2007). Gender in Sport 
Management: A contemporary picture 
and alternative futures. In C. Aitchison 
(Author), Sport and gender identities: 
Masculinities, femininities and sexualities 
(pp. 74-89). London: Routledge. doi: 
http://www.basijcssc.ir/sites/default/
files/Sport%20and%20Gender%20
Identities-%20Masculinities,%20
femininities%20and%20sexualities.pdf
Shilbury, D., Sotiriadou, K. P., & Green, B. 
C. (2008). Sport Development. Systems, 
Policies and Pathways: An Introduction 
to the Special Issue. Sport Management 
Review, 11(3), 217-223. doi: 10.1016/
S1441-3523(08)70110-4 
Skogvang, B. (2013). Players’ and 
Coaches’ Experiences with the 
Gendered Sport/Media Complex in Elite 
Football. In Gender and Sport. Changes 
and Challenges, 103-122. Retrieved 
September 1, 2014.
Smith, E. (2010). Sociology of sport and 
189AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
social theory. Retrieved November 05, 
2014, from http://books.google.ch
Sotiriadou, K., Shilbiry, D., & Quick, 
S. (2008). The Attraction, Retention/
Transition, and Nurturing Process of 
Sport Development: Some Australian 
Evidence. Journal Sport Management, 
247-272. 
Sport Accord. (2013, February). 
Women in Leadership Positions within 
SportAccord Members. Retrieved April 
10, 2014, from http://www.sportaccord.
com/multimedia/docs/2013/02/
SportAccord_Women_in_Leadership_
Positions_Factsheet_February_2013_2.
pdf
Teetzel, S. (2011). Rules and reform: 
Eligibility, gender differences, 
and the Olympic Games. Sport 
in Society, 14(3), 386-398. doi: 
10.1080/17430437.2011.557275
Wadesango, N., Machingamb, S., 
Ashu, G., & Chireshe, R. (2010). Nature 
and effects of women’s participation in 
sporting decision-making structures in 
the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender 
Equity, 24(85), 62-75. Retrieved April 8, 
2014.
Wolverton, B. (2014, April 10). Report 
Describes Increase in Female Athletes 
but Lack of Female Coaches. The 
Chronicle of Higher Education.
Women, gender equality and sport. 
(2007). New York: United Nations, 
Division for the Advancement of Women, 
Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. 
Retrieved April 14, 2014, from http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/
Women%20and%20Sport.pdf
Women’s Sport and Fitness Foundation. 
(2014.). Trophy Women? NGB Leadership 
Audit 2014. Retrieved September 1, 2014, 
from http://www.wsff.org.uk/system/1/
assets/files/000/001/640/1640/cf1acd74f/
original/Trophy_Women_Report_2014_
final.pdf

AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology 191
Gianluca SIRACUSANO & Dawn AQUILINA 
Integrity Management 
in International Sport 
Federations
Status Quo and Future Perspectives
Chapter 10 – Integrity Management
192
Corporate Governance
Challenges for International Sports Federations
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
Integrity Management in International Sports Federations:
Status Quo and Future Perspectives
‘You must be the change you 
wish to see in the world . . .’
Mahatma GANDHI 
(Leader of the Indian independent movement) 
193AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
Abstract
In the recent years, a surprisingly 
wide range of sports have been 
touched – and in some cases sadly 
overwhelmed – by a considerable 
number of recurring scandals involving 
corruption, match-fixing and betting 
frauds. The roots of these phenomena 
can be ultimately traced to the increasing 
commercialisation of sport as well as 
to the explosion and rapid growth of 
the global online betting market. The 
expansion and evolution of the sport 
business on a global scale has been 
linked to the distortion of the traditional 
inherent values of sport, being recently 
portrayed as a self-oriented money 
making business (McGowan, 2008; 
Madigan and Delaney, 2009). The ideal 
of sport as an arena driven by social and 
moral strength, aspiration, inspiration 
and fair play is gradually losing its lustre. 
Moving from this premise, the ultimate 
goal of the paper is to delineate, analyse, 
and compare the different governance 
approaches and tools adopted by 
the sport movement and by the most 
important International Federations to 
better tackle corruption in sport, with 
particular focus on match-fixing. To 
this purpose, the report has identified a 
model of integrity management based on 
four strategic pillars and has highlighted 
some good practises that are currently 
proliferating.
Introduction
In the recent years, a surprisingly 
wide range of sports have been 
touched – and in some cases sadly 
overwhelmed – by a considerable 
number of recurring scandals involving 
corruption, match-fixing and/or betting 
frauds. The roots of these phenomena 
can be ultimately traced to the increasing 
commercialisation of sport as well as 
to the explosion and rapid growth of 
the global online betting market. The 
expansion and evolution of the sport 
business on a global scale has been 
linked to the distortion of the traditional 
inherent values of sport, being recently 
portrayed as a self-oriented money 
making business (McGowan, 2008; 
Madigan and Delaney, 2009). The ideal 
of sport as an arena driven by social and 
moral strength, aspiration, inspiration and 
fair play is gradually losing its lustre. In 
this context, the integrity of sport relies 
on the authenticity of the outcome of 
sport competitions being entirely and 
exclusively based on the competing 
merits of the participants involved. In a 
crescendo of public concern, match-
fixing, along with doping, hooliganism 
and racism has undoubtedly become 
one of the most severe pathology faced 
by the sport movement in the 21st 
century. It is not a case that the integrity 
of sport competitions is a subject which 
has been rising in prominence on the 
agendas of the sport environment, and 
is now unanimously recognised as an 
overriding priority and fundamental 
core value to be firmly preserved. 
Symmetrically, such topic has also 
received a great academic attention in 
the last years because of its alarming 
pervasiveness. A multitude of reports 
and studies in this critical area illustrates 
how the manipulation of sport events is 
commonly carried out by transnational 
organised criminals exploiting gambling 
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and thriving on the lack of international 
regulations (for instance ICSS, 2014; 
UNODC/IOC, 2013; IRIS, 2012). At a 
public level, governments, regulators, 
supranational institutions, prosecutors 
and law enforcements authorities have 
intensified their dialogue over the last 
five years, culminating with the adoption 
of a Council of Europe’s Convention in 
September 2014, as an international 
instrument aimed at fighting the 
manipulation of sports competitions.
On the other side, the sports 
organisations, and particularly 
International Federations, have 
contributed to this institutional framework 
and have started to implement internally 
tools, models and regulations addressing 
the integrity challenges that they are 
facing. Moving from this premise, 
the ultimate goal of the research is to 
delineate, analyse, and compare the 
different governance approaches and 
tools adopted by 28 Summer Olympic 
International Federations (members of 
ASOIF), to better tackle corruption in 
sport, with particular focus on match-
fixing.
A Definitional 
Framework: The 
Concept of Integrity in 
Sport
Integrity is one of those concepts that 
emerges over and over in debates 
about modern sports, particularly in the 
commercialised and professional era 
that now prevails. However, there is yet 
no clear consensus and acceptance in 
the institutional and academic worlds 
around the definition of the concept 
of integrity of sport (Chappelet and 
Mrkonjic, 2013). Indeed, without a clear 
understanding of its meaning, sport 
integrity is impossible to protect, monitor 
and preserve. In everyday speech, the 
word integrity evokes concepts like 
wholeness, undividedness and purity.1 
Similarly, in the world of sports, the 
investigated word assumes analogous 
connotations: it refers to the wholeness, 
honesty and incorruptibility of both the 
sport and its players (Danaher, 2014). 
It reflects a set of collective ideals and 
agreed values, including but not limited 
to bravery, goodness, sportsmanship, 
fair play and discipline. However, despite 
being something typically perceived and 
understood by everyone, it is a concept 
that refuses to be contained within 
well-defined boundaries. As a starting 
point in a definitional attempt, it should 
highlighted that what de facto drives the 
popular devotion to sports is its integrity: 
the authentic, unscripted ethos of a 
contest that engages athletes who strive 
to win in a genuine and honourable way, 
and generates a level of excitement and 
admiration rarely reached by other forms 
of entertainment (Monitor Quest, 2011). 
Integrity thus constitutes the salience 
of sport, as well as the authenticity seal 
and ultimate guarantee of the innate 
values incorporated in it. Undeniably, 
one of the most fundamental pillars of 
sport resides in the unpredictability of 
the outcome of the competitions, which 
constitutes a condicio sine qua non of its 
1 Interestingly, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) 
defines integrity as “the quality of being honest 
and fair” and as “an unpaired condition”, but also 
as “firm adherence to a code of especially moral 
or artistic values”.
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authenticity and reliability. Fair and honest 
performances and outcomes presuppose 
immunity from illegitimate enhancements 
and/or external influences.
Where a sport ordinarily demonstrates 
integrity, it is usually linked to a 
greater level of public confidence, fan 
engagement, support and trust. In 
light of this, it is feared that if the public 
starts to perceive the result of a sport 
contest as predetermined or affected 
by external factors exceeding the 
sphere of the competing merits of the 
participants involved, then all the interest 
is likely to wane and the people to get 
disillusioned. This potential vicious cycle 
constitutes a threat not only for fan and 
sportspeople in general, but also for 
all the diverse actors in the ecosystem, 
such as sponsors, broadcasters, 
manufacturers, betting operators and 
others who depend on sport for their 
livelihood and/or business. As a matter 
of fact, today sport is confronting with a 
plethora of dilemmas and challenges to 
its integrity that, in their scope, dynamics 
and consequences, threaten sport’s 
commercial and social appeal (Monitor 
Quest, 2011).
One of the most comprehensive and 
substantiated definitions of the concept 
of sport integrity has been elaborated by 
Monitor Quest (2011) as follows:
“Sports integrity consists of two broad 
commitments on the part of competitors, 
teams, governing authorities, and 
associated parties in sport to the 
broader public. These are: 1) to preserve 
the fundamental character of sport 
competition as an honest test of skill 
and ability; 2) to act on and off the field 
in ways consistent with preserving the 
social and economic value of sport.(p. 
15)”
This definition emphasises two critical 
dimensions: the authenticity of the 
competition itself, and the conduct – 
on and off the field – of sport related 
professionals consistent with the scope 
of preserving the social, economic 
and recreational value of sport. In view 
of these considerations, any form of 
behaviour which might have the effect to 
alter or distort the natural outcome of a 
competition, as well as any detrimental 
conduct capable of inflicting reputational, 
financial or social damage, can be 
subsumed under the notion of threat to 
the integrity of sport. Within this broad 
framework, what constitutes an integrity 
breach varies depending on the sport, its 
competition dynamics, its regulations and 
governance peculiarities. In a similar vein, 
integrity management has been defined 
by Maesschalck & Vanden Auweele 
(2010, p.2) as ‘the activities undertaken 
to stimulate and enforce integrity and 
prevent integrity violations within a 
particular organisation’.
The Major Threats for 
Integrity in Modern 
Sport
As just observed, attempting to define the 
concept of sport integrity is a necessary 
preliminary step when exploring the best 
strategies to maintain sports immaculate 
from the plethora of integrity threats 
happening with greater frequency on a 
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global scale. Symmetrically, the spectrum 
of integrity threats currently assaulting 
sports is as diverse as sophisticated. 
Indeed, adopting such a broad definition 
for sport integrity inevitably results in a 
similar wide-ranging connotation for the 
area of integrity threats. Within this broad 
theoretical framework, a methodical 
classification of the most relevant threats 
to the integrity of sports is an important 
preliminary step that can facilitate in 
preventing, anticipating and mitigating the 
possible breaches.
Some authors (Maenning, 2005) have 
theorised a categorisation based on the 
distinction between competition (or on-
field) and non-competition (or off-field) 
related integrity threats:
Competition related, where the 
threat usually affects a competitions or 
match. The professionals commonly 
involved are athletes, coaches and/
or sport officials and the purpose is 
typically to influence the outcome of a 
match. This category notably includes 
betting and/or sport related match-fixing, 
manipulation of competitions, doping, 
insider information, conducts detrimental 
to sport and technological performance 
enhancement;
Non-competition related, where the 
threat usually affects the management 
process. The professionals commonly 
involved are managers, administrators 
and/or other employers and the purpose 
is typically to influence decisions and 
determinations related to sport events, 
funding, elections, appointments and 
rights (i.e. hosting events, marketing 
rights, apical management positions, 
etc.). This category notably includes 
corruption, money laundering, 
management malfeasance, financial 
irregularities, conflicts of interests and 
money laundering.
Figure 1: Map of Integrity Threats
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Other potential ways to differentiate all 
the existent integrity threats could be to 
look at whether the primary purpose is to 
gain economic or sport benefits, whether 
the threats are uniquely in conflict with 
the disciplinary rules (and hence can be 
punished only by sport judicial bodies) or 
also in conflict with the law (and therefore 
can be prosecuted by public authorities), 
or whether the threat takes root in 
individual or collective interests (Oxford 
Research, 2010).
The scope of this paper is limited 
to the study of actual and potential 
strategies in place within International 
Federations in order to prevent solely 
match-fixing. However, it should be noted 
that, given the strong interrelationship 
and correlation between the different 
integrity threats observed, a solid 
strategy against match-fixing is likely to 
generate positive effects towards the 
other integrity threats just identified. The 
manipulation of sports competitions, 
including match-fixing, is regularly cited, 
together with doping, as one of the most 
serious threats to the integrity of sport. 
Concerns have substantially multiplied 
as new technologies have globalised 
betting and organised crime seems to 
be targeting the market. In the last years 
the amount of detection activity that took 
place has been really shocking (Brown, 
2014). Match-fixing has been recently 
defined by the Council of Europe (2014) 
as “an intentional arrangement, act or 
omission aimed at an improper alteration 
of the result or the course of a sports 
competition in order to remove all or 
part of the unpredictable nature of the 
aforementioned sports competition with 
a view to obtaining an undue advantage 
for oneself or for others”2
Given the growing amount of recent 
scandals across a broad spectrum of 
sports, it is difficult to determine which 
particular sports are more exposed to 
match-fixing. Distinguished researchers 
(Forrest et al., 2008) and betting 
regulators (Norwegian Gaming and 
Foundation Authority et al., 2013) have 
outlined a series of common factors 
conducive to increasing and facilitating 
the incidence and scale of match-fixing. 
These have been generally regarded as 
the most influential circumstances:
• High betting volumes;
• Wide number of betting types available;
• Athlete or officials with low salaries;
• Athlete or officials can take single 
actions able to determine, on their own, 
the outcome or part of the outcome of 
the competition;
• Single competitions do not affect the 
final placing in a tournament;
2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2014), Convention on 
the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, Article 
3 – Definitions. Interestingly, a broader definition 
has been coined by the Australian Sport Minister 
as follows: “Match-fixing involves the manipulation 
of an outcome or contingency by competitors, 
teams, sports agents, support staff, referees and 
officials and venue staff. Such conduct includes: 
a) deliberate fixing of the result of a contest, 
or of an occurrence within the contest, or of a 
point spread; b) deliberate underperformance; 
c) withdrawal (tanking); d) an official’s deliberate 
misapplication of the rules of the contest; e) 
interference with the play or playing surfaces 
by venue staff; f) abuse of insider information 
to support a bet placed by any of the above or 
placed by a gambler who has recruited such 
people to manipulate an outcome or contingency” 
(SPORT AND RECREATION MINISTERS’ 
COUNCIL COMMINQUÉ (2011), National Policy 
on Match-Fixing in Sport).
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• Weak and/or superficial scrutiny of the 
competitions;
• Salary levels are regarded as unjust;
• General level of corruption in the 
community.
These factors could be used by sport 
bodies and authorities as guiding 
principles to analyse how vulnerable 
to match-fixing their sport is and to 
implement effective measures aimed at 
preventing and combating it.
The growth of match-fixing for 
the purpose of betting frauds has 
mirrored the tremendous expansion 
of global online betting and live sports 
coverage (Squires, 2014). Indeed, 
recent studies from Marketline (2013) 
and H2 Gambling Capital (2013) have 
unveiled the exceptional growth of the 
global online gambling industry during 
the period 2006-2013. By 2012, H2 
Gambling Capital valued the industry 
at an estimated €50.7 billion (Bozkurt, 
2012). This impressive rate of expansion 
is forecasted to continue to manifest 
itself during the period 2014-2017 
at an increase of 51.4% since 2012 
(MarketLine, 2013). In other words, the 
betting segment has experienced an 
exponential expansion, primarily thanks 
to the advent of new online betting 
platforms. As a matter of fact, gambling 
and betting have always been at the 
forefront of technological advancement 
and have recently sustained a massive 
‘cyber revolution’. With the constant 
emergence of new operators in the 
market and the explosion of the online 
betting sector, users today experience an 
unprecedented spectrum of offers and 
betting types, which varies depending on 
each specific sport.
Although football, tennis, cricket, horse 
racing and badminton appear to be the 
most lucrative sports for match-fixers, 
there have been multiple less sonorous 
match-fixing cases in as many other 
sports.
A recent study (2013) published by the 
international law enforcement body, 
INTERPOL, highlighted that match-fixing 
“was reported in over 70 countries across 
six continents” only during the period 
of time from June 2012 to May 2013. 
Similarly, in January 2013, FIFA stated 
that it believed that “about 50 national 
leagues outside of Europe are being 
targeted by organised crime figures in the 
betting market”.
In this line of considerations, the ICSS 
Report (2014) suggested that “numerous 
clues lead one to think that the cases 
so far identified make up only the tip 
of the iceberg”.3 The implications from 
this development are two-fold; online 
betting does not only pose a threat to 
sports integrity but the exposure it has 
to money laundering should not be 
underestimated. There are a number of 
factors that contribute to the latter such 
as; the wide variety of online betting 
products offered by gaming companies 
especially by those that operate in poorly 
regulated markets, which gives them 
the opportunity to accept higher cash 
flows and have a relatively high pay-out 
percentages and tax-free winnings.
3 The report highlighted the occurrence of 37 
reported scandals in Europe, 17 in Asia, 5 in 
America, 4 in Africa and 4 in Oceania, over the 
last three year.
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Given this context, at a governmental 
and institutional level it is essential to 
understand the need for a coordinated, 
cross-jurisdictional, supranational 
approach in order to deal efficiently with 
this globalised phenomenon. It is not a 
case that the issue of the manipulation 
of sports competitions has undeniably 
become, today, an issue of international 
public interest, that has escalated the 
agenda of prominent European and 
international institutions. Within this new 
framework, one of the most interesting 
initiatives is certainly the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Manipulation 
of Sports Competitions, which was 
adopted and opened for signatures in 
September 2014. The Convention aims 
to “prevent, deter, detect and combat” 
sports manipulation by promoting 
“national and international cooperation 
between the public authorities 
concerned, as well as with the relevant 
bodies or organisations particularly those 
representing the sports movement and 
betting operators” (Article 1).
It is certainly true that sports institutions 
cannot deal with the proliferation of cases 
of match-fixing on their own – a fortiori 
if this phenomenon is linked to sports 
betting and criminals’ affairs, which can 
potentially affect public order.
However, it is equally undeniable that 
the sport movement as a whole and 
especially International Federations 
are urgently required to take new 
stringent steps in order to create and 
implement measures, regulations, tools 
and management protocols aimed at 
addressing the issue. A report from the 
EU Commission’s Expert Group on Good 
Governance in Sport (2012) highlighted 
that “a lack of respect for good 
governance principles may contribute 
to conditions that facilitate instances 
of match-fixing. Therefore, a sound 
financial management, transparency, 
risk management plans and strategies 
at association and federation level are 
crucial to prevent fraud in sport, notably 
match-fixing, and to safeguard the 
integrity of sport” (p.10). Similarly, the 
European Parliament in its Resolution 
on Match-Fixing and Corruption in Sport 
(2013) called upon “all sports governing 
bodies to commit to good governance 
practises in order to reduce the risk of 
falling victim to match-fixing”. Other policy 
platform such as the Council of Europe4, 
UNESCO5 and the Commonwealth 
Advisory Board on Sport6 have equally 
expressed the need for better sports 
governance to help the fight against 
match-fixing, primarily through a system 
of proper sport rules and sanctions 
(ESSA, 2014). The ICSS Report (2014, 
p.4) corroborates these findings and 
warns that: “the lack of resources 
in some federations needed for the 
detection of fraud and weak surveillance 
of competitions in lower leagues, junior’s 
competitions and also women’s team 
sports and local competitions, lead to 
the conclusion that cases of manipulation 
could be a lot more numerous than those 
yet uncovered” (p. 4). Monitor Quest 
(2011) reiterated this concern as they 
observed how governing bodies of sports 
have often been unable to keep pace 
4 Cf. Council of Europe Convention on the 
Manipulation of Sports Competitions (2014), 
Article 7.
5 Cf. UNESCO Declaration of Berlin (2013).
6 Cf. Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport 
(CABOS), Chair’s Statement 12 June 2013.
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in their efforts to detect and mobilise 
against the actual integrity threats and 
consequently have found themselves in 
playing catch-up.
The Virtuous Cycle: 
The Pillars of Integrity 
Management
Unfortunately, the history of integrity 
management within the international 
sport bodies is connoted by an alarming 
lack of interest and superficiality. 
Some International Federations have 
always tended to believe that integrity 
breaches (and especially match-fixing) 
constitute isolated cases that do not 
require a structured approach and can 
be addressed with reactive measures 
in case of occurrence. Alternatively, 
some sports organisations have always 
asserted a natural impermeability to 
match-fixing, stressing that only certain 
sports or competitions are being touched 
by this pathology.
However, this trend is currently moving 
towards an authentic awareness 
of the risks at stake, and the sport 
bodies are starting to understand 
the crucial importance of preserving 
integrity as necessary condition of the 
Figure 2: The Integrity Cycle - the Four Pillars of Integrity Management
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commercial and social value of their 
sports. As it will be noted in the next 
paragraph, there are examples of 
International Federations implementing 
this philosophy, establishing effective 
regulations and investigative systems and 
adopting a proactive and preventative 
strategy instead of a reactive one. 
Despite few federations seems to be 
adequately resourced and staffed to 
detect and deal with this phenomenon, 
some good practises are currently 
proliferating, also thanks to the positive 
pressure and guidance of prominent 
sport governing bodies.
The authors have identified a model of 
integrity management based on four 
strategic pillars (or operational elements), 
which aim to tackle the different facets 
and components of the sophisticated 
dynamics ascribable to the manipulation 
of sport competitions.7 However, it should 
be preliminarily underlined that a critical 
prerequisite for an effective strategy is to 
consciously recognise the existence of 
this phenomenon and to accept the scale 
of the problem.
Regulations
The adoption of clear, detailed and 
stringent regulations is imperative in order 
to define what is match-fixing, which 
conducts are subsumable under this 
category, who are the targets involved 
and what are the sanctions for such 
actions. In general, it is desirable to 
enclose these specialised provisions into 
7 In general, an analogous approach has been 
observed and discussed by multiple authors: inter 
alia, Aquilina and Chetcuti (2013), Monitor Quest 
(2011), Sportradar (2014), ICSS (2014), Oxford 
Research (2010).
a separated, autonomous, body of rules 
that specifically deals with all the integrity 
threats identified above. This corpus iuris 
should assume the most enforceable 
architecture and can appear in different 
juridical vests (i.e. code of conduct, 
anti-corruption and integrity rules, anti-
manipulation code).
These regulations should apply to 
athletes, management, officials, 
support personnel, agents, doctors, 
etc., in order to reinforce at every level 
the integrity of the sport and promote 
exemplary ethical standards. From a 
pure substantial perspective, a system 
of severe sanctions is required in order 
to compensate and attain optimal 
deterrence. However, an efficient strategy 
and clear policy for combating threats 
to sports integrity must be built upon a 
profound understanding of the scale and 
nature of each threat. Therefore, before 
drawing up the regulations, an exercise 
of ‘threats assessment’ would surely be 
a wise passage (especially for corruption 
and management malfeasance), able 
to suggest the shapes of structure, 
governance and operational controls 
needed.
To be credible, rules ought to be 
strictly and uniformly applied to ensure 
consistency within a sport and ideally 
also across different sports so that 
minimum standards, to which everyone 
must adhere to, can energetically take 
root within the whole sport community.8 
The same consistency must apply also to 
enforcement and prosecution.
8 In a similar sense, cf. Monitor Quest (2011) and 
Oxford Research (2010), which calls for a “lowest 
common denominator” in international sports 
movement.
202
Integrity Management in International Sport Federations
Status Quo and Future Perspectives
AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
Education
Surveillance and disciplinary sanctions 
cannot be efficient on their own. They 
should be integrated and combined 
with prevention strategies. In this light, 
educational initiatives constitute a 
fundamental integrity protection measure 
with a long lasting impact.
Education strategies usually consist in 
the implementation of comprehensive 
programmes for athletes and other 
central actors in sport to prevent 
them from engaging in unacceptable 
behaviours and warning them of the 
surveillance they are under and the 
severe repercussions of breaking the 
rules. These education programmes 
should target all the broad spectrum 
of sports actors, including athletes, 
referees, officials, supporters, managers, 
sports journalists, public prosecutors, 
etc.
Education should focus on informing 
targets about the threats to sport; why 
it is wrong for athletes to engage in 
behaviours which are contrary to the 
values of sport; how corruption can ruin 
and endanger athletes’ careers; what 
code of conduct athletes are required 
to follow; how match-fixers operate 
and target sports participants; how to 
behave if contacted in relation to actions 
which constitute a threat to sport; how 
gambling can lead to addiction; how 
inside information can be used for 
betting purposes; what the sanctions 
and consequences are if the rules are 
breached; how to recognise and resist 
match-fixing, etc. Education should 
be specifically tailored for the different 
targets at stake and can be implemented 
through e-learning programmes, 
face-to-face lectures, pre-competition 
briefings, workshops, seminars, online 
programmes, quizzes and certifications.
Monitoring
With regard to betting related match-
fixing, monitoring of betting activities 
is certainly an area of critical focus. 
Through surveillance of both betting 
patterns and athletes’ behaviours it can 
be ascertained whether the integrity 
regulations or codes of conduct have 
been breached. Each sports governing 
body should therefore ensure to have 
effective mechanisms in place to 
guarantee compliance with their rules. 
A credible and extensive monitoring and 
detection of the global betting market is 
a crucial requisite to tackle manipulation 
of sports competitions. In recent 
years considerable progress has been 
made with the development by betting 
operators of advanced warning systems 
to alert sports organisations of any 
suspicious activity. These mechanisms 
can be achieved mainly through the 
support of betting operators, who 
generally have comprehensive means 
to detect and deter possible instances 
of manipulations, by providing data and 
intelligence via centralised platforms 
for exchange of information. However, 
the betting industry does not have the 
power to impose disciplinary sanctions 
on athletes or officials in breach of 
integrity rules. This is the responsibility 
of sport authorities and, consequently, 
International Federations should have 
strategic partnerships with betting 
operators in place in order to leverage 
such useful information and intelligence. 
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Surveillance of betting activities and 
sports competitions should include:
• monitoring of odds and odds 
movements within the international 
betting market;
• analysis of the course of actions of 
competitions;
• in case of unusual patterns, exchange 
of information with sport governing 
bodies;
• analysis of the probability of a 
competition being manipulated (via 
special algorithms);
• monitoring of betting accounts and 
volumes of stakes;
• detection of suspicious individuals in 
sport venues during competitions;
• databases of all scandals, with alerts 
on athletes and officials previously 
involved;
• platforms for confidential exchange of 
data.
Reporting
The establishment of an appropriate 
reporting system is a necessary tool to 
‘close’ the integrity virtuous cycle and 
ensure that all the unusual conducts and 
instances of manipulations are brought 
to the attention of the sport bodies. 
An effective way to achieve this goal is 
undoubtedly the creation of a telephone 
‘hotline’ (or ‘whistleblower’) for athletes 
and other participants involved in sport 
as a confidential platform to report 
integrity threats. Particularly, as long 
as there are no means in place able to 
guarantee the athletes’ protection, in 
terms of anonymity, confidentiality and 
independence, athletes will continue to 
be reluctant about reporting instances 
of manipulations and/or disclosing 
incidents. The International Olympic 
Committee highlighted the importance 
of this (and in fact implemented such 
measure at the Sochi Winter Games 
2014) – often snubbed – type of 
prevention:
“Recognising the need for a reporting 
system for athletes, their entourage, 
as well as referees, it is strongly 
recommended that sports organisations 
and sports event organisers establish 
a system whereby anyone can report, 
in a confidential manner, if he or she 
has been approached or has witnessed 
any wrongdoing related to match-fixing 
or irregular and illegal betting” (IOC 
Recommendations from the Working 
Group on the Fight against Irregular and 
Illegal Sports Betting, 2013).
In view of these considerations, it should 
be conclusively underlined that the 
primary scope of this tool should be to 
protect athletes and sports, and not to 
help convict or arrest third parties. 
Owing to the exploratory nature of this 
study, it must be stressed at the outset 
that the underlying aim of devising 
this framework was not to ‘test’ the 
28 International Federations from a 
statistical point of view, but to generate 
rich insights into how each of these 
federations are reacting to these issues 
based on their size, resources, history of 
dealing with match-fixing in their sport 
and culture (values system). Indeed, 
all ASOIF federations websites were 
scanned and published data in relation 
to the existing regulations, platforms and 
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tools they were using to preserve sport 
integrity, was added to provide valuable 
insight into the value system that these 
organisations sought to promote. These 
insights could serve as a reference point 
to other IFs, which are contemplating to 
introduce/improve such measures and 
tools.
The Conceptual 
Model Applied: 
Current Status within 
ASOIF International 
Federations
Once identified a potential theoretical 
model to minimise the likelihood of 
integrity breaches, it is important 
to determine the current level of 
implementation in place within the 
sport movement. To this purpose, 
the interesting Table 1 illustrates the 
current integrity status quo of the ASOIF 
federations and investigates the presence 
or absence of each critical factors 
observed in the theoretical framework. 
The table below provides a simplified 
overview of the general advancement 
of integrity management strategies 
within ASOIF federations umbrella 
that encompass the following sports: 
archery, athletics, aquatics, badminton, 
basketball, boxing, canoeing, cycling, 
equestrian, fencing, field hockey, football, 
golf, gymnastics, handball, judo, modern 
pentathlon, rowing, rugby union, sailing, 
shooting, table-tennis, taekwondo, 
tennis, triathlon, volleyball, weight-lifting 
and wrestling. From examination of the 
data, it seems prima facie apparent the 
scarce level of attention towards this 
novel management area. Indeed, from 
a cursory glance, it can be easily noted 
that the number of “No” (60% of the 
investigated cases) in the table is way 
larger than the number of “Yes” (40% 
of investigated cases). However, on a 
brighter side, it should also be noted that 
some recent trends appear relatively 
encouraging. From a governance point of 
view, a best practice for IFs to effectively 
implement all the integrity functions 
observed in the preceding paragraph, is 
to establish a separate integrity ‘unit’ or, 
depending on the size of the federation, 
a single integrity ‘officer’ or ‘point of 
contact’. Despite only 6 out of the 28 
federations scrutinised, today have a 
specific functional unit or officer in place, 
it seems safe to affirm that a dramatic 
improvement is expected in this regard 
in the close future. From this point of 
view a good solid initiative comes from 
the International Tennis Federation, 
that has established a fully operational 
‘Tennis Integrity Unit’ since 2008. Since 
its inception, a growing number of 
players were sanctioned with a life ban 
for committing match-fixing offences. 
However, recent allegations do not seem 
to completely validate such a positive 
view; the reference is to an investigation 
conducted by two media companies 
(BuzzFeed News and BBC, Jan 2016) 
according to which, in past years the TIU 
had omitted to take actions against a 
number of professional players, despite 
repeated warnings of match-fixing. The 
findings of the joint investigation unveiled 
that a US Open champion and doubles 
winners at Wimbledon were among a 
group of 16 players who had repeatedly 
been reported for losing matches when 
205AISTS International Academy of Sports Science and Technology
highly suspicious bets have been placed 
on their games. Further evidence also 
demonstrated the existence of gambling 
syndicates in Russia and Italy, suspected 
of having earned substantial amounts 
of money placing highly suspicious bets 
on the concerned games. Further to this 
investigation, the ITF has announced 
the institution of an independent Review 
Panel aimed at reviewing and reporting 
on the appropriateness and effectiveness 
of the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program 
and making recommendations for 
possible changes (TIU Media Release, 
Jan 2016). As a part of the ambitious 
mission of the panel, a structural review 
of the ITU seemed to be contemplated:
How the TIU can be more 
transparent without compromising 
the TIU’s need for investigative 
confidentiality; additional resources 
for the TIU both within the unit and 
at tournaments; structural and/or 
governance changes that enhance 
the independence of the TIU.
It remains to be seen whether the 
announcement paves the way for a 
concrete restructuring and strengthening 
of the TIU’s functions and powers, but for 
now it is being hailed as a necessary step 
to fully restore the effectiveness of the 
ITF’s integrity strategy.
As to the monitoring field, a closer look 
into the data indicates that more than 
20% of the federations under the scope 
of the study appear to have a specific 
monitoring system in place (of their 
own). A model practice in this regard 
is undoubtedly the ‘Early Warning 
System’ implemented by the Federation 
Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA). Two private companies leaders 
in the services of monitoring of betting 
are Genius Sport and Sportradar, which 
provide some federations (e.g. FIBA, 
UEFA) with tailored fraud prevention 
systems. Along similar lines, another 
important recent initiative is the 
‘Integrity Betting Intelligence System’ 
(IBIS) established by the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) with the aim 
of supporting International Federations 
and event organisers in the fight for 
clean competitions and clean athletes, 
by providing them with alerts and 
intelligence via a specialised platform for 
exchange of information. On this front, it 
should be noted that as of early 2016, all 
ASOIF federations have adhered to IBIS 
and can use it also at their own events. 
Interestingly, IBIS remains operational 
between editions of the Olympic Games 
for the benefit of the federations to use 
at their major international events and 
other multisport events. In the event that 
a federation suspects one of its events 
is at risk, the federation may ask IBIS for 
information on the betting market.
In terms of educational provision based 
on the available sources, approximately 
30% of ASOIF federations including: 
badminton, equestrian, football, 
rugby, table-tennis and tennis, have 
developed solid educational initiatives 
to raise awareness and educate their 
stakeholders in matters of match-
fixing. This said, a best practise has 
been identified within the World Rugby, 
that presents a dedicated online 
e-learning platform (financed through 
EU Commission’s funding) translated 
in 13 languages and aimed at raising 
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International 
Federation
Integrity 
Officer / 
Unit
Monitoring of 
Betting*
Educational 
Initiatives
Integrity Code/
Policy**
Hot Line
Federation 
International de 
Natation
No No No Yes - “Rules on 
the Prevention of 
the Manipulation 
of Competitions”
No
World Archery 
Federation
No No No Yes - “Betting & 
Anti- Corruption 
Appendix”
No
International 
Association of 
Athletics Federa-
tion
Yes No No Yes - “Betting, 
Manipulation of 
Results & Anti- 
Corruption Rules”
No
Badminton 
World Feder-
ation
No Yes (i.e. part-
nership with 
Bwin)
Yes - semi-
nars to raise 
awareness on 
match-fixing & 
briefings pre- 
tournaments
Yes -“Code of 
Conduct of Par-
ticipants related 
to Betting, Wa-
gering & Irregular 
Match results” 
(Appendix 5)
Yes – 
Whistle 
Blower 
Reporting 
System
Federation 
Internationale de 
Basketball
Yes Yes - with 
Genius Sport & 
Sportrardar
No     No No
Association 
Internationale de 
Boxe
No No Yes     No No
International Ca-
noe Federation
No No No     No No
Union Cycliste 
Internationale
No No No     No No
Federation 
Equestre Inter-
nationale
Yes Yes Yes - “Clean 
Sport” Pro-
gramme
No Yes
Federation 
Internationale 
d’Escrime
No No No Yes - “Betting & 
Anti Corruption 
Rules”
No
* This criterion should be considered met only if a specific monitoring system is provided. However, it 
should be reiterated that all ASOIF federations have signed up to the IBIS platform implemented by the 
IOC.
** This criterion should be considered met only if a specific code, corpus of rules and/or separate 
comprehensive section is provided. See Table 2 for a more detailed breakdown of the policies related to 
betting and match-fixing.
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Federation 
Internationale de 
Hockey
No No Yes Yes - “Anti-Cor-
ruption Regula-
tions”
No
Federation 
Internationale 
de Football 
Association
Yes Yes - Early 
Warning Sys-
tem (EWS)
Yes - seminars 
& programmes 
- multiple 
partners (i.e. 
INTERPOL)
Yes - “Code of 
Conduct”
Yes – FIFA 
Integrity 
Hotline
International Golf 
Federation
No No No No No
Federation 
Internationale de 
Gymnastique
No No No No No
International 
Handball Feder-
ation
No No No No No
International 
Judo Federation
No No No No No
Union Internatio-
nale de Pentath-
lon Moderne
No No No No No
Federation 
Internationale 
des Societes 
D’Aviron
No No No Yes - “Integrity, 
Manipulation of 
Competition and 
Betting” (Appen-
dix 1)
No
World Rugby Yes No Yes - dedicated 
online platform
Yes - “Anti-Cor-
ruption and 
Betting”
Yes
International 
Sailing Feder-
ation
No No No Yes - “Betting & 
Anti-Corruption” 
(Appendix 5)
No
International 
Shooting Sport 
Federation
No No No No No
International 
Table Tennis 
Federation
No Yes - through 
Sportradar and 
Genius Sport
Yes - 
seminars on 
prevention
Yes - “Regu-
lations against 
Illegal Betting and 
Corruption”
No
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World Taekwon-
do Federation
No No No Yes - “Bylaws 
on Betting and 
Corruption”
No
International 
Tennis Feder-
ation
Yes Yes - Multiple 
partners (i.e. 
Sportradar)
Yes - ded-
icated online 
platform
Yes - “Tennis 
Anti- Corruption 
Program”
Yes
International 
Triathlon Union
No No No No No
Federation 
Internationale de 
Volleyball
No No No Yes - “Betting 
and Corruption 
Rules”
No
The IOC seems to have taken a 
significant step in this direction with the 
creation an Integrity and Compliance 
Hotline open to athletes, coaches, 
referees as well as the general public, in 
order to report any suspicious behaviours 
or activities related to competition 
manipulation and infringements of the 
IOC Code of Ethics or other matters 
falling under the IOC’s jurisdiction, 
including financial misconduct or other 
legal, regulatory and ethical breaches 
(IOC Press Release, Jul 2015).
With regard to the state of integrity 
regulations, given the importance of this 
pillar, Table 2 builds a detailed picture of 
the current integrity rules and policies in 
place.
As noted in the preceding section, 
a set of stringent regulations is an 
indispensable measure in the fight 
against match-fixing. Table 1 highlights 
that 15 federations have currently in place 
a separate comprehensive corpus of 
rules addressing and regulating integrity 
breaches. This figure seems significant 
if compared with the general trends. 
However, when breaking down the 
awareness about betting risks and 
match-fixing among athletes and officials.
As to the reporting mechanisms, findings 
reveal that this constitutes the weakest 
aspect (together with the presence of 
an ‘integrity unit’) in the target group, 
with only 5 federations having a specific 
hot line or whistle-blowing system in 
place in 2016. Most federations have 
been reticent to date in this regard, as 
it generally perceived that the act of 
whistle-blowing will be detrimental to the 
image of their organisation. However, as 
Maesschalck & Vanden Auweele (2010) 
argue, this could actually serve them 
well in the long run as the more reporting 
channels a federation opens up, the 
less likely it is for affected individuals 
to turn to the press or other public 
reporting channels, hence preventing 
a major public scandal. Albeit being a 
relatively complex and sensitive matter, 
federations should seek to draft and 
implement a robust whistle-blowing 
policy that comprises of two aspects: the 
first that a reporting channel is opened 
and the second that the individual and 
information are protected. 
Table 1: Integrity Management and Tools with ASOIF Federations
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regulations in place in the federations, the 
data suddenly show some alarming facts: 
despite almost all federations prohibit any 
form of participation in betting activities 
for their athletes and officials, more than 
35% of the targets do not impose any 
sanction for such behaviours. On a more 
International 
Federation
Participation 
Prohibited
Promotion 
Prohibited
Anti 
Match- 
Fixing 
Provision
Insider 
Information 
Prohibited
Sanctions 
for 
betting 
activities
Federation 
International de 
Natation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Archery 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International 
Association of 
Athletics Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Badminton World 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Federation 
Internationale de 
Basketball
Yes No Yes – Light 
Provision
No Yes
Association 
Internationale de 
Boxe
Yes – Light 
Prohibition
No Yes Yes Yes
International Canoe 
Federation
No No No No No
Union Cycliste 
Internationale
No Yes No No No
Federation Equestre 
Internationale
Yes – Only in the 
Olympic Games
Yes – Only in 
the Olympic 
Games
Yes No No
Federation 
Internationale 
d’Escrime
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Federation 
Internationale de 
Hockey
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
encouraging note, more than 80% of 
the analysed federations currently have 
an ad hoc anti match-fixing provision 
or policy in place. However, from a 
qualitative perspective, the overall picture 
reveals a clear need for standardised 
integrity model rules or code of conducts, 
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Federation 
Internationale de 
Football Association
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International Golf 
Federation
No No No No No
Federation 
Internationale de 
Gymnastique
No No Yes – Light 
Provision
No No
International 
Handball Federation
Yes No No No Yes
International Judo 
Federation
Yes – Light 
prohibition
Yes – Light 
prohibition
Yes No Yes
Union Internationale 
de Pentathlon 
Moderne
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Federation 
Internationale des 
Societes D’Aviron
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Rugby Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International Sailing 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International 
Shooting Sport 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International Table 
Tennis Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
World Taekwondo 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International Tennis 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
International 
Triathlon Union
Yes Yes Yes No No
Federation 
Internationale de 
Volleyball
Yes Yes Yes No No
International 
Weightlifting 
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United World 
Wrestling
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Betting Related Regulations with ASOIF Federations
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applicable harmoniously and uniformly 
across all the IFs. These model rules can 
serve as minimum standards to which 
everyone – irrespective of the sport 
played – must comply, and federations 
can then establish more stringent 
regulations in certain critical areas and if 
necessary implement special measures 
depending on the scale of the challenges 
faced. In this vein, considerable hopes 
have been placed on the recent 
adoption by the IOC of the ‘Olympic 
Movement Code on the Prevention of the 
Manipulation of Competitions’ with the 
aim of providing the Olympic Movement 
and its members with harmonised 
regulations to protect all competitions 
from the risk of manipulation (IOC Press 
Release, Dec 2015):
The Code is a regulatory framework 
defining the different kinds of 
violations, minimum standards of 
disciplinary procedures and the 
scope of sanctions. All NOCs, IFs 
and their respective members at the 
continental, regional and national 
levels, as well as IOC recognised 
organisations, are called upon to 
implement regulations in compliance 
with the Code. This does not prevent 
sports organisations from having 
more stringent regulations in place. 
In order to The first implementation of 
the Code took place at the Rio 2016 
Olympic Games, albeit it remains to 
be seen whether the tools envisaged 
by the new legal framework will be 
effectively adopted and implemented 
by federations and sports governing 
bodies.
Strengthening Integrity 
via Future Action and 
Collaboration
From the foregoing, it can be deduced 
that match-fixing linked to betting poses 
a number of integrity challenges to IFs, 
albeit they vary in scale and depth, 
as it has been demonstrated in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. All 
stakeholders of the sport movement 
are aware that actions must be taken 
now in order to safeguard the universal 
values of sport and maintain people’s 
interest. In recent years, there have 
been some innovative steps taken in 
the fight against match-fixing, however 
from the available evidence there is 
still room for improvement even for the 
more established and resourceful IFs. 
Tennis is a case in point, and in spite of 
the central role that the TIU holds, the 
international tennis governing bodies 
have been criticised both in recent media 
allegations and, more importantly, in a 
report commissioned by the European 
Union, that they ‘do too little in terms 
of education and prevention’ (Asser 
Institute, 2014, p.114). It seems not to 
be a coincidence, in fact, that further 
to recent scandals highlighted in the 
previous section, the newly-born TIU 
Review Panel has been empowered 
also with the task of analysing ‘how to 
extend the scope and reach of the tennis 
integrity education program’ (TIU Media 
Release, Jan 2016).
On the basis of the evidence currently 
available, it seems fair to suggest that 
more pedagogical tools should be 
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developed and more events should be 
organised to raise awareness of the 
integrity issues involved in all levels of 
the sport. Tennis is not the only sport 
going through this predicament but as 
the second most bet on sport in Europe, 
attracting almost €1 billion annually of 
the total of bets placed worldwide, it 
definitely needs to assume a greater 
responsibility in educating its players 
and fans in the betting risks involved 
(Sportradar in Rebeggiani & Rebeggiani, 
2013: 171). As abundantly highlighted in 
this study, a critical prerequisite for an 
effective integrity management strategy 
is to consciously recognise the existence 
of these phenomena and to assess 
the scale of the problem. The findings 
indicate that to date only few of the 28 
federations investigated are in fact duly 
equipped with the necessary managerial 
resources and tools to confront and 
mitigate the current integrity threats, 
relating to betting-related match-fixing. 
In light of these theoretical and empirical 
findings, a great deal of interest arouses 
around the recent creation by ASOIF 
of special Taskforce on Governance, 
with the mission of developing a 
comprehensive set of principles and 
indicators for IFs in the field of good 
governance, serving exactly as a tool to 
assess the status quo of IFs in terms of 
transparency, integrity, democracy, sport 
development & solidarity and control 
mechanisms (ASOIF Media Release, Jan 
2016). Building upon an already existing 
theoretical framework (Chappelet and 
Mrkonjic, 2013), the goal is to enable 
IFs to objectively measure and ensure 
good governance throughout their own 
structure:
The assessment shall take into 
consideration the different sizes and 
resources of the IFs and put a strong 
focus on the evolution of governance 
processes in the respective 
organisations. Good governance 
shall thus be treated as an ongoing 
process that needs to be deeply 
rooted as a culture within each IF 
and should be regularly reviewed 
and improved. Accordingly, some 
of the indicators are likely to further 
evolve with time and new ones may 
be added (ASOIF Media Release, Jan 
2016).
The results of this initiative are still 
unknown at the time of this publication. 
However, consensus seems to be 
emerging that the task of devising 
adequate procedures to prevent and 
deal with integrity breaches is today 
more pressing than ever for IFs. Despite 
some laudable initiatives, it is still rare to 
observe sports governing bodies that 
make integrity management a top priority 
and have installed model practices, 
sustained by appropriate investment 
throughout their sports (Monitor Quest, 
2011). This study can hopefully serve as 
an inspiration to those federations that 
are aware of the risks that integrity threats 
pose to their sports and have realised the 
need for new regulatory and operational 
approach within their management 
structures. On these grounds, this 
study has identified a model of integrity 
management based on four strategic 
pillars and has highlighted some good 
practises that are currently proliferating, 
mainly thanks to the positive pressure 
and guidance of international sport 
bodies, such as the International Olympic 
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Committee and ASOIF. Unfortunately, 
there is no solution that will instantly 
eradicate match-fixing from sport. 
But it is only through a structured and 
multi-directional integrity management 
approach that sports can tackle the 
sophisticated facets and dynamics of the 
actual integrity threats. 
This calls for a blended approach both at 
state level, where federations should build 
partnerships with gambling commissions 
and regulators and also at supranational 
level, by engaging into discussions with 
law enforcement agencies and European 
institutions such as the Council of 
Europe. Going forward federations must 
increase their willingness to discuss these 
issues more openly and demonstrate 
their commitment to maintaining their 
sport clean by implementing good 
governance principles to mitigate the 
risk of occurrence of match-fixing cases. 
As denoted by the EU Expert Group on 
Good Governance in Sport, federations 
have a dual role to play since they set 
the rules of their sport and are also 
responsible for organising lucrative 
major sport events globally. ‘This double 
role of international bodies implies 
that standards of good governance 
applicable to them should be higher 
than those at lower levels of the sport 
pyramid’ (EU Expert Group, 2013, 
p.4). In fact federations should set the 
standard for good practice and support 
their member associations at regional 
and national level to establishing and 
maintaining appropriate standards of 
good governance based on the their 
size, resources, vulnerability and level of 
risk. As highlighted in this paper, there 
are a myriad of risks associated with 
match-fixing in sport that fall directly 
under the responsibility of international 
sport governing bodies. In order to 
mitigate such risks, concrete measures 
should be implemented and should 
include monitoring/alert systems, raising 
awareness, education and prevention, 
certification, the establishment of risk 
management tools and re-addressing 
sport regulations. The EU Expert Group 
recommends:
A flexible approach is proposed 
based on a set of minimum standards 
that can be applied universally 
but which can be supplemented 
as appropriate depending on 
risk, resource and other relevant 
factors relating to the sports body 
concerned.
In line with these considerations, it seems 
apparent the need for a new scrupulous 
attention towards the integrity sector 
within the governance structures and 
strategic management processes of the 
International Federations. Of course it 
remains to be seen to what extent the 
federations will adopt and implement 
these minimum principles globally as 
to date much of the discussions have 
taken place uniquely within the European 
institutional context. Given the topicality 
of the issue, there is certainly scope for 
future research to examine and assess 
the effectiveness of the principles of good 
governance adopted and implemented 
by federations, within a framework of 
integrity management as demonstrated 
here, in dealing comprehensively with 
cases of betting-related match-fixing.
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Abstract
CAS Mediation deserves to be better 
known and promoted. Mediation 
allows swift resolution of sport related 
disputes in the interest of athletes, 
trainers, clubs, sports federations and 
generally all actors and stakeholders. 
The present contribution examines 
the current Mediation rules of the CAS 
and formulates recommendations for 
improvement. The systematic inclusion 
of med-arb provisions making mediation 
mandatory as a first step in the dispute 
resolution process, the possibility 
for Federations to organize internal 
mediation in addition to CAS mediation, 
and the change of name of the CAS-TAS 
are some of the topics addressed in the 
present article.
Introduction
Everyone knows about the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) today. The 
Court made international headlines 
with the Russian doping case, days 
before the opening of the Rio Olympic 
Games. There have been times when 
the CAS has been more discreet. The 
adoption of the Mediation Rules and the 
practice of mediation at the CAS is one 
of these instances. The present article 
is a reflection on what has been done 
in the field of mediation at the CAS, and 
how to improve the use of mediation 
in the interest of all stakeholders. The 
last changes of the Mediation rules 
are in force since January 1, 20161. 
CAS Mediation has a large potential 
for resolving sport related disputes. As 
1 CAS Mediation rules: http://www.tas-cas.org/
en/mediation/rules.html
Meroni rightly states: “…the world of 
sport needs an alternative, better, richer, 
sophisticated and more nuances and 
suitable system of dispute resolution” 
(Mironi 2016, §7). The more systematic 
use of mediation would meet this need.
CAS Mediation – Brief 
History
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
was founded in 1984. The CAS is 
dedicated to dispute resolution in the 
world of sport. The original idea was to 
create a separate and specialized body 
to help clubs, athletes, trainers, sports 
federations and generally all stakeholders 
resolve disputes independently from any 
sport federation or national court system. 
Over the years, the CAS has gained 
recognition as a specialized, independent 
and neutral arbitration institution in a 
multicultural environment. In disputes 
brought before the CAS, stakes are 
usually important in terms of finance, 
image, reputation, time and sport’s 
career.
The specificities of the world of sport 
and the need for an independent 
venue contributed to the success and 
international reputation of the CAS.
In 1994, the International Council 
of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) was 
established to manage the CAS and its 
financing, safeguard the independence 
of the institution and allow the CAS to 
assume its role as a dispute resolution 
institution through arbitration. In 1999, 
the CAS adopted the Mediation Rules. 
The CAS realized that it was necessary to 
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diversify dispute resolution services and 
implement mediation.2 The rules have 
been amended over time and their latest 
version dates back to 1st January 2016.
Arbitration and Mediation are 
complementary processes. Arbitration 
offers an adjudicative procedure to deal 
with disputes whereas mediation allows 
the parties to find solutions by engaging 
in assisted negotiation with the help of 
a CAS mediator. Mediation provides a 
confidential setting and allows preserving 
relationships when possible.
A number of mediators from different 
countries and legal cultures are 
appointed by the CAS.3 For several 
years, mediation remained barely known 
and rarely used. To this day, CAS has 
registered approximately sixty mediation 
procedures.4 In 2016, ten mediation 
procedures were administered by CAS, 
among which six were successfully 
terminated and three were cancelled 
(i.e., before the mediation meeting took 
place) and one was still pending mid-
January 2017. It is interesting to note 
that all ten mediation procedures in 
2 Today, there are four entry doors at the CAS:  
(1) Ordinary Arbitration, (2) Appeal Arbitration, (3) 
Mediation (since 1999) and (4) Ad-hoc divisions of 
the CAS– to swiftly settle disputes during major 
world sport events such as the Olympic games 
(since 1996 – decisions often reached within 24h 
to allow the games to continue).
3 The list of CAS mediators with a short biography 
is available under: http://www.tas-cas.org/en/
mediation/list-of-mediators.html.
4 If we compare this number with the number of 
arbitration procedures administered by the CAS 
annually, it seems indeed very low. However, 
there is without a doubt a growing interest for 
mediation in general and in the world a sport 
specifically as indicated in the increasing number 
of articles published on this topic.
2016 were related to football, as many 
arbitration cases do. One mediation was 
of disciplinary/governance nature and the 
others were commercial disputes.5 
This recent increase in the number of 
CAS mediation cases -although not 
impressive as to the actual number, 
but significant because the number of 
cases doubled this past year- is certainly 
due to CAS efforts to inform about 
mediation by systematically proposing 
CAS mediation when a new arbitration 
procedure is registered and also to the 
general awareness of the advantages 
of mediation as a dispute resolution 
process.6 
In a further effort to promote mediation, 
the CAS organized its first conference 
on mediation in May 2014 at the Olympic 
museum in Lausanne. The conference 
was preceded by a workshop for CAS 
mediators from around the world. The 
two days were a success, attracting 
130 participants (sport professionals, 
arbitrators, mediators and representatives 
of sport federations) from over 40 
countries.7 Although mediation may have 
slightly distinct characteristics in different 
languages and legal cultures, CAS rules 
makes it possible to have one set of rules 
to use in relation to sport disputes.
5 The authors owe a very special thank to Ms. 
Despina Mavromati, Head of research and 
mediation at CAS, for her valuable contribution 
of the above mentioned not yet published recent 
statistics.
6 Mediation was suggested by CAS only in 
ordinary procedures until 2014. Since then, 
CAS systematically proposes mediation in both 
ordinary and appeal procedures see Mavromati, 
“Mediation”, p. 27.
7 The CAS published the workshop and 
conference report, see Mavromati, “Prospects.”
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CAS Mediation 
Rules – Overview8 
and Suggestions for 
Improvements
Definition
According to art.1 of CAS mediation 
rules,9 
“CAS mediation is a non-binding 
and informal procedure, based on 
an agreement to mediate in which 
each party undertakes to attempt 
in good faith to negotiate with the 
other party with a view of settling a 
sport related dispute. The parties 
are assisted in their negotiation by a 
CAS mediator.”
The definition of mediation, as provided 
by CAS rules, is quite standard. 
Mediation is intended primarily for 
contractual disputes, although, in certain 
cases, if all the parties agree, disciplinary 
matters10 may be submitted to CAS 
mediation (art. 1 §2). Doping issues, 
match fixing and corruption cases are 
8 CAS Mediation Rules of January 1, 2016.
9 CAS Mediation rules: http://www.tas-cas.org/
en/mediation/rules.html.
10 Many disputes encompass both aspects, 
contractual and disciplinary, since the disciplinary 
aspect derives from the alleged violation of the 
contract; see e.g. transfer cases in football where 
the player goes to another new club without the 
end of his contract with the current club. See for 
instance, CAS Award of 2 July 2013 rendered in 
Arbitrations CAS 2013/A/3091, 3092 and 3093 
involving Al Nasr Sports Club, FC Nantes, FIFA 
and the player Ismaël Bangoura. In such “mixed” 
cases, there is room for splitting disciplinary and 
commercial aspects and using both arbitration 
and mediation processes combined.
excluded from CAS mediation.
As soon as the dispute arises, the parties 
may engage in CAS mediation and do so 
at any stage of the conflict. This means 
that the parties do not have to follow the 
adjudicative procedures provided for in 
the Federation statutes at the national 
or international level before going to 
CAS mediation. This is quite different 
from cases when CAS has jurisdiction 
as an appellate court in arbitration when 
the litigants must exhaust all internal 
procedural stages.
CAS mediation rules offer peculiarities 
when compared with other sets of 
international mediation rules.11 This is the 
case for the representation of the parties 
(2.2) and the role of the mediator (2.3). 
There is also room for improvement in the 
drafting of the rule regarding the focus 
on settlement (2.4) and the need to make 
mediation more compelling at the outset 
with a mandatory process (2.5).
Representation of the Parties
One of the peculiarities of CAS mediation 
rules is the possibility for parties to 
be “represented or assisted” in the 
mediation.12 When assisted, the parties 
will be present and engage in the 
mediation process. On the contrary, 
representation in this context means 
that the party will not be present at the 
mediation and that “the representative 
must have full written authority to 
settle the dispute alone, without 
needing to consult the party she/he is 
11 A comparison can be made with ICC Mediation 
rules, CEDR rules, CEPANI rules, CMAP rules, or 
WIPO rules.
12 Art. 7 – CAS Mediation Rules.
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representing”.13 
This may have simply been a “cut and 
paste” from CAS arbitration rules. 
However, the impact is different in 
the mediation process. It is usually 
considered that the parties should be 
present at the mediation in order for the 
process itself to work best as it is based 
on the good faith of personal involvement 
of the parties - and their counsel, as the 
case may be - to try and find a solution to 
the dispute. It is interesting to note in this 
regard that CAS includes the possibility 
of handling online processes as a 
valuable tool for impecunious athletes 
who are not in a position to finance a trip 
from their home country to CAS’ seat in 
Lausanne (Mavromati, 2014, p. 27).
Recommendation: Making it 
mandatory for parties to be present, 
even if assisted, may be a better choice 
for CAS mediation. The promotion of 
phone and online mediation practice 
could be a way to allow more “presence” 
of the parties to the mediation. The 
presence of the parties in dispute allows 
mediation to offer its full potential, 
discuss related issues that may not have 
been considered at first, even if it may 
be uncomfortable at first. This opens 
the door to maintaining relationships 
between the parties who may continue 
to interact or encounter each other in the 
small world of sport with different titles 
and functions  over time.14 The presence 
of the parties may be useful even if there 
will be no further interaction between the 
13 Art.7 §3 – CAS Mediation Rules.
14 Indeed, an athlete today may become a coach/
trainer/arbitrator tomorrow or become involved 
in the management of a sport federation or in 
sport’s related media or commerce.
parties, because the process will in many 
cases allow closure and appeasement.
Role of the Mediator
Another particularity of CAS mediation is 
the possibility for the mediator to propose 
solutions.15 The rules do provide that the 
mediator may not impose a solution to 
either party (art.9 §2).
Most mediation rules, whether 
international or national, provide 
specifically that the mediator should not 
give his/her opinion or offer solutions.16 
In this sense, CAS mediation rules stand 
out. In most countries, an amicable 
dispute resolution process where 
the neutral offers solutions is called 
conciliation and not mediation. This 
is not simply an academic distinction. 
Mediation and conciliation are different 
processes with specific sets of rules, 
the frontiers of which vary from one 
jurisdiction to another (Guy-Ecabert, 2011 
Mirimanoff, 2016, p. 226). CAS chose 
to make mediation closer to conciliation 
than in most jurisdictions.
Recommendation: Providing that 
the mediator may offer solutions to the 
parties usually comes from the idea that 
this is the only way to move forward, 
to be concrete and not get caught in 
endless discussions. This is however a 
15 Art. 9 c – CAS Mediation Rules.
16 The extent to which a mediator participates 
in the search for solutions vary from one 
judicial culture to another. There is a variety of 
practices. It may also depend on the phases 
of the mediation process and the profile of the 
mediator appointed (facilitative, evaluative, or 
transformative). Still the express invitation to 
propose a solution included in the CAS mediation 
rules stands out. In this sense, CAS mediation is 
clearly an evaluative mediation, see Gay, p. 24.
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misconception of mediation in the sense 
that the role of the mediator is not to 
bring the parties where he/she wants 
them to go. It is a process in which the 
parties will decide the direction they want 
to take and the mediator assists them 
in this process. The role of the mediator 
is not so much to instruct the parties 
on the best solution to their dispute, 
but rather to allow the parties to have 
this conversation in a structured and 
confidential setting. Often, this space 
is exactly what is needed, allowing 
the parties to discuss and agree on 
issues in a way that suits them and 
not necessarily the mediator. This may 
happen in the mediation process even if 
the parties have been negotiating directly 
and through their respective counsels 
for a long time, then got stuck (Gay, 
2012, p. 14-26). The dynamics and the 
organisation of the mediation process 
and the presence of a neutral will make 
the difference.17 
Focus on Settlement
Reading the CAS mediation rules, it 
becomes apparent that the sole focus 
of the mediation process is to reach a 
settlement. In this sense, mediation will 
17 It should be noted that conciliation also exists 
at the CAS in the ordinary arbitration process, 
(rule 42) or the appeal arbitration (rule 56 §2). 
It is important to notice that this conciliation 
refers to the power of “amicable settlement” 
of the arbitrator. No more. It is not a separate 
conciliation procedure parallel to or prior to 
the arbitration, with a different neutral. It is an 
effort, if the parties agree and truly engage in the 
conciliation effort with the help of the arbitrator, to 
settle the dispute amicably. Conciliation is neither 
a mandatory process, nor a step in the arbitration 
procedure. If the parties reach an agreement 
during the conciliation, it will be included in the 
arbitration award by the arbitrator.
be a success if, and only if, a settlement 
is reached. Although it is evident that, 
if the parties reach an agreement, 
the mediation process is a success, 
mediation may also be useful in different 
ways, whether a settlement agreement 
is reached or not during the mediation 
process. Indeed, when a dispute arises, 
parties need a place to lay down their 
views, be heard, and when possible, 
reach a closure that each can take back 
and live with. Mediation may have allowed 
the parties to enter into dialogue again, 
and although no agreement was reached 
during mediation, the parties may very 
well reach a common understanding or 
a settlement at a later stage, in a more 
informal setting. It may be that mediation 
allowed the parties to see more clearly 
into the dispute to tackle the issues 
at stake and although arbitration is 
undertaken later, it may speed up the 
arbitration process substantially. For all 
these reasons, and in particular when 
no agreement is reached at the end of 
the mediation process, it seems that the 
sole focus of the CAS mediation rules 
on reaching a settlement may not have 
captured fully the essence of mediation 
and its potential in the world of sport.
Recommendation: It would be useful to 
revisit the Mediation rules with a broader 
view of what mediation can bring to the 
table. The CAS has the power and ability 
to define, introduce and develop a culture 
of mediation taking into consideration 
what mediation can offer as a dispute 
resolution process and not simply a short 
cut of the arbitration procedure.18 
18 In this respect, see also Mironi.
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A Voluntary Process – 
Mandatory Mediation
As of today, CAS mediation is a voluntary 
process. It starts with an agreement to 
mediate when the dispute arises or a 
mediation clause in a contract.19 There 
is otherwise no possibility to force 
anyone to engage in mediation. This is 
quite common in many countries and 
institutionalised mediation rules. There 
are many ways to promote mediation 
and one of them is to make the use of 
mediation mandatory as a first step to 
resolve the dispute.
Recommendation: CAS has taken the 
stand so far of not making the mediation 
process a mandatory step before arbitral 
proceedings are commenced. CAS 
should consider including a default 
mandatory20 med-arb clause in its rules.
What would be the advantages of doing 
so?
First, mediation could have a “funnel 
effect” according to which it would limit 
the number of litigious topics to be later 
resolved by arbitration.
Second, the med-arb two-step process 
allows for some chronological distance 
19 Art. 2 - CAS Mediation rules. See also ATF 
4A_628/2015 considering that the sanction 
for not respecting a mediation or conciliation 
clause in a contract results in the temporary 
incompetence of the arbitrator, and comment by 
Lévy.
20 The CAS already provides for consensual Med-
Arb clauses, combining both the advantages 
of the mediation process in terms of impact, 
time and cost and the assurance of a having a 
decision, even if it will be imposed on the parties 
by an arbitration award. See, model clauses 
provided by CAS on its website: http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/mediation/standard-clauses.html.
with the arbitration stage and helps 
parties realize that they are in control of 
the fate of their case if they are capable 
of agreeing on a mutually satisfactory 
solution. If the parties do not find an 
agreement during the mediation process, 
they know a third-party (the arbitrator) will 
then be empowered to solve the dispute 
in a way they do not control anymore. 
In this respect, a med-arb clause could 
be seen as “mediation with muscle,” 
inasmuch as the parties are made 
aware of their potential loss of control 
which would incentivise a good faith 
negotiation.
Third, with such an approach, going to 
mediation (an assisted negotiation) would 
be as binding as going to arbitration (an 
adjudicative process). As seen above, 
mediation is a voluntary process and is, 
like arbitration,21 known as a “creature of 
contract”, hence consensual in nature. 
Arbitration, as an alternative dispute 
resolution method implying a waiver 
to resort to national courts, may only 
take place through the consent of the 
parties involved. However, the peculiar 
monopolistic structure of professional 
sport shows how “forced” arbitration 
can be. Indeed, where statutes of an 
21 See, e.g., the USA where the Supreme Court 
notes that there is near universal agreement that 
arbitration is a creature of contract, and that a 
party is bound to arbitrate only to the extent that 
it has agreed to do so, and then only with regard 
to the specific issues that are contemplated by 
the party’s arbitration agreement, see, e.g., Volt 
Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469-470 
(1989). See also, Landrove, p. 1 et seq. with case 
law and scholarly references. In addition, see 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 
(1974) (“The statute’s [FAA’s] underlying premise 
[is] that arbitration is a creature of contract.”).
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international sport’s federation provide 
for CAS arbitration in their rules, an 
athlete has no choice but to become a 
member of the structure “as is” (i.e., with 
the arbitration obligation) if he/she wants 
to earn his/her living as a professional 
athlete. Consequently, his/her consent 
may not be considered to be totally 
free. However, this situation is viewed 
as acceptable by the Swiss Federal 
Court (“SFT”).22 The same reasoning 
would certainly hold for a mediation 
clause making it mandatory to initiate the 
assisted negotiation process, yet allowing 
the parties to opt-out at any stage.
As potential drawbacks (that in our view 
do not supersede the above mentioned 
advantages), one could theoretically 
imagine that a party does not genuinely 
participate in good faith in the mediation 
so as to delay tactically the process in 
order to reach the statute of limitations 
or to exhaust the other party.23 Another 
potential drawback could be to 
follow the isolated and unsatisfactory 
practice provided for in the CAS rules 
of appointing a single person who 
would first act as mediator and then as 
arbitrator in the same case within the 
frame of a med-arb clause.24 This “double 
22 See, e.g., SFT decision ATF 133 III 235, 243-
244, §4.3.2.2. On the issue of forced arbitration, 
see also Rigozzi, §§475 et seq. and 811 et seq. 
and cited references.
23 Indeed, in most jurisdictions, commencing 
mediation, be it per se or as a first step of a 
multi-tiered dispute resolution clause such as 
a med-arb clause, does not suspend, let alone 
interrupt the running of the statute of limitations, 
see, e.g., EU: art. 8(1) Directive 2008/52/CE, as 
well as Résolution du Parlement européen du 
13 septembre 2011 sur la mise en œuvre de la 
directive relative à la médiation (2011/2026(INI))
CH: art. 62 I et 213 I CPC / art. 135 ch. 2 CO.
24 Art. 13 §3 of the CAS Mediation Rules; See 
hat” approach makes it very difficult for 
the mediation to be successful. It actually 
prevents parties from fully cooperating 
and exchanging information (as to notably 
their interests, needs and priorities) 
within the mediation process and no 
confidential information is disclosed 
during the private caucuses with the 
mediator for the parties fear this might, 
even unconsciously, be used in the 
second step of the process by the former 
mediator who became an arbitrator in the 
same case.25 
Consequently, mandatory CAS mediation 
through a med-arb approach implying 
the appointment of a mediator and 
subsequently a different person as an 
arbitrator seems to be the most efficient 
way of promoting CAS mediation as 
well as fostering good and efficient 
governance of dispute resolution 
methods within CAS.26 
Improving Governance in 
Sport Federations through the 
Implementation of Mediation in their 
Statutes
As a more general recommendation, it 
also, e.g., 2007 Swiss Mediation Rules which still 
exceptionally authorize it (art. 22 al. 2).
25 Accordingly, art. 13 §3 of the CAS Mediation 
Rules, which provides for the possibility of the 
mediator to act subsequently as an arbitrator 
if all parties agree, ought to be cancelled. On 
the fluctuating approach of the CAS to med-arb 
clauses with one neutral, prohibiting such practice 
until 2013, and then allowing for the same neutral 
to act as a mediator then an arbitrator, see Dutoit, 
§§45 et seq.
26 On promoting mandatory mediation for 
sport related disputes, see Mironi, §7.2. For 
a governance study of a dispute resolution 
mechanism, although not dealing with mediation 
in particular, see WTO.
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would be useful for the CAS to engage 
sport federations to include a mandatory 
CAS mediation clause in their statutes 
and rules. This would contribute to 
lessen the level of conflicts and disputes 
in the sport world by offering a dispute 
resolution mechanism based on restoring 
communication and allowing the parties 
to find solutions early on, without the 
cumbersome need to exhaust remedies 
within the pyramidal sports federation 
structure as required where dealing with 
arbitration.
The authors are aware that CAS 
proposes its services, but that the 
decision as to the inclusion of the 
mediation clauses in their statutes 
pertains to the federations, so that 
the issue might be better suited for 
ICAS (rather than for CAS) to address. 
Consequently, a different approach to 
CAS mediation, could be Federation 
mediation.
In some of the bigger federations, 
mediation services could be organized 
internally with independent mediators 
(appointed, selected and financed) by 
the federations.27 As seen above, in 
other cases involving smaller federations 
recourse to CAS mediation with CAS 
mediators could be referred to.
In any case, Federations should make 
mediation a mandatory step (CAS 
mediation or Federation mediation), as 
is the case for internal decision making 
through arbitration at the CAS. Mediation 
should be made accessible and easy to 
27 In a comparable way as the inclusion of 
arbitration at the international federation level, as 
made by FIBA with BAT (Basketball Arbitration 
Tribunal), see http://www.fiba.com/bat.
initiate. This could give mediation a new 
dynamic and allow resolution of sport 
related disputes quickly with less harm 
done within the federations.
This would be an opt-out process – 
mandatory to enter into mediation and 
be present at one mediation session at 
least– in person or online. The mandatory 
character would only apply to the 
introduction of the process, not to its 
duration and not to reaching a settlement 
of course.28 
The inclusion of mandatory mediation 
within sport federations and clubs is 
being implemented slowly. The European 
Clubs Association (ECA), the World 
Boxing Council (WBC) and the Canadian 
SDRCC29 have pioneered in the field 
of mandatory mediation (Mironi 2016, 
§6). FIFA has recently appointed two 
mediators to deal with employment 
related disputes. In addition, a number of 
sport cases going to mediation are the 
result of mandatory mediation imposed 
by a specific jurisdiction through court-
ordered mediation like in the United 
States.30 
28 A number of countries have introduced 
mandatory mediation in their judicial system on 
a broad scale, like Italy with very good results; 
see Law Decree no. 69/2013, reintroducing 
mandatory mediation following a constitutional 
battle on Legislative decree no. 28/2010. There 
is currently a legislative project in Belgium to 
introduce mandatory mediation as well. Also in 
favor of mandatory mediation, see European 
Parliament Study.
29 Canadian centralized dispute resolution system 
covering all fields of sport.
30 See, e.g., 2011 NFL owners and players dispute 
went through mediation as ordered by the court, 
with involvement of multiple representatives from 
each side. See, BusinessWeek (June 9, 2011); 
WKRN (May 6, 2011). A similar possibility exists in 
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For the reasons stated above, mandatory 
federation mediation and mandatory CAS 
mediation ought to be put in place.
In addition to the already stated grounds 
for mandatory mediation inclusion one 
may consider the following:
• Mandatory mediation ought to be 
made available for both commercial 
and disciplinary proceedings, even 
where keeping in mind the prohibition 
in principle set by CAS as to doping, 
match-fixing and corruption cases (art. 
1 §2 of CAS Mediation Rules).
• Such “in principle” prohibition ought to 
be refined in CAS Rules so as to state 
clearly that in such cases the principle 
of sanction is in no way jeopardized, 
but that the modalities of serving the 
sanction could be made more efficient 
and creative. Would it not be useful 
to leave some space for converting 
part of an athlete’s suspension based 
on racial discriminatory remarks in an 
obligation to follow a course on the 
issue and on additional obligations 
to educate juniors in his/her sport on 
such issues during a period much 
longer than the initial suspension 
period? This is a solution mediation 
can achieve that no arbitration (where 
law is the single decisive parameter) 
could ever bring.31 
• As is the case for CAS ordinary 
arbitration, mediation is confidential 
and should be able to prevent a 
negative image of the world of sport 
through discreet dispute resolution 
Switzerland, see art. 213 and 214 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.
31 Holding the same view, with a reference to 
the increased interest on restorative justice, see 
Mironi, §8.
not automatically appearing on the 
newspapers headlines. Disputes could 
still be solved “within the sport family”. 
As to disciplinary cases, transparency 
could be fully preserved by providing 
for the systematic publication of 
non-confidential parts of the agreed 
settlement such as the sanction 
modalities.
• CAS could also easily make a 
widespread publicity of mediation 
provisions in all sport related 
commercial contracts by suggesting 
the inclusion and the wording of a 
specific med-arb provision.
• The obstacles to mediation, such 
as the need for a clear decision that 
sets an examples or provides users 
with some transparent case-law in an 
unexplored topic are fairly unique and 
do not seem to overturn the general 
advantages of including mandatory 
mediation.
• The apparent obstacle of lack of 
enforcement of mediated settlements 
is being currently studied at the 
highest level to reach an equivalent 
of the 1958 New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.32 When 
arbitration proceedings are pending, 
the settlement agreement reached 
in mediation, following a med-arb 
provision, can easily be included in 
32 See, the so called NYC II project: The 
UNCITRAL Convention on Enforceability 
of Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
International Commercial Mediation At its forty-
seventh session (New York, 7-18 July 2014), the 
UNCITRAL agreed that the Working Group should 
consider the issue of enforcement of settlement 
agreements resulting from international 
commercial mediation proceedings.
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a consent award.33 When there are 
no arbitration proceedings pending, 
the enforceability of the settlement 
agreement reached in CAS mediation 
should be pragmatically solved by a 
new CAS rule allowing the settlement 
agreement to be included in a consent 
award. The new CAS rule could 
provide an extra fee to be paid by the 
parties wishing a consent award to be 
rendered.
• Finally, there could be a choice of 
venue for the mediation process that 
would not infringe upon the fact that 
any settlement would be considered to 
have been reached at the CAS seat in 
Lausanne.
Conclusions on 
Fostering the Use of 
Mediation in Sport 
Disputes
Improving good governance of effective 
dispute resolution methods in sport is 
a challenge because there are no such 
things as two identical disputes and there 
is no single dispute resolution method 
ideal for each and every case. More often 
than not it is a combination of available 
alternative dispute resolution methods 
that appears to be the most effective tool. 
Keeping in mind the flexibility of mediation 
proceedings that can take place either 
before, in parallel, or even after arbitral 
33 Which represents no novelty to CAS because it 
is the way frequently used when CAS conciliation 
is successful within the frame of pending arbitral 
proceedings; For information and statistics on 
CAS Conciliation, See Mavromati/Reeb, pp. 305-
310 (for ordinary procedure) and pp. 495-502 (for 
appeal procedures).
proceedings,34 mediation seems to be 
an effective dispute resolution tool per se 
and in combination with arbitration.
As internationally recognized, the use 
of mediation, is a good practice as it 
“results in significant benefits, such 
as reducing the instances where a 
dispute leads to the termination of a 
commercial relationship, facilitating 
the administration of international 
transactions by commercial parties and 
producing savings in the administration 
of justice.”35 When compared with 
arbitration, mediation offers “efficiency 
and flexibility, privacy and parties’ 
autonomy, better discourse and more 
optimal substantive outcome, preserving, 
restoring and transforming business and 
personal relationships, sustainability of 
outcome – voluntary compliance and 
enforcement…”. (Mironi 2016, §3). 
Finally, in addition to revising the CAS 
Mediation Rules as developed in the 
present contribution, in particular with 
respect to mandatory mediation, the 
authors strongly recommend to rename 
the institution by keeping the acronyms 
CAS-TAS and make them CAS-CMS 
and TAS-CMS standing for “Center 
for Mediation for Sport” and in French 
“Centre de Médiation du Sport.” The 
34 Again, an arbitral award may decide what the 
sanction is, and a subsequent mediation solve 
how the sanction ought to be served, see supra 
Section 3.
35 As recognized by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) in its Resolution 57/18 of 
19 November 2002. See also, UNCITRAL 
Secretariat’s Note of 28th November 2016, A/
CN.9/WG.II/WP.200, including items to be 
discussed during its forthcoming Sixty-sixth 
session in New York, 6-10 February 2017.
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authors believe that keeping the current 
name and adding the same acronyms 
in both English and French would be a 
strong signal of CAS changing gear and 
developing not only arbitration for sport 
related disputes, but also mediation with 
its full potential.
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and federations navigate an increasingly 
complex sport landscape through 
advisory and consulting services in the 
fields of: 
• Economic Impact Studies;
• Developing Women’s Leadership;
• Sport Sustainability and Corporate 
Social Responsibility; and
• Sports Development Initiatives.
The AISTS’s flagship programme, the 
Master of Advance Studies (MAS) in 
Sports Administration and Technology 
has been educating aspiring sport 
managers from all over the world for over 
a decade. Frequently ranked amongst 
the top Sports Management programmes 
worldwide, the AISTS brings together 
over 140 international sport experts in the 
sciences of Management, Technology, 
Law, Medicine, and Sociology to produce 
strong and inspired industry leaders.
Through this combination of research 
and educational the AISTS is in an 
unique position to connect the world 
of academia with the sport industry. 
Through a range of dynamic and 
engaging platforms such  
as roundtables, seminars, workshops, 
and open conferences, the AISTS aims  
to create opportunities that broker 
dialogue, broaden networks and  
deepen relationships.
www.aists.org
